Sebastian Gryglewicz

Optimal investment in learning-curve technologies

We study optimal investment in technologies characterized by the learning curve. There are two investment patterns depending on the shape of the learning curve. If the learning process is slow, firms invest relatively late and on a larger scale. If the curve is steep, firms invest earlier and on a smaller scale. We further demonstrate that learning investment differs greatly from investment in technologies without learning effects. Learning investments generate substantial initial losses and are very sensitive to downside risk. We show that the most susceptible to losses and risk are technologies with intermediate speed of learning.

Similar bidders in takeover contests

When bidders in a corporate takeover have related resources and post-acquisition strategies, their valuations of a target are likely to be interdependent. This paper analyzes sequential-entry takeover contests in which similar bidders have correlated private valuations. The level of similarity affects information content of bids and bidding competition. Our model predicts that expected acquisition prices and the probability of multiple-bidder contests are the highest for intermediately similar bidders. We test these predictions in laboratory experiments in which we control the similarity between bidders. The experimental data confirm the non-monotonic effects of similarity on prices and on the frequency of multiple-bidder contents

Lame-Duck CEOs

We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.

Agency Conflicts over the Short- and the Long-Run: Short-Termism, Long-Termism, and Pay-for-Luck

We develop a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls current earnings via short-term effort and firm growth via long-term effort and the firm is subject to both short- and long-run shocks. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce both over- and underinvestment in short- and long-term efforts compared to first best, leading to short- or long-termism in corporate policies. Exposure to long-run shocks introduces pay-for-luck in incentive compensation but only after sufficiently good performance due to incentive compatibility, thereby rationalizing the asymmetric benchmarking observed in the data. Correlated short- and long-run shocks to earnings and firm size lead to externalities in incentive provision over different time horizons.We develop a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls current earnings via short-term effort and firm growth via long-term effort and the firm is subject to both short- and long-run shocks. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce both over- and underinvestment in short- and long-term efforts compared to first best, leading to short- or long-termism in corporate policies. Exposure to long-run shocks introduces pay-for-luck in incentive compensation but only after sufficiently good performance due to incentive compatibility, thereby rationalizing the asymmetric benchmarking observed in the data. Correlated short- and long-run shocks to earnings and firm size lead to externalities in incentive provision over different time horizons.

Transitory Versus Permanent Shocks: Explaining Corporate Savings and Investment

Theory has recently shown that corporate policies should respond differently to permanent or transitory cash flow shocks. We devise a novel filter to decompose cash flow shocks into permanent and transitory components. The policy choices of large publicly traded U.S. firms, such as cash holdings, credit line usage, and equity issuance, are related to the characteristics of the shocks estimated by our filter, i.e., volatilities, correlation and drift rates of the permanent and transitory shocks, as predicted by theory. Moreover, the interaction between the permanent and transitory cash flow shocks is strongly related to a firm’s leadership status within its industry.

Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay-for-Performance: Theory and Evidence

When firm value is non-linear in manager effort, pay-for-performance, measured as the sensitivity of manager compensation to firm value, is not a sufficient statistic for the strength of managerial incentives. To demonstrate this effect, we characterize the optimal contract between an investor and a risk-averse manager in the presence of a lumpy investment option. In our model, increasing the size of the growth option can decrease pay-performance sensitivity despite always increasing managerial effort and incentives. Low pay-performance sensitivity is consistent with higher effort and incentives because increasing the size of the growth opportunity increases the sensitivity of firm value to managerial effort. We document new empirical evidence consistent with our model. In a within firm analysis, a one standard deviation increase in Market-toBook, a proxy for the presence of growth options, is associated with a roughly 6.5% decrease in Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) pay-performance sensitivity, as measured by dollar changes in manager wealth to dollar changes in firm value.

Learning Effect in Toehold Acquisitions

Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies have rarely been adopted in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds ineffective and becoming obsolete? We show that this is not the case. We find that toeholds are preferred for executing difficult takeovers. After controlling for such endogeneity in toehold-based acquisitions, toeholds do increase returns to acquirers. Moreover, the performance of toehold strategies improves over time due to more selective and more effective acquisition of toeholds. We find that this time trend is in part explained by learning-by-doing from past toehold acquisitions.Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies are rarely used in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds becoming obsolete because of their apparent ineffectiveness? We show that the answer is no. We find that toeholds are preferred for executing difficult takeovers. After controlling for such endogeneity in toehold-based acquisitions, toeholds do increase returns to acquirers. Moreover, the performance of toehold strategies improves over time due to more selective and more effective acquisition of toeholds. We find that this time trend is in part explained by learning-by-doing. Acquirers learn from their previous toehold experience to be more selective with respect to the circumstances when to execute a toehold strategy and then choose a more effective toehold size.