Sarbajit Chaudhuri

Can International Factor Mobility Reduce Wage Inequality in a Dual Economy

We introduce international labor mobility in a three-sector general equilibrium model with rural-urban migration. We demonstrate that under some reasonable conditions an inflow of foreign skilled labor (capital) can reduce skilled-unskilled wage inequality.

How and how far to liberalize a developing economy with informal sector and factor market distortions

Whether a liberalizing developing economy should implement the entire WTO-prescribed package, and to what extent this is expedient, are two important questions, especially because the available empirical evidence suggests that developing countries have been facing substantial adjustment costs in their endeavour to implement trade and investment reform. The present paper makes a humble effort to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with informal sectors. Welfare implications of three liberalization policies: inflow of foreign capital, tariff reduction and labour market reform, have first been analysed in a full-employment framework. Later, the paper has been extended into a Harris – Todaro framework with an urban informal sector and capital market distortion. We have shown that welfare consequences of a tariff reform and/or a policy of deregulating the labour market crucially depend on the presence and magnitude of foreign capital in the economy. It is argued here that unless a proper choice among different prescribed policies, compatible with the internal institutional, technological and trade-related characteristics, is made, drastic implementation of reform measures may produce counterproductive results for the welfare of the relevant country.

Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: a Theoretical Analysis

The paper presents a theory of interest rate determination on informal credit in backward agriculture when there is a market for formal credit. The farmer has to bribe the official of the formal credit agency in order to get formal credit. The official and the moneylender play a non-cooperative game in choosing the amount of formal credit and the informal interest rate, respectively. The informal-sector interest rate and the effective formal-sector interest rate (incorporating the bribe) are equal in equilibrium. A reduction in the formal interest rate and/or an increase in the price of the product may lead to an increase in the equilibrium bribing rate and the informal interest rate when the formal credit and the informal credit are complementary to each other.

Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture: A theoretical analysis

The paper presents a theory of interest rate determination in the informal credit market in backward agriculture. The market for informal credit is created by the delay in disbursement of formal credit. The delay is controlled by the official of the formal credit agency, and he is bribed by the farmer to reduce the delay. The official and the moneylender play a non-cooperative game in choosing the bribing rate and the informal interest rate, respectively. The informal sector interest rate and the effective formal sector interest rate (incorporating the bribe) are equal in equilibrium. Agricultural price and credit subsidy policies may raise the interest rate in the informal credit market.

Rural-Urban Migration, the Informal Sector, Urban Unemployment, and Development Policies: A Theoretical Analysis

This paper develops a theoretical model like Gupta’s to show the simultaneous existence of the urban informal sector and open unemployment in the urban sector in a Harris–Todaro type of model of rural–urbanmigration. A wage or a price subsidy policy to the rural sector, or a demand management policy like an export promotional scheme in the manufacturing sector, reduces the urban unemployment level, and provides a theoretical basis for the introduction of export promotional measures like the formation of duty‐free Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to solve the urban unemployment problem. The policy conclusions of the present paper are different from those found in Gupta’s 1993 model.

Foreign capital inflow, skilled-unskilled wage inequality and unemployment of unskilled labour in a fair wage model

This paper has developed a three-sector general equilibrium framework that explains unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. Unemployment of unskilled labour is of the Harris-Todaro (1970) type while unemployment of skilled labour is caused due to the validity of the FWH in the high-skill sector. There are two types of capital one of which is specific to the primary export sector while the other moves freely among the different sectors. Inflows of foreign capital of either type unambiguously improve the economic conditions of the unskilled working class. However, the effects on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality and the extent of unemployment of both types of labour crucially hinge on the properties implied by the efficiency function of the skilled workers.

Removal of Protectionism, Foreign Investment and Welfare in a Model of Informal Sector

The paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model with two informal sectors with complete mobility of labour between these sectors and with a positive relationship between wage income and labours efficiency to show that the results relating to foreign capital inflow and removal of protectionism may be counterintuitive to the conventional wisdom. The paper is also devoted to explain why some developing countries implement tariff reforms very slowly compared to others, even after formally choosing free trade as their development strategies, in a more general fashion than the existing tariff-jumping theory.

Foreign Capital Inflow, Fiscal Policies And Incidence Of Child Labour In A Developing Economy

Empirical evidence suggests that the incidence of child labour taken as a whole has declined in the developing countries with economic growth due to foreign capital. But, in some high-growth-prone areas, the problem has been on the rise. A pertinent question is why liberalized investment policies have produced dissimilar results in different cases. The present paper is intended to provide an answer to the above question using a three-sector general equilibrium framework with two informal sectors and a non-traded final commodity. The paper is also designed to investigate the efficacy of an education subsidy policy and a lump-sum tax on the richer people in controlling the problem of child labour. We find that the effects of different policies on child labour crucially hinge on the relative intensities in which child labour and adult labour are used in the two informal sectors. However, we find that on the whole a policy of subsidy on education is more effective in comparison with the policy of economic growth with foreign capital in eradicating the prevalence of the evil in the system.

Foreign Capital, Return to Education and Child Labour

This paper attempts to identify the different channels through which economic reforms can affect the incidence of child labour in a developing economy. Using a three-sector general equilibrium model it shows that inflows of foreign capital can lower the problem of child labour by raising the return to education and reducing the earning opportunities of children. It demonstrates how foreign capital produces favourable effect on the incidence of child labour although it affects wage inequality adversely.

Foreign Capital and Skilled-Unskilled Wage Inequality in a Developing Economy with Non-Traded Goods

The existing theoretical literature does not take into consideration the existence of non-traded goods and the nature of capital mobility between the traded and the non-traded sectors in analyzing the consequences of liberalized investment policies on the relative wage inequality in the developing countries. The present paper purports to fill in this gap using two four-sector general equilibrium models reasonable for a developing economy. We have found that inflows of foreign capital usually improve the wage inequality when the low-skill sector is capital-intensive. But, the relative wage gap may widen if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive. When the non-traded sector produces a non-traded final commodity wage inequality worsens if the low-skill sector is capital-intensive and employs only a very small proportion of the unskilled workforce and if the primary export sector is unskilled labour-intensive. Appropriate policy recommendations for improving the wage inequality have also been made.