Scott Woodcock

The robustness of altruism as an evolutionary strategy

Kin selection, reciprocity and group selection are widely regarded as evolutionary mechanisms capable of sustaining altruism among humans andother cooperative species. Our research indicates, however, that these mechanisms are only particular examples of a broader set of evolutionary possibilities.In this paper we present the results of a series of simple replicator simulations, run on variations of the 2–player prisoners dilemma, designed to illustrate the wide range of scenarios under which altruism proves to be robust under evolutionary pressures. The set of mechanisms we explore is divided into four categories:correlation, group selection, imitation, and punishment. We argue that correlation is the core phenomenon at work in all four categories.

The Social Dimensions of Modesty

Modesty is a surprisingly complicated character trait. Most of us feel that we intuitively understand what modesty is, and we feel confident that we can recognize modesty when it is exhibited in others. However, it is difficult to provide a detailed account of modesty without discovering that it is not nearly as simple as one initially presumes it to be. For example, in her recent book Uneasy Virtue, Julia Driver proposes a definition of modesty that seems uncomplicated until further reflection reveals it to be more intricate and contentious than it appears. Driver claims that modesty is the virtue of being disposed to persistently underestimate ones self-worth despite available evidence suggesting that this estimation is incorrect.1 There is something compelling about such a concise definition of modesty, but Drivers view implies that a modest agent is truly ignorant of her natural talents, accomplishments or other attributes that contribute to assessments of her self-worth. It is this feature of Drivers definition that has generated debate since she first presented her view of modesty in an influential article that preceded her book.2 Critics claim that it is counterintuitive to require modest agents to be ignorant of their natural talents and accomplishments, for it hardly seems virtuous to be disposed to make chronic errors of judg-

Moral Schizophrenia and the Paradox of Friendship

In his landmark paper, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’, Michael Stocker introduces an affliction that is, according to his diagnosis, endemic to all modern ethical theories. Stockers paper is well known and often cited, yet moral schizophrenia remains a surprisingly obscure diagnosis. I argue that moral schizophrenia, properly understood, is not necessarily as disruptive as its name suggests. However, I also argue that Stockers inability to demonstrate that moral schizophrenia constitutes a reductio of modern ethical theories does not rule out the possibility that he has identified a noteworthy psychological phenomenon. Stocker is, in my opinion, correct to note that balancing our broad ethical obligations with authentic personal motives is a non-trivial psychological challenge, even if this challenge is not equivalent to a mental disorder. Hence, I conclude that proponents of modern ethical theorists should not be complacent about the burdens associated with implementing a ‘schizophrenic’ moral psychology.

Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Indeterminacy Objection

Abstract Philippa Foot’s virtue ethics remains an intriguing but divisive position in normative ethics. For some, the promise of grounding human virtue in natural facts is a useful method of establishing normative content. For others, the natural facts on which the virtues are established appear naively uninformed when it comes to the empirical details of our species. In response to this criticism, a new cohort of neo-Aristotelians like John Hacker-Wright attempt to defend Foot by reminding critics that the facts at stake are not claimed to be explanatory descriptions of the kind provided by empirical science. Instead, they are derived from a logical form that is presupposed when we categorize something as a living organism. Neo-Aristotelian naturalism is therefore said to be immune to the empirical defeaters put forward as criticism of the theory. I argue that neo-Aristotelians like Hacker-Wright can only rescue Foot’s naturalism from being uninformed by exposing it to an indeterminacy objection: if claims about human virtue are grounded in facts about our species other than those derived from science, then the position becomes immune to empirical defeaters at the cost of being unable to generate informative normative content.

When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley

As the trolley problem runs its course, consequentialists tend to adopt one of two strategies: (a) silently take comfort in the fact that deontological rivals face their own enduring difficulties, or (b) appeal to cognitive psychology to discredit the deontological intuitions on which the trolley problem depends. I refer to the first strategy as silent schadenfreude and the second as debunking attack. My aim in this paper is to argue that consequentialists ought to reject both strategies and instead opt for what I call robust advantage. This strategy emphasizes the intricate calculations that consequentialists employ to defend against objections based on friendship and integrity. I argue that these calculations offer consequentialism an explanatory advantage over deontology in the context of the trolley problem. It requires striking a delicate balance between deeply internalized dispositions to avoid causing harm and a context-sensitive ability to prevent disasters; however, empirical data help consequentialism on this front by illustrating that the integration of separate cognitive functions is an ordinary part of human psychology.