Sascha Füllbrunn

Trust and Trustworthiness in Anonymous Virtual Worlds

Virtual communities like Second Life (SL) represent an economic factor with increasing potential, but may induce behavior that deviates from real-world experience. This article introduces a new experimental design that is based on the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), but eliminates the problem of multiple virtual identities. One treatment of the experiment in the virtual world SL was conducted and the results compared to the First Life (FL) control treatment, which was conducted on a university campus. In SL, significantly lower investment levels were found, but significantly higher average returns were found than in the FL treatment or in the literature. It is conjectured that the disparity between trusting and trustworthy behavior is a sign that the social structure in SL is still evolving. It seems plausible that the trustors in a young and developing society cautiously test the extent of trustworthiness, whereas the trustees strategically invest in levels of trustworthiness that are higher than in settled societies to build up a trustworthy environment.

Sudden Termination Auctions - An Experimental Study

The design of online markets has become a major issue due to the capability of operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of auction market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. Candle auctions prove to be a much faster, but equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.

Anonymity deters collusion in hard-close auctions: Experimental Evidence

This paper studies whether collusion occurs in three-bidder three-object second-price hard-close auctions. The experimental results of two laboratory treatments are reported. The first one, the anonymity treatment, involves subject groups that can trace decisions to the bidder under conditions of anonymity. The second one, the friends treatment, involves groups of subjects who know each other. In this treatment, each bid can be identified with a person. The paper reports no collusion in the anonymity treatment but some collusion in the friends treatment.

Limited Liability, Moral Hazard, and Risk Taking: A Safety Net Game Experiment

We model the safety net problem as a social dilemma game involving moral hazard, risk taking, and limited liability. The safety net game is compared to both an individual decision task involving full liability and the deterministic public goods game. We report experimental data to show that limited liability leads to higher risk taking in comparison to full liability; nevertheless, the difference is much smaller than predicted by theory. In the safety net game, subjects behave as if socially responsible for the losses they impose on the group. With repetition, nevertheless, a gradual emergence of the moral hazard problem arises.

COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA

In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoners dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions, i.e. to appear to collude early in the auction and to defect at the very last moment.