Saul Estrin

Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies

In this paper, we evaluate what we have learned to date about the effects of privatization from the experiences during the last fifteen to twenty years in the postcommunist (transition) economies and, where relevant, China. We distinguish separately the impact of privatization on efficiency, profitability, revenues, and other indicators and distinguish between studies on the basis of their econometric methodology in order to focus attention on more credible results. The effect of privatization is mostly positive in Central Europe, but quantitatively smaller than that to foreign owners and greater in the later than earlier transition period. In the Commonwealth of Independent States, privatization to foreign owners yields a positive or insignificant effect while privatization to domestic owners generates a negative or insignificant effect. The available papers on China find diverse results, with the effect of nonstate ownership on total factor productivity being mostly positive but sometimes insignificant or negative.

Institutions and entrepreneurship development in Russia: a comparative perspective

In this paper we use a comparative perspective to explore the ways in which institutions and networks have influenced entrepreneurial development in Russia. We utilize Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data collected in 2001 and 2002 to investigate the effects of the weak institutional environment in Russia on entrepreneurship, comparing it first with all available GEM country samples and second, in more detail, with Brazil and Poland. Our results provide strong evidence that Russias institutional environment is important to explain its relatively low levels of entrepreneurship development, where the latter is measured in terms of both number of start-ups and of existing business owners. In addition, Russias business environment contributes to the relative advantage of entrepreneurial insiders (those already in business) to entrepreneurial outsiders (newcomers) in terms of new business startups.

Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value?

The role of government shareholding in corporate performance is central to an understanding of Chinas newly privatized large firms. In this paper, we analyze shareholders as agents that can both harm and benefit companies. We examine the ownership structure of 826 listed corporations and find that government shareholding is surprisingly large. Its effect on corporate value is found to be negative, but non-monotonic. Up to a certain threshold, corporate value decreases as government shareholding stakes increase, but beyond this corporate value begins to increase. We interpret this in terms of ownership concentration and the advantages of government partiality.

Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition

This paper examines the elements of institutional development critical to the enhancement of company performance in transition economies. This includes initial conditions, forms of privatization, institutional frameworks and the competitiveness of markets. Comparing empirical evidence, the paper concludes that there is a clear distinction in effectiveness of policies followed and their impact between Central Europe and CIS countries. This divergence is attributed to fundamentally different political attitudes toward reform, the need of CIS governments to gain political support for reform and as a consequence of the desire of Central European countries to join European Union.

Entrepreneurship, Social Capital, and Institutions: Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship Across Nations

We model and test the relationship between social and commercial entrepreneurship drawing on social capital theory. We propose that the country prevalence rate of social entrepreneurship is an indicator of constructible nation–level social capital and enhances the likelihood of individual commercial entry. We further posit that both social and commercial entrepreneurial entry is facilitated by certain formal institutions, namely strong property rights and (low) government activism, albeit the latter impacts each of these types of entrepreneurship differently. We apply bivariate discrete choice multilevel modeling to population–representative samples in 47 countries and find support for these hypotheses.

Does ownership always matter

Abstract The objective of this paper is to explain and illustrate the complex relationship between ownership arrangements and enterprise performance. It is commonly argued that efficiency will be lower in the public sector than the private because enterprise objectives deviate from maximisation of profits and because monitoring arrangements are inadequate due to the absence of capital market discipline. We argue that public ownership does make the owner-manager relationship more complicated because the chain of principals and agents is expanded; objectives are politically determined; and these are conveyed by a policy-making administrative structure to management. But the relative efficiency of public as against private ownership actually depends on the efficacy of capital market monitoring: on the political and constitutional system; on the information and sanctions available to policy makers; and on the nature of the management market. Variation in these factors can help to explain the different natures and roles of the public sector between countries.

The productivity effects of worker participation: Producer cooperatives in western economies

The paper presents econometric estimates of productivity effects of various forms of worker participation in Western producer cooperatives. While the effects vary across institutional settings, the overall effect is found to be positive. The positive effects are found most uniformly with respect to profit sharing and, to a slightly lesser extent, individual capital (share) ownership and participation in decision-making by workers. The size of individual worker loans to the coop is unrelated to productivity, while collective capital ownership exhibits an insignificant or a negative productivity effect.

Labor-managed cooperatives and private firms in north central Italy: An empirical comparison

The authors analyze the differences between the behavior of private firms and that of producer cooperatives in a matched sample of the two organizational types from the regions of Emilia Romagna and Toscana in North-Central Italy, where producer cooperatives are numerous. Individual firm-level surveys provide new detailed comparative data on key issues such as investment, productivity, wages, employment, and industrial relations. Differences between the two types of firm are found in labor relations, employment, pay, production methods, the relationship to the external market environment, and the level of economic performance. The authors find no significant differences in investment horizons or criteria for finance, despite theoretical assertions to the contrary. The cooperatives apparently have higher productivity, more labor-intensive production methods, lower income differentials, and a more tranquil industrial relations environment than the private firms.

Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in Russia

We investigate whether privatization, competitive forces, and the hardening of budget constraints played efficiency-enhancing roles in Russia in the immediate post-privatization period. We find evidence of a positive impact of privatization on labor productivity: a 10% point increase in private share ownership raises real sales per employee by 3–5%. The evidence on product market competition is weaker, depending on model specification. Soft budget constraints are usually found to reduce restructuring but the effect is small and insignificant. We find that in terms of their impacts on productivity, privatization and subsidy reduction are substitutes; privatization and competition (measured as the geographic scope of markets) are complements; and that competition and subsidy reduction are independent. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

The Effect of Ownership and Competitive Pressure on Firm Performance in Transition Countries: Micro Evidence from Bulgaria, Romania and Poland

This paper uses a unique representative firm level data set to analyse the effect of domestic and international competitive pressure and ownership changes in three emerging economies, Bulgaria Poland and Romania. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: Domestic competitive pressure, measured by market structure, and increased import penetration are associated with higher firm performance in Poland irrespective of the ownership structure of firms. Furthermore the positive effects of increased import competition are reinforced for foreign owned firms. In contrast, in Bulgaria and Romania, increased import penetration is associated with lower firm performance, while there is some evidence that more competitive market structures are associated with higher total factor productivity. However, these effects depend on the ownership structure of firms, which suggests the existence of complementarities between competitive pressure and ownership changes. The results also indicate that privatisation has positive effects on firm performance. In particular, domestic private firms and foreign owned firms outperform state owned firms. Furthermore, there is evidence that foreign owned firms do better than domestically owned private firms especially in Bulgaria and Poland. The results on ownership are somewhat weaker for Romania.