Scott F. Aikin

Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism

I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.

Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given

Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subjects beliefs are justified on the basis of that subjects awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of the Given is then provided in terms of refinements of Deweys theory of experience. The doctrine of the Given is implicated in the functions of inquiry insofar as one must take it that experience is a source of justification.

Contrastive Self‐Attribution of Belief

A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the following, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter‐example to the evidentialist argument from assertion.

Poe's Law, group polarization, and argumentative failure in religious and political discourse

Poes Law is roughly that online parodies of religious views are indistinguishable from sincere expressions of religious views. Poes Law may be expressed in a variety of forms, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, polarized attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poes Law have relevance in wider circles than religion, particularly politics. Moreover, regular invocations of Poes Law in critical discussions have the threat of further entrenching and polarizing views.

Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism

Abstract Epistemic infinitism is certainly not a majority view in contemporary epistemology. While there are some examples of infinitism in the history of philosophy, more work needs to be done mining this history in order to provide a richer understanding of how infinitism might be formulated internal to different philosophical frameworks. Accordingly, we argue that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can be read as operating according to an ‘impure’ model of epistemic infinitism. The infinite obligation inaugurated by the ‘face to face encounter’ with the Other yields an approach to the ethics of belief that accords with infinitism. This reading of Levinas brings his ethical thought into dialogue with contemporary epistemology as well as provides an historical example of infinitism within the current debates.

Pragmatism and Pluralism Revisited

In 2005, we published a jointly authored article arguing that pragmatists must reject pluralism. As certain pragmatists describe themselves as pluralists, the essay received its share of criticism; however, no response has succeeded in defeating the essay’s argument. Nonetheless, contemporary classical pragmatists persist in embracing the term. Something’s amiss. In this article, we defend a conclusion that differs importantly from that of the 2005 paper. We will show that pragmatism is consistent with a view that we call modest epistemological pluralism. Thus, pragmatists can be pluralists. However, contemporary classicalists should beware. Our argument shows that pragmatism and pluralism are consistent, not that they are intrinsically allied. More importantly, the modest epistemological pluralism is not the pluralism that contemporary classicalists seem most eager to embrace. The argument proceeds in six steps. First, we dispense with a common but unacceptable conception of pluralism. Second, we identify what pluralism must assert. Third, we distinguish different varieties of pluralism. Fourth, we argue that pragmatists must reject all pluralisms except for what we term modest epistemological pluralism. Fifth, we discuss the prospects for pragmatist-friendly modest epistemological pluralism. Finally, we address the concern that modest epistemological pluralism is not practically distinguishable from monism.

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND THE EXPANDING PROBLEM OF EVIL

The problem of evil is that morally gratuitous suffering and destruction is evidence against a benevolent and potent god. Often cases of this evil are restricted to human suffering, but if the moral universe is expanded in the fashion associated with environmental ethics, the scope of morally significant suffering and destruction grows. Consequently, the wider the scope of the moral universe, the problem of evil becomes harder for theists to solve.

Argument in mixed company: Mom's Maxim vs. mill's principle

It is impolite to discuss matters of religion or politics in mixed company. So goes the popular adage which all of us were supposed to have learned as children from our mothers. Lets call it Moms Maxim . We tend to accept Moms Maxim. But is it philosophically sound? In this short essay, we raise some objections to Moms Maxim and make a case for an alternative which we call Mills Principle .

What did Epicurus Learn from Plato

Epicurus and Epicureans were famously antagonistic toward Platonic metaphysics and the dialectical style and technique pioneered in the Academy. However, there are Platonic methodological and doctrinal themes in Epicuruss epistemology, theology, and politics.

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, by Pritchard, Duncan: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, pp. xv + 239, US

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