Satish K. Pillai

Clinical Framework and Medical Countermeasure Use During an Anthrax Mass-Casualty Incident.

In 2014, CDC published updated guidelines for the prevention and treatment of anthrax (Hendricks KA, Wright ME, Shadomy SV, et al. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention expert panel meetings on prevention and treatment of anthrax in adults. Emerg Infect Dis 2014;20[2]. Available at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/2/13-0687_article.htm). These guidelines provided recommended best practices for the diagnosis and treatment of persons with naturally occurring or bioterrorism-related anthrax in conventional medical settings. An aerosolized release of Bacillus anthracis spores over densely populated areas could become a mass-casualty incident. To prepare for this possibility, the U.S. government has stockpiled equipment and therapeutics (known as medical countermeasures [MCMs]) for anthrax prevention and treatment. However, previously developed, publicly available clinical recommendations have not addressed the use of MCMs or clinical management during an anthrax mass-casualty incident, when the number of patients is likely to exceed the ability of the health care infrastructure to provide conventional standards of care and supplies of MCMs might be inadequate to meet the demand required. To address this gap, in 2013, CDC conducted a series of systematic reviews of the scientific literature on anthrax to identify evidence that could help clinicians and public health authorities set guidelines for intravenous antimicrobial and antitoxin use, diagnosis of anthrax meningitis, and management of common anthrax-specific complications in the setting of a mass-casualty incident. Evidence from these reviews was presented to professionals with expertise in anthrax, critical care, and disaster medicine during a series of workgroup meetings that were held from August 2013 through March 2014. In March 2014, a meeting was held at which 102 subject matter experts discussed the evidence and adapted the existing best practices guidance to a clinical use framework for the judicious, efficient, and rational use of stockpiled MCMs for the treatment of anthrax during a mass-casualty incident, which is described in this report. This report addresses elements of hospital-based acute care, specifically antitoxins and intravenous antimicrobial use, and the diagnosis and management of common anthrax-specific complications during a mass-casualty incident. The recommendations in this report should be implemented only after predefined triggers have been met for shifting from conventional to contingency or crisis standards of care, such as when the magnitude of cases might lead to impending shortages of intravenous antimicrobials, antitoxins, critical care resources (e.g., chest tubes and chest drainage systems), or diagnostic capability. This guidance does not address primary triage decisions, anthrax postexposure prophylaxis, hospital bed or workforce surge capacity, or the logistics of dispensing MCMs. Clinicians, hospital administrators, state and local health officials, and planners can use these recommendations to assist in the development of crisis protocols that will ensure national preparedness for an anthrax mass-casualty incident.

Evolution of Ebola Virus Disease from Exotic Infection to Global Health Priority, Liberia, Mid-2014

As the disease spread, the scale of the epidemic required a multi-faceted public health response.

The Infectious Diseases Society of America Emerging Infections Network -Bridging the Gap between Clinical Infectious Diseases and Public Health

In 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention granted a Cooperative Agreement Program award to the Infectious Diseases Society of America to develop a provider-based emerging infections sentinel network, the Emerging Infections Network (EIN). Over the past 17 years, the EIN has evolved into a flexible, nationwide network with membership representing a broad cross-section of infectious disease physicians. The EIN has an active electronic mail conference (listserv) that facilitates communication among infectious disease providers and the public health community, and also sends members periodic queries (short surveys on infectious disease topics) that have addressed numerous topics relevant to both clinical infectious diseases and public health practice. The article reviews how the various functions of EIN contribute to clinical care and public health, identifies opportunities to further link clinical medicine and public health, and describes future directions for the EIN.

Ebola and Its Control in Liberia, 2014–2015

Several factors explain the successful response to the outbreak in this country.

Decreased Ebola Transmission after Rapid Response to Outbreaks in Remote Areas, Liberia, 2014.

Basic interventions and community acceptance can result in rapid control of outbreaks.

First confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in the United States, updated information on the epidemiology of MERS-CoV infection, and guidance for the public, clinicians, and public health authorities - May 2014

Since mid-March 2014, the frequency with which cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection have been reported has increased, with the majority of recent cases reported from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, the frequency with which travel-associated MERS cases have been reported and the number of countries that have reported them to the World Health Organization (WHO) have also increased. The first case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler recently returned from Saudi Arabia, was reported to CDC by the Indiana State Department of Health on May 1, 2014, and confirmed by CDC on May 2. A second imported case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler from Saudi Arabia having no connection with the first case, was reported to CDC by the Florida Department of Health on May 11, 2014. The purpose of this report is to alert clinicians, health officials, and others to increase awareness of the need to consider MERS-CoV infection in persons who have recently traveled from countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula. This report summarizes recent epidemiologic information, provides preliminary descriptions of the cases reported from Indiana and Florida, and updates CDC guidance about patient evaluation, home care and isolation, specimen collection, and travel as of May 13, 2014.

Secondary Infections with Ebola Virus in Rural Communities, Liberia and Guinea, 2014–2015

Persons who died of Ebola virus disease at home in rural communities in Liberia and Guinea resulted in more secondary infections than persons admitted to Ebola treatment units. Intensified monitoring of contacts of persons who died of this disease in the community is an evidence-based approach to reduce virus transmission in rural communities.

The Epidemiology of Foodborne Botulism Outbreaks: A Systematic Review

Background We performed a systematic review of foodborne botulism outbreaks to describe their clinical aspects and descriptive epidemiology in order to inform public health response strategies. Methods We searched seven databases for reports of foodborne botulism outbreaks published in English from database inception to May 2015. We summarized descriptive characteristics and analyzed differences in exposure and toxin types by geographic region. We performed logistic regression to assess correlations between exposure source, implicated food, and outbreak size. Results There were 197 outbreaks reported between 1920 and 2014. The median number of cases per outbreak was 3 (range 2-97). The majority of reported outbreaks (109; 55%) occurred in the United States. Toxin types A, B, E, and F were identified as the causative agent in 34%, 16%, 17%, and 1% of outbreaks, respectively. The median duration between exposure and symptom onset was approximately 1 day. The mean percentage of cases requiring mechanical ventilation per outbreak was 34%. Seventy percent of all outbreaks and 77% of small outbreaks (≤11 cases) originated from point source exposures, while commercial foods were significantly (odds ratio, 6.9; 95% confidence interval, 2.2-21.1) associated with large outbreaks (≥12 cases). Conclusions Toxin type A accounted for half of outbreaks, and these outbreaks had a higher proportion of patient ventilatory failure. Most outbreaks were due to point source exposures, while outbreaks due to commercial food were larger. For effective responses to foodborne botulism outbreaks, these findings demonstrate the need for timely outbreak investigation and hospital surge capacity.

Forewarning of Poliovirus Outbreaks in the Horn of Africa: An Assessment of Acute Flaccid Paralysis Surveillance and Routine Immunization Systems in Kenya

BACKGROUND Although the Horn of Africa region has successfully eliminated endemic poliovirus circulation, it remains at risk for reintroduction. International partners assisted Kenya in identifying gaps in the polio surveillance and routine immunization programs, and provided recommendations for improved surveillance and routine immunization during the health system decentralization process. METHODS Structured questionnaires collected information about acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance resources, training, data monitoring, and supervision at provincial, district, and health facility levels. The routine immunization program information collected included questions about vaccine and resource availability, cold chain, logistics, health-care services and access, outreach coverage data, microplanning, and management and monitoring of AFP surveillance. RESULTS Although AFP surveillance met national performance standards, widespread deficiencies and limited resources were observed and reported at all levels. Deficiencies were related to provider knowledge, funding, training, and supervision, and were particularly evident at the health facility level. CONCLUSIONS Gap analysis assists in maximizing resources and capacity building in countries where surveillance and routine immunization lag behind other health priorities. Limited resources for surveillance and routine immunization systems in the region indicate a risk for additional outbreaks of wild poliovirus and other vaccine-preventable illnesses. Monitoring and evaluation of program strengthening activities are needed.

2011 investigation of internal contamination with radioactive strontium following rubidium Rb 82 cardiac PET scan.

During routine screening in 2011, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified 2 persons with elevated radioactivity. CBP, in collaboration with Los Alamos National Laboratory, informed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that these people could have increased radiation exposure as a result of undergoing cardiac Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans several months earlier with rubidium Rb 82 chloride injection from CardioGen-82. We conducted a multistate investigation to assess the potential extent and magnitude of radioactive strontium overexposure among patients who had undergone Rb 82 PET scans. We selected a convenience sample of clinical sites in 4 states and reviewed records to identify eligible study participants, defined as people who had had an Rb 82 PET scan between February and July 2011. All participants received direct radiation screening using a radioisotope identifier able to detect the gamma energy specific for strontium-85 (514 keV) and urine bioassay for excreted radioactive strontium. We referred a subset of participants with direct radiation screening counts above background readings for whole body counting (WBC) using a rank ordering of direct radiation screening. The rank order list, from highest to lowest, was used to contact and offer voluntary enrollment for WBC. Of 308 participants, 292 (95%) had direct radiation screening results indistinguishable from background radiation measurements; 261 of 265 (98%) participants with sufficient urine for analysis had radioactive strontium results below minimum detectable activity. None of the 23 participants who underwent WBC demonstrated elevated strontium activity above levels associated with routine use of the rubidium Rb 82 generator. Among investigation participants, we did not identify evidence of strontium internal contamination above permissible levels. This investigation might serve as a model for future investigations of radioactive internal contamination incidents.