Scott Spiegel

Transfer of value from fit.

People experience regulatory fit when they pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory orientation (E. T. Higgins, 2000). Five studies tested whether the value experienced from regulatory fit can transfer to a subsequent evaluation of an object. In Studies 1 and 2, participants gave the same coffee mug a higher price if they had chosen it with a strategy that fit their orientation (eager strategy/promotion; vigilant strategy/prevention) than a strategy that did not fit. Studies 3-5 investigated possible mechanisms underlying this effect. Value transfer was independent of positive mood, perceived effectiveness (instrumentality), and perceived efficiency (ease), and occurred for an object that w as independent of the fit process itself. The findings supported a value confusion account of transfer.

Increasing or decreasing interest in activities: the role of regulatory fit.

What makes peoples interest in doing an activity increase or decrease? Regulatory fit theory (E. T. Higgins, 2000) provides a new perspective on this classic issue by emphasizing the relation between peoples activity orientation, such as thinking of an activity as fun, and the manner of activity engagement that the surrounding situation supports. These situational factors include whether a reward for good performance, expected (Study 1) or unexpected (Study 2), is experienced as enjoyable or as serious and whether the free-choice period that measures interest in the activity is experienced as enjoyable or as serious (Study 3). Studies 1-3 found that participants were more likely to do a fun activity again when these situational factors supported a manner of doing the activity that fit the fun orientation-a reward or free-choice period framed as enjoyable. This effect was not because interest in doing an activity again is simply greater in an enjoyable than a serious surrounding situation because it did not occur, and even reversed, when the activity orientation was important rather than fun, where now a serious manner of engagement provides the fit (Study 4a and 4b).

Assimilative behavior identification can also be resource dependent: the unimodel perspective on personal-attribution phases.

Three studies examine the role of situational constraint information on behavior identification. It was found that where the behavior-identification task is relatively easy assimilation of the behavior-identification to situational constraints is independent of cognitive load. However, where the behavior-identification task is relatively difficult, assimilation is undermined by load. Given that the discounting of situational constraint information, too, can be independent of load where the dispositional-inference task is easy, and is load-dependent when the task is difficult, it appears that both assimilation and discounting behave identically in regard to load. This conclusion is consistent with the judgmental unimodel whereby behavior identification and dispositional inference differ in the contents of the judgmental questions they address while sharing the underlying process whereby these questions are answered.