Sarah K. Tauber

The effect of identical word pairs on people's metamemory judgments: What are the contributions of processing fluency and beliefs about memory?

Judgments of learning (JOLs) are higher for identical pairs (dog–dog) than for related pairs (dog–cat). This identical effect may be mediated (a) by processing fluency (i.e., identical pairs are processed faster than related pairs) or (b) by a belief that identical pairs are better remembered or (c) by both factors. In the present work, we assessed the contribution of both factors. We evaluated whether a measure of processing fluency (i.e., self-paced study) mediated the relationship between pair type and JOLs (Experiment 1) and attempted to disrupt processing fluency using an AlTeRnAtInG presentation format (Experiment 2). We also evaluated whether judgments made in the absence of processing fluency demonstrated the identical effect (Experiment 3), and, finally, we had participants read a vignette about an experiment that included both pair types and estimate which pairs would be best remembered (Experiment 4). Evidence from all experiments converged on the conclusion that peoples beliefs about how variables affect memory—and not differential fluency—best explain the identical effect, although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that fluency plays a small role. The outcomes were consistent with the analytic-processing theory of JOLs—namely, when instructed to make JOLs, people adopt an analytic problem-solving approach that involves identifying variation across pairs that plausibly relate to memory and then use this variation to make JOLs.

The role of prior knowledge in error correction for younger and older adults

Previous work has demonstrated that, when given feedback, younger adults are more likely to correct high-confidence errors compared with low-confidence errors, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Research examining the hypercorrection effect in both older and younger adults has demonstrated that the relationship between confidence and error correction was stronger for younger adults compared with older adults. However, recent work suggests that error correction is largely related to prior knowledge, while confidence may primarily serve as a proxy for prior knowledge. Prior knowledge generally remains stable or increases with age; thus, the current experiment explored how both confidence and prior knowledge contributed to error correction in younger and older adults. Participants answered general knowledge questions, rated how confident they were that their response was correct, received correct answer feedback, and rated their prior knowledge of the correct response. Overall, confidence was related to error correction for younger adults, but this relationship was much smaller for older adults. However, prior knowledge was strongly related to error correction for both younger and older adults. Confidence alone played little unique role in error correction after controlling for the role of prior knowledge. These data demonstrate that prior knowledge largely predicts error correction and suggests that both older and younger adults can use their prior knowledge to effectively correct errors in memory.

The concreteness effect on judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of fluency and beliefs

Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants’ beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants’ beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants’ predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.

Monitoring of learning at the category level when learning a natural concept: Will task experience improve its resolution? ☆

Researchers have recently begun to investigate peoples ability to monitor their learning of natural categories. For concept learning tasks, a learner seeks to accurately monitor learning at the category level - i.e., to accurately judge whether exemplars will be correctly classified into the appropriate category on an upcoming test. Our interest was in whether monitoring resolution at the category level would improve as participants gain task experience across multiple study-test blocks, as well as within each block. In four experiments, exemplar birds (e.g., American Goldfinch, Cassins Finch) paired with each family name (e.g., Finch) were studied, and participants made a judgment of learning (JOL) for each exemplar. Of most interest, before and after studying the exemplars, participants made category learning judgments (CLJs), which involved predicting the likelihood of correctly classifying novel birds into each family. Tests included exemplars that had been studied or exemplars that had not been studied (novel). This procedure was repeated for either one or two additional blocks. The relative accuracy of CLJs did not improve across blocks even when explicit feedback was provided, whereas item-by-item JOL accuracy improved across blocks. Category level resolution did improve from pre-study to post-study on an initial block, but it did not consistently increase within later blocks. The stable accuracy of CLJs across blocks poses a theoretical and empirical challenge for identifying techniques to improve peoples ability to judge their learning of natural categories.

The Influence of Retrieval Practice Versus Delayed Judgments of Learning on Memory Resolving a Memory-Metamemory Paradox

The positive effect of delayed retrieval practice on subsequent test performance is robust; by contrast, making delayed judgments of learning (JOLs) encourages covert retrieval but has a minor influence on final test performance. In three experiments, we experimentally established and explored this memory-metamemory paradox. After initial study of paired associates (e.g., husky - ram), participants either were explicitly tested (husky - ?) or made a JOL. In Experiment 1, we adopted the standard JOL method, using a short retention interval, whereas in Experiments 2 and 3, we used a common testing-effect method involving a longer retention interval. Delayed JOLs did not boost test performance, but explicit delayed tests boosted memory after a longer retention interval. As important, participants spent less time to make JOLs than to retrieve responses. These data indicate that differences in the dynamics of retrieval for practice tests versus delayed JOLs are responsible for the paradox.

Why Is Knowledge Updating after Task Experience Incomplete? Contributions of Encoding Experience, Scaling Artifact, and Inferential Deficit

Knowledge updating occurs when people learn about the impacts of variables on memory after experiencing their effects. For instance, judgments of learning (JOLs) for encoding strategies (e.g., imagery and repetition) show no difference during a first study–test trial; however, during a second trial, JOLs better reflect the benefits of the more effective strategy. Although this outcome indicates some knowledge updating, JOLs on a second trial rarely update to reflect the full impact of a given variable. We investigated several explanations for this incomplete updating. Evidence using prestudy JOLs from Experiments 1 and 2 disconfirmed the encoding-disrupts-updating (EDU) hypothesis, which is that the experience of encoding items on the second trial disrupts the use of new knowledge in making JOLs. In Experiment 3, we used binary JOLs to evaluate whether the lack of updating is an artifact of people not wanting to use extreme ratings, which accounted for some—but not all—of the incomplete updating. Finally, in Experiment 4, immediately after the test on the initial trial, participants received feedback about how many items they had recalled for each level of the focal variable, and their JOLs on the second trial still showed incomplete updating. Taken together, the evidence suggests that incomplete knowledge updating on JOLs arises from multiple factors, including a scaling artifact and the deficient use of accurate knowledge when making JOLs.

The effects of emotion on younger and older adults’ monitoring of learning

ABSTRACT Age-related differences in memory monitoring appear when people learn emotional words. Namely, younger adults’ judgments of learning (JOLs) are higher for positive than neutral words, whereas older adults’ JOLs do not discriminate between positive versus neutral words. In two experiments, we evaluated whether this age-related difference extends to learning positive versus neutral pictures. We also evaluated the contribution of two dimensions of emotion that may impact younger and older adults’ JOLs: valence and arousal. Younger and older adults studied pictures that were positive or neutral and either high or low in arousal. Participants made immediate JOLs and completed memory tests. In both experiments, the magnitude of older adults’ JOLs was influenced by emotion, and both younger and older adults demonstrated an emotional salience effect on JOLs. As important, the magnitude of participants’ JOLs was influenced by valence, and not arousal. Emotional salience effects were also evident on participants’ free recall, and older adults recalled as many pictures as did younger adults. Taken together, these data suggest that older adults do not have a monitoring deficit when learning positive (vs. neutral) pictures and that emotional salience effects on younger and older adults’ JOLs are produced more by valence than by arousal.

Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants’ judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

ABSTRACT Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion (i.e. positive and negative) influence judgments of learning (JOLs) relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions (Experiment 2). Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion (e.g. anger) was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory.

Children’s agenda-based regulation: The effects of prior performance and reward on elementary school children’s study choices

The main goal of the current experiments was to examine the influence of monitoring and reward on elementary school childrens study decisions. First and third graders studied names for 10 animals (e.g., The elephants name is Suzy) and then were given a cued recall test on which they were shown the animal and needed to recall the name. Next, they were given an opportunity to restudy the animal-name pairs, and some of these pairs were slated to earn a reward (a sticker) if correctly recalled. In Experiment 1, both groups of children were (a) more likely to restudy previously unrecalled pairs than previously recalled pairs and (b) more likely to restudy pairs that were slated to receive a reward. In Experiment 2, we further explored childrens use of reward using a forced-choice selection task. Namely, during selection, pairs were presented in dyads where one pair was slated for a reward and the other pair was not, and the children could choose only one pair from each dyad for restudy. Both first and third graders chose to restudy pairs slated for a reward. Thus, even young elementary school children consider both rewards and performance monitoring when regulating their learning.