Sarah R. Garner

A Brighter Side to Memory Illusions: False Memories Prime Children's and Adults' Insight-Based Problem Solving.

Can false memories have a positive consequence on human cognition? In two experiments, we investigated whether false memories could prime insight problem-solving tasks. Children and adults were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. In Experiment 1, the results showed that regardless of age, when the critical lure was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list. When the critical lure was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different from when there was no DRM priming. In Experiment 2, without an intervening recall test, children and adults still exhibited higher solution rates and faster solution times to CRAT problems that were primed than to those that were not primed. This latter result shows that priming occurred as a result of false memory generation at encoding and not at retrieval during the recall test. Together, these findings demonstrate that when false memories are generated at encoding, they can prime solutions to insight-based problems in both children and adults.

Can false memories prime problem solutions

Previous research has suggested that false memories can prime performance on related implicit and explicit memory tasks. The present research examined whether false memories can also be used to prime higher order cognitive processes, namely, insight-based problem solving. Participants were asked to solve a number of compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lure was also the solution to the problem. The results showed that when the critical lure: (a) was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list and (b) was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different than when there was no DRM priming. A second experiment demonstrated that these outcomes were not a simple artifact of the inclusion of a recall test prior to the problem solving task. The implications of these results are discussed with regard to the previous literature on priming and the adaptive function of false memories.

Positive Consequences of False Memories

Previous research is replete with examples of the negative consequences of false memories. In the current research, we provide a different perspective on false memories and their development and demonstrate that false memories can have positive consequences. Specifically, we examined the role false memories play in subsequent problem-solving tasks. Children and adults studied and recalled neutral or survival-relevant lists of associated words. They then solved age-normed compound remote associates, some of whose solutions had been primed by false memories created when studying the previous lists. The results showed that regardless of age: (a) survival-related words were not only better recollected but were also more susceptible than neutral words to false memory illusions; and (b) survival-related false memories were better than neutral false memories as primes for problem-solving. These findings are discussed in the context of recent speculation concerning the positive consequences of false memories, and the adaptive nature of reconstructive memory.

Priming children’s and adults’ analogical problem solutions with true and false memories

We investigated priming of analogical problem solutions with true and false memories. Children and adults were asked to solve nine verbal proportional analogies, three of which had been primed by Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was presented as the initial word in the list (true memory priming), three of which were primed by DRM lists whose critical lures were the solution to the verbal proportional analogies (false memory priming), and three of which were unprimed. We controlled for age differences in solution rates (knowledge base) in order to examine developmental differences in speed of processing. As anticipated, the results showed that adults completed the problems significantly faster than children. Furthermore, both children and adults solved problems primed with false memories significantly faster than either those primed with true memories or unprimed problems. For both age groups, there was no significant difference between solution times for unprimed and true primed problems. These findings demonstrate that (a) priming of problem solutions extends to verbal proportional analogies, (b) false memories are more effective at priming problem solutions than true memories, and (c) there are clear positive consequences to the production of false memories.

False memories from survival processing make better primes for problem-solving

Previous research has demonstrated that participants remember significantly more survival-related information and more information that is processed for its survival relevance. Recent research has also shown that survival materials and processing result in more false memories, ones that are adaptive inasmuch as they prime solutions to insight-based problems. Importantly, false memories for survival-related information facilitate problem solving more than false memories for other types of information. The present study explores this survival advantage using an incidental rather than intentional memory task. Here participants rated information either in the context of its importance to a survival-processing scenario or to moving to a new house. Following this, participants solved a number of compound remote associate tasks (CRATs), half of which had the solution primed by false memories that were generated during the processing task. Results showed that (a) CRATs were primed by false memories in this incidental task, with participants solving significantly more CRATs when primed than when unprimed, (b) this effect was greatest when participants rated items for survival than moving, and (c) processing items for a survival scenario improved overall problem-solving performance even when specific problems themselves were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to adaptive theories of memory.

Developmental trends in adaptive memory

Recent studies have revealed that memory is enhanced when information is processed for fitness-related purposes. The main objective of the current experiments was to test developmental trends in the evolutionary foundation of memory using different types of stimuli and paradigms. In Experiment 1, 11-year-olds and adults were presented with neutral, negative, and survival-related DRM word lists. We found a memory benefit for the survival-related words and showed that false memories were more likely to be elicited for the survival-related word lists than for the other lists. Experiment 2 examined developmental trends in the survival processing paradigm using neutral, negative, and survival-related pictures. A survival processing advantage was found for survival-related pictures in adults, for negative pictures in 11/12-year-olds, and for neutral pictures in 7/8-year-olds. In Experiment 3, 11/12-year-olds and adults had to imagine the standard survival scenario or an adapted survival condition (or pleasantness condition) that was designed to reduce the possibilities for elaborative processing. We found superior memory retention for both survival scenarios in children and adults. Collectively, our results evidently show that the survival processing advantage is developmentally invariant and that certain proximate mechanisms (elaboration and distinctiveness) underlie these developmental trends.

Priming analogical reasoning with false memories.

Like true memories, false memories are capable of priming answers to insight-based problems. Recent research has attempted to extend this paradigm to more advanced problem-solving tasks, including those involving verbal analogical reasoning. However, these experiments are constrained inasmuch as problem solutions could be generated via spreading activation mechanisms (much like false memories themselves) rather than using complex reasoning processes. In three experiments we examined false memory priming of complex analogical reasoning tasks in the absence of simple semantic associations. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated the robustness of false memory priming in analogical reasoning when backward associative strength among the problem terms was eliminated. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we extended these findings by demonstrating priming on newly created homonym analogies that can only be solved by inhibiting semantic associations within the analogy. Overall, the findings of the present experiments provide evidence that the efficacy of false memory priming extends to complex analogical reasoning problems.

Overgeneral past and future thinking in dysphoria: the role of emotional cues and cueing methodology

Overgeneral memory, where individuals exhibit difficulties in retrieving specific episodes from autobiographical memory, has been consistently linked with emotional disorders. However, the majority of this literature has relied upon a single methodology, in which participants respond to emotional cue words with explicit instructions to retrieve/simulate specific events. Through the use of sentence completion tasks the current studies explored whether overgenerality represents a habitual pattern of thinking that extends to how individuals naturally consider their personal past and future life story. In both studies, when compared with controls, dysphoric individuals evidenced overgeneral thinking style with respect to their personal past. However, overgeneral future thinking was only evident when the sentence stems included emotional words. These findings highlight the importance of investigating the overgenerality phenomenon using a variety of cueing techniques and results are discussed with reference to the previous literature exploring overgenerality and cognitive models of depression.

Individual differences in susceptibility to false memories: The effect of memory specificity

Previous research has highlighted the wide individual variability in susceptibility to the false memories produced by the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) procedure. This study investigated whether susceptibility to false memories is influenced by individual differences in the specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval. Memory specificity was measured using the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT). Memory specificity did not correlate with correct recognition, but a specific retrieval style was positively correlated with levels of false recognition. It is proposed that the contextual details that frequently accompany false memories of non-studied lures are more accessible in individuals with specific retrieval styles.

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems

ABSTRACT Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.