Sean McKeever

Turning on Default Reasons

Particularism takes an extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons and thereby threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example, pain, and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, some particularists draw a distinction between default and non-default reasons. The present paper argues that all but the most deflationary ways of drawing this distinction are either implausible or else insufficient to help the particularist avoid flattening the moral landscape. The difficulty can be avoided, however, if we reject particularisms extremely ecumenical view of reasons.

Aesthetics and Particularism

We begin with a pair of scenarios: nOn Tuesday, Edgar is hosting an opening at his gallery. Art Maison, for his friend, the up and coming painter Andrew. Knowing that this is an important opportunity for Andrew, Edgar has assured him that he will do his best to bring off the event successfully. Edgar also knows that proper lighting is critical for art to look its best, and several bulbs at the gallery have recently gone dead and need to be replaced. But a trip to the store is inconvenient, and, for no better reason than that, he neglects to replace them. As a consequence, at the opening Andrew’s paintings are less impressive than they otherwise would be.

A moral basis for prohibiting performance enhancing drug use in competitive sport

Abstract A strong moral reason for prohibiting doping in sport is to be found in the bad choices that would be faced by clean athletes in a sporting world that tolerated doping. The case against doping is not, however, to be grounded in the concept of coercion. Instead, it is grounded in a general duty of sport to afford fair opportunity to the goods that are distinctively within sports sphere of control. The moral reason to prohibit doping need not be balanced against any autonomy claim of athletes who would prefer to dope because, upon closer examination, such claims have no force. The moral reason to prohibit doping does, however, need to be balanced against the enforcement costs imposed on all athletes by effective prohibition.

Medically Assisted Death

Young, Robert, Medically Assisted Death, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. viiixa0+xa0251, £16.99 (paper). A casual observer of public discourse regarding euthanasia and physician-assist...