Sascha Topolinski

Gaining Insight Into the “Aha” Experience:

The literature on insight lists four main characteristics of this experience: (a) suddenness (the experience is surprising and immediate), ease (the solution is processed without difficulty), positive affect (insights are gratifying), and the feeling of being right (after an insight, problem solvers judge the solution as being true and have confidence in this judgment). Although this phenomenology is well known, no theory has explained why insight feels the way it does. We propose a fluency account of insight: Positive affect and perceived truth and confidence in one’s own judgment are triggered by the sudden appearance of the solution for a problem and the concomitant surprising fluency gain in processing. We relate earlier evidence on insight concerning the impact of sudden fluency variations on positive affect and perceived truth and confidence.

The Architecture of Intuition: Fluency and Affect Determine Intuitive Judgments of Semantic and Visual Coherence and Judgments of Grammaticality in Artificial Grammar Learning.

People can intuitively detect whether a word triad has a common remote associate (coherent) or does not have one (incoherent) before and independently of actually retrieving the common associate. The authors argue that semantic coherence increases the processing fluency for coherent triads and that this increased fluency triggers a brief and subtle positive affect, which is the experiential basis of these intuitions. In a series of 11 experiments with 3 different fluency manipulations (figure-ground contrast, repeated exposure, and subliminal visual priming) and 3 different affect inductions (short-timed facial feedback, subliminal facial priming, and affect-laden word triads), high fluency and positive affect independently and additively increased the probability that triads would be judged as coherent, irrespective of actual coherence. The authors could equalize and even reverse coherence judgments (i.e., incoherent triads were judged to be coherent more frequently than were coherent triads). When explicitly instructed, participants were unable to correct their judgments for the influence of affect, although they were aware of the manipulation. The impact of fluency and affect was also generalized to intuitions of visual coherence and intuitions of grammaticality in an artificial grammar learning paradigm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

The face of fluency: Semantic coherence automatically elicits a specific pattern of facial muscle reactions

This study shows that high conceptual fluency induced by hidden semantic coherence automatically triggers a specific pattern of facial expressions. In the present study, word triads that either had or had not a common remote associate were read by individuals while automatic facial responses were recorded. Although participants were ignorant about the underlying semantic structure, participants’ faces showed an activation of the smiling muscle zygomaticus major (indicating increased positive affect), a relaxation of the frowning muscle corrugator supercilii (indicating decreased negative affect and mental effort), and a relaxation of the forehead muscle frontalis (indicating increased familiarity) after reading coherent compared to incoherent word triads. Implications for intuitive judgements of semantic coherence are discussed.

The analysis of intuition: Processing fluency and affect in judgements of semantic coherence

In semantic coherence judgements individuals are able to intuitively discriminate whether a word triad has a common remote associate (coherent) or not (incoherent) without consciously retrieving the common associate. A processing-fluency account for these intuitions is proposed, which assumes that (a) coherent triads are processed more fluently than incoherent triads, (b) this high fluency triggers a subtle positive affect, and (c) this affect may be experienced as a cognitive feeling and used in explicit judgement. In line with this account, it was shown that coherent triads (a) are processed faster than incoherent triads (Study 1), (b) serve as positive affective primes (Study 2), and (c) are liked more than incoherent triads (Study 3). When participants were provided with an irrelevant source of their affective reactions, they lost the ability to intuitively discriminate between coherent and incoherent triads (Study 4). Finally, an item-based analysis found that triads that are processed faster are liked more and are more likely to be judged coherent, irrespective of their actual coherence (Study 5).

Scanning the “Fringe” of consciousness: What is felt and what is not felt in intuitions about semantic coherence

In intuitions concerning semantic coherence participants are able to discriminate above chance whether a word triad has a common remote associate (coherent triad) or not (incoherent triad). These intuitions are driven by increased fluency in processing coherent triads compared to incoherent triads, which in turn triggers a brief and short positive affect. The present work investigates which of these internal cues, fluency or positive affect, is the actual cue underlying coherence intuitions. In Experiment 1, participants liked coherent word triads more than incoherent triads, but did not rate them as being more fluent in processing. In Experiment 2, participants could intuitively detect coherence when they misattributed fluency to an external source, but lost this intuitive ability when they misattributed affect. It is concluded that the coherence-induced fluency by itself is not consciously experienced and not used in the coherence intuitions, but the fluency-triggered affective consequences.

The Sensorimotor Contributions to Implicit Memory, Familiarity, and Recollection

The sensorimotor contributions to memory for prior occurrence were investigated. Previous research has shown that both implicit memory and familiarity draw on gains in stimulus-related processing fluency for old, compared with novel, stimuli, but recollection does not. Recently, it has been demonstrated that processing fluency itself resides in stimulus-specific motor simulations or reenactment (e.g., covert pronouncing simulations for words as stimuli). Combining these lines of evidence, it was predicted that stimulus-specific motor interference preventing simulations should impair both implicit memory and familiarity but leave recollection unaffected. This was tested for words as verbal stimuli associated to pronouncing simulations in the oral muscle system (but also for tunes as vocal stimuli and their associated vocal system, Experiment 2). It was found that oral (e.g., chewing gum), compared with manual (kneading a ball), motor interference prevented mere exposure effects (Experiments 1-2), substantially reduced repetition priming in word fragment completion (Experiment 3), reduced the familiarity estimates in a remember-know task (Experiment 5) and in receiver-operating characteristics (Experiment 6), and completely neutralized familiarity measured by self-reports (Experiment 4) and skin conductance responses (Experiment 7), while leaving recollection and free recall unaffected (across Experiments 1-7). This pattern establishes a rare memory dissociation in healthy participants, that is, explicit without implicit memory or recognizing without feeling familiar. Implications for embodied memory and neuropsychology are discussed.

False Fame Prevented: Avoiding Fluency Effects Without Judgmental Correction

Three studies show a way to prevent fluency effects independently of judgmental correction strategies by identifying and procedurally blocking the sources of fluency variations, which are assumed to be embodied in nature. For verbal stimuli, covert pronunciations are assumed to be the crucial source of fluency gains. As a consequence, blocking such pronunciation simulations through a secondary oral motor task decreased the false-fame effect for repeatedly presented names of actors (Experiment 1) as well as prevented increases in trust due to repetition for brand names and names of shares in the stock market (Experiment 2). Extending this evidence beyond repeated exposure, we demonstrated that blocking oral motor simulations also prevented fluency effects of word pronunciation on judgments of hazardousness (Experiment 3). Concerning the realm of judgment correction, this procedural blocking of (biasing) associative processes is a decontamination method not considered before in the literature, because it is independent of exposure control, mood, motivation, and post hoc correction strategies. The present results also have implications for applied issues, such as advertising and investment decisions.

Moving the Eye of the Beholder Motor Components in Vision Determine Aesthetic Preference

Perception entails not only sensory input (e.g., merely seeing), but also subsidiary motor processes (e.g., moving the eyes); such processes have been neglected in research on aesthetic preferences. To fill this gap, the present research manipulated the fluency of perceptual motor processes independently from sensory input and predicted that this increased fluency would result in increased aesthetic preference for stimulus movements that elicited the same motor movements as had been previously trained. Specifically, addressing the muscles that move the eyes, I trained participants to follow a stimulus movement without actually seeing it. Experiment 1 demonstrated that ocular-muscle training resulted in the predicted increase in preference for trained stimulus movements compared with untrained stimulus movements, although participants had not previously seen any of the movements. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that actual motor matching and not perceptual similarity drove this effect. Thus, beauty may be not only in the eye of the beholder, but also in the eyes’ movements.

Oral Approach-Avoidance: Affective Consequences of Muscular Articulation Dynamics

Can mouth movements shape attitudes? When people articulate different consonants (e.g., B or K) they press the tongue and the lips against various spots in the mouth. This allows for construction of words that feature systematic wanderings of consonantal stricture spots either from the front to the rear (inward; e.g., BENOKA) or from the rear to the front (outward; e.g., KENOBA) of the mouth. These wanderings of muscular strictures resemble the oral kinematics during either deglution (swallowing-like, inward movement) or expectoration (spitting-like, outward movement). Thus, we predicted that the articulation of inward and outward words induces motivational states associated with deglutition and expectoration--namely, approach and avoidance--which was tested in 9 experiments (total N = 822). Inward words were preferred over outward words, being labeled as nonsense words (Experiments 1, 4, 5, 6, and 9), company names (Experiment 2), or person names (Experiments 3, 7, and 8), with control words falling in between (Experiment 5). As a social-behavioral consequence, ostensible chat partners were more often chosen to interact with when having inward compared to outward names (Experiment 7). The effect was found in German-speaking (Experiments 1-5) and English-speaking (Experiment 6) samples, and it occurred even under silent reading (all experiments) and for negatively labeled targets (names of villains; Experiment 8). Showing articulation simulations as being the causal undercurrent, this effect was absent in aphasia patients who lacked covert subvocalizations (Experiment 9).

Immediate Truth--Temporal Contiguity between a Cognitive Problem and Its Solution Determines Experienced Veracity of the Solution.

A temporal contiguity hypothesis for the experience of veracity is tested which states that a solution candidate to a cognitive problem is more likely to be experienced as correct the faster it succeeds the problem. Experiment 1 varied the onset time of the appearance of proposed solutions to anagrams (50 ms vs. 150 ms) and found for both correct and incorrect candidates that faster appearing solutions were more frequently judged as being correct, although participants were not aware of the difference in onset delay. Experiment 2 replicated this effect with mathematical equations, shorter onset latencies (0 ms vs. 50 ms), and a reversed sequence (presenting first the solution and then the problem). Experiment 3 showed that the probability of judging a word as the solution of a remote associate insight problem decreases linearly with increasing onset delay (50 ms, 150 ms, 300 ms). Possible neurobiological-cognitive explanations for this effect are proposed.