Sebastian Biba

China's Continuous Dam-building on the Mekong River

Abstract This article analyses Chinas hydro-politics along the Mekong River. It seeks to explain why Chinas unilateral dam-building projects on the upper reaches of the river have not been met with sustained criticism on the part of the downstream riparian countries, for which upstream dams are likely to have severe negative consequences. It is held that China has embarked on a strategy of implicit and broadly conceived actor-reversed issue linkage as a means to nip any loud disapproval of its dams in the bud. By downplaying its dam-building projects and instead promoting common development goals with the Mekong riparian countries through highly increased political and economic engagement, Beijing has successfully defused any potential counter-measures against its dams, at least for the time being. The sustainability of this strategy and its transferability to others of Chinas trans-boundary rivers must be questioned.

Desecuritization in China's Behavior towards Its Transboundary Rivers: the Mekong River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers

Fresh water has no substitute, and its availability has been declining sharply around the globe. In Asia, Chinas role as a multidirectional and transborder water provider is unmatched. Analysis of Chinas behavior towards its transboundary rivers is therefore pivotal. By examining three different case studies—the Mekong River in Southeast Asia, the Brahmaputra River in South Asia and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers in Central Asia—this article seeks to lay the theoretical groundwork for understanding Chinas behavior. It pits previously applied realist rationales against the more recent notion of desecuritization strategies and makes a case for the latter. While desecuritization implies non- or de-escalation, it does not necessarily mean genuine long-term cooperation. The future of Asias shared waters may thus be a contentious one.

The goals and reality of the water–food–energy security nexus: the case of China and its southern neighbours

Abstract The so-called ‘nexus’ approach has recently been promoted as addressing externalities across the water, food and energy sectors, thus helping to achieve ‘water/energy/food security for all’, ‘equitable and sustainable growth’ and a ‘resilient and productive environment’. While these are noble goals, this article argues that the reality on the ground appears to be taking a different direction, at least when it comes to China and its neighbours in South and Southeast Asia. There, a new era of large-scale water infrastructure development is creating several security-related problems, which represent serious challenges to the nexus goals. These challenges include food–energy tensions, human security threats and ecological risks. These challenges can also be linked to rising friction surrounding the management of water, food and energy resources in the region. The article argues that, in order for the nexus goals to be achieved in China and the countries on its southern periphery, there must first be increased awareness of this nexus among policy-making elites.

From securitization moves to positive outcomes: The case of the spring 2010 Mekong crisis:

Full securitization has largely been regarded as something negative that should be avoided. While acknowledging this, the present article adds that securitization moves that fail to succeed (i.e. that end in securitization failure) can, at least in the environmental sector of security, trigger positive outcomes if a given issue becomes (re)politicized rather than depoliticized. This is because securitization moves can be helpful in raising sufficient awareness of an issue to gain the attention of the relevant audience(s). Subsequently, the article argues, different audience strategies determine whether securitization moves are turned into securitization failure as (re)politicization or securitization failure as depoliticization. The article introduces different behavioral strategies that audiences can employ to reject securitization moves: the passive recipient strategy, the blocking strategy, and the active reshaping strategy. Only the latter indicates that an audience not interested in letting securitization moves succeed simultaneously seeks to have the issue in question be, or remain, a part of the political agenda. The article uses the spring 2010 Mekong crisis as a test case to support its theoretical arguments.

China’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ Mekong River politics: the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation from a comparative benefit-sharing perspective

ABSTRACT This article analyzes China’s Mekong River politics before and after the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) from a comparative benefit-sharing perspective. China’s pre-LMC approach focused too much on the creation of economic benefits from and beyond the river while neglecting ecological benefits to the river. Moreover, despite the problems this ‘old’ approach caused for China and its downstream neighbours, China’s current LMC strategy seems to essentially replicate its former approach. While sustainable water resources management is identified as a priority area, actual cooperation and benefit sharing in this field remain insufficient.

It’s status, stupid: explaining the underlying core problem in US–China relations

This article explains growing tensions in US–China relations through the lens of an intensifying status competition between the two countries. On the one hand, the United States has not truly opened the existing international order to a rising China, thus disrespecting Beijing’s status claims out of fear of losing its own dominant status. On the other hand, China, in its increasingly frustrated status seeking, has meanwhile turned to building parallel structures of global and regional governance and has moreover displayed a gradually more assertive behaviour in its neighbourhood, thereby also confronting the United States, which has been disinclined to show any weakness in front of its regional allies and partners. While China needs to realize that gaining status is a slow endeavour, which cannot be enforced but has to be earned, the United States needs to understand that China’s status seeking is quite a natural process, which cannot be suppressed if conflict is to be avoided.