Sarah Fine

Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer

Cosmopolitan liberals have long argued that, contrary to prevailing practices and assumptions, there is a tension between liberal principles, on the one hand, and the coercively enforced borders and exclusive membership practices that are familiar features of nation states, on the other hand. In that vein, it has become common to emphasize the liberal commitments to universalism and moral equality and to highlight the moral arbitrariness of birth place in order to question the relevance of borders in relation to a person’s rights and opportunities. It is notable, too, that liberal principles are often regarded as the universalist antidote to the more particularist or exclusionary tendencies of the other features (sovereignty, nationality, democracy) that make up the modern state. This is one of the reasons why Christopher Heath Wellman’s article “Immigration and Freedom of Association” is so novel and interesting: Wellman puts forward what appears to be a distinctly liberal case for the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. As Wellman points out, we must not overlook the potentially exclusionary implications of the liberal commitment to freedom of association. There is a widespread and apparently uncontroversial view of the relationship between free-

Non-domination and the ethics of migration

In this paper, I begin a preliminary exploration of the ways in which neo-Roman republicanism, organized as it is around the twin notions of free person and free state, might contribute to the ongoing conversation about the ethics of migration. I extrapolate and sketch distinctively republican responses to the following migration-related issues: refugees, resident non-citizens, international freedom of movement and state rights to exclude would-be immigrants. I indicate areas where I think republicans are on the strongest ground, areas where republicanism’s contribution is limited and areas where republicans face important dilemmas. I examine how these dilemmas might be addressed from within republican theory. The aim is to reflect upon the ethics of migration through the lens of the neo-Roman conception of political liberty, to see what we learn both about enduring questions in the ethics of migration and about the appeal of contemporary republicanism as a political theory.

Democracy, citizenship and the bits in between

This paper lays the foundations for a democratic defence of the argument that at least some non-citizens are entitled to claim rights of political participation with regard to states in which they are not resident. First I outline a distinctively democratic case for granting participatory rights to certain non-resident non-citizens, based upon the central claim that in a democracy those who are governed ought to have the opportunity to participate in the exercise of government. I offer support for extending rights of participation to some non-resident non-citizens by addressing two possible democratic objections, relating to political equality and reciprocity.

Whose Freedom of Movement Is Worth Defending

As long as the EU continues to present refugees as a problem to be kept at bay, with repeated promises to strengthen its borders against unwanted arrivals, those of us who wish to defend freedom of movement as a core component of EU citizenship have to ask ourselves not just about Europe’s ‘immobile’ citizens who associate free movement with unpalatable costs, but about the people on the wrong side of the territorial and civic borders who are paying the ultimate price.

Migration, political philosophy, and the real world

In Strangers in Our Midst, David Miller develops a ‘realist’ political philosophy of immigration, which takes as its point of departure ‘the world as it is’ and considers what legitimate immigration policies would look like ‘under these circumstances’. Here I focus on Miller’s self-described realist methodology. First, I ask whether Miller actually does start from the ‘world as it is’. I note that he orients his argument around a particular vision of national communities and that, in so doing, he deviates from a description of ‘the real world’. In shifting between the descriptive and prescriptive without clearly acknowledging it, Miller undermines his claim to be outlining legitimate policies ‘under these circumstances’. I also question whether Miller’s picture of ‘the real world’ takes sufficient account of past injustice and its ongoing relationship to migration regimes. I maintain that there is a fundamental tension between Miller’s commitments to his brand of nationalism on the one hand, and his version of realism on the other hand.