Sara J. Shettleworth

Bayesian integration of spatial information.

Spatial judgments and actions are often based on multiple cues. The authors review a multitude of phenomena on the integration of spatial cues in diverse species to consider how nearly optimally animals combine the cues. Under the banner of Bayesian perception, cues are sometimes combined and weighted in a near optimal fashion. In other instances when cues are combined, how optimal the integration is might be unclear. Only 1 cue may be relied on, or cues may seem to compete with one another. The authors attempt to bring some order to the diversity by taking into account the subjective discrepancy in the dictates of multiple cues. When cues are too discrepant, it may be best to rely on 1 cue source. When cues are not too discrepant, it may be advantageous to combine cues. Such a dual principle provides an extended Bayesian framework for understanding the functional reasons for the integration of spatial cues.

Clever animals and killjoy explanations in comparative psychology

From the process of organic evolution to the analysis of insect societies as self-organizing systems, biology is full of awe-inspiring examples of complexity arising from simplicity. Yet in the contemporary study of animal cognition, demonstrations that complex human-like behavior arises from simple mechanisms rather than from higher processes, such as insight or theory of mind, are often seen as uninteresting and killjoy, almost a denial of mental continuity between other species and humans. At the same time, however, research elsewhere in psychology increasingly reveals an unexpected role in human behavior for simple, unconscious and sometimes irrational processes shared by other animals. Greater appreciation of such mechanisms in nonhuman species would contribute to a deeper, more truly comparative psychology.

Learning about environmental geometry: an associative model.

K. Cheng (1986) suggested that learning the geometry of enclosing surfaces takes place in a geometric module blind to other spatial information. Failures to find blocking or overshadowing of geometry learning by features near a goal seem consistent with this view. The authors present an operant model in which learning spatial features competes with geometry learning, as in the Rescorla-Wagner model. Relative total associative strength of cues at a location determines choice of that location and thus the frequencies of reward paired with each cue. The model shows how competitive learning of local features and geometry can appear to result in potentiation, blocking, or independence, depending on enclosure shape and kind of features. The model reproduces numerous findings from dry arenas and water mazes.

Memory without awareness: pigeons do not show metamemory in delayed matching to sample.

Metamemory, the ability to report on memory strength, is clearly established in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) by converging evidence from several paradigms. In contrast, A. Inman and S. J. Shettleworth (1999) found no conclusive evidence of metamemory in pigeons. The authors studied pigeons further in 3 paradigms, with multiple tests of metamemory in each. Pigeons encountered a safe alternative to a matching-to-sample test either before (Experiment 2) or concurrently with (Experiment 3) the matching test. Choices of the safe option did not vary consistently with matching accuracy or change in trials with omitted samples in the way predicted for an animal with metamemory. In Experiment 4, confidence ratings following completion of the matching test also did not vary consistently as predicted by metamemory.

The evolution of comparative cognition: Is the snark still a boojum?

In The Snark is a Boojum, Beach [Beach, F.A., 1950. The snark was a boojum. American Psychologist. 5, 115-124] famously asserted that animal psychology embraced too few species and too few problems to deserve the name comparative. Later in the 20th century, others [e.g. Kamil, A.C., 1988. A synthetic approach to the study of animal intelligence. In: Leger, D.W. (Ed.), Comparative Perspectives in Modern Psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, vol. 35. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, pp. 230-257; Shettleworth, S.J., 1993. Where is the comparison in comparative cognition? Alternative research programs. Psychological Science. 4, 179-184] expressed similar concerns about the new subfield of comparative cognition, suggesting that a more biological approach to choice of species and problems was needed to balance a dominant anthropocentrism. The last 10-15 years have seen many new developments, and a recent survey like Beachs reveals a very different picture. Not only are many more species being studied, contributions by researchers from different backgrounds are increasing, and research on comparative cognition is better connected with developmental psychology, behavioral neuroscience, primatology, behavioral ecology, and other fields. Contemporary research addresses three major aspects of cognition about equally: basic processes, physical cognition, and social cognition. This article describes a selected research program from each area, chosen to exemplify current trends and challenges for the field.

Modularity, comparative cognition and human uniqueness

Darwins claim ‘that the difference in mind between man and the higher animals … is certainly one of degree and not of kind’ is at the core of the comparative study of cognition. Recent research provides unprecedented support for Darwins claim as well as new reasons to question it, stimulating new theories of human cognitive uniqueness. This article compares and evaluates approaches to such theories. Some prominent theories propose sweeping domain-general characterizations of the difference in cognitive capabilities and/or mechanisms between adult humans and other animals. Dual-process theories for some cognitive domains propose that adult human cognition shares simple basic processes with that of other animals while additionally including slower-developing and more explicit uniquely human processes. These theories are consistent with a modular account of cognition and the ‘core knowledge’ account of childrens cognitive development. A complementary proposal is that human infants have unique social and/or cognitive adaptations for uniquely human learning. A view of human cognitive architecture as a mosaic of unique and species-general modular and domain-general processes together with a focus on uniquely human developmental mechanisms is consistent with modern evolutionary-developmental biology and suggests new questions for comparative research.

An associative model of geometry learning: a modified choice rule.

In a recent article, the authors (Miller & Shettleworth, 2007) showed how the apparently exceptional features of behavior in geometry learning (reorientation) experiments can be modeled by assuming that geometric and other features at given locations in an arena are learned competitively as in the Rescorla-Wagner model and that the probability of visiting a location is proportional to the total associative strength of cues at that location relative to that of all relevant locations. Reinforced or unreinforced visits to locations drive changes in associative strengths. Dawson, Kelly, Spetch, and Dupuis (2008) have correctly pointed out that at parameter values outside the ranges the authors used to simulate a body of real experiments, our equation for choice probabilities can give impossible and/or wildly fluctuating results. Here, the authors show that a simple modification of the choice rule eliminates this problem while retaining the transparent way in which the model relates spatial choice to competitive associative learning of cue values.

Animal cognition: Deconstructing avian insight.

A new study of how experience contributes to apparently insightful problem-solving by tool-using crows has shown that operating an apparatus with the beak or a stick promotes novel use of stones on the same apparatus.

Do animals have insight, and what is insight anyway?

We cannot test animals for insights distinctive phenomenology, the aha experience, but we can study the processes underlying insightful behaviour, classically described by Köhler as sudden solution of a problem after an impasse. The central question in the study of insightful behaviour in any species is whether it is the product of a distinctive cognitive process, insight. Although some claims for insight in animals confuse it with other problem-solving processes, contemporary research on string pulling and other physical problems, primarily with birds, has uncovered new examples of insightful behaviour and shed light on the role of experience in producing it. New research suggests insightful behaviour can be captured in common laboratory tasks while brain activity is monitored, opening the way to better integration of research on animals with the cognitive neuroscience of human insight.