Sébastien G. Lazardeux

Cohabitation and Conflicting Politics in French Policymaking

1. Cohabitation and Policymaking in Semi-Presidential Systems 2. Policymaking under Cohabitation 3. Institutional Dynamics and Policymaking Efficiency 4. Cohabitations and Policymaking Efficiency: An Empirical Test 5. Cohabitation and Prime Ministerial Policymaking Strategies 6. Conclusions

Conclusion: Cohabitation and Policymaking in Comparative Context

This book emerged from the realization of a void in the literature on semi-presidentialism. Despite the vast number of publications that treat semi-presidential institutions as an independent variable, very few look at their effect on the policy process, and those that do either lack theoretical foundations or empirics. This lack of scholarly attention seems particularly puzzling, given the volume of research conducted on policymaking efficiency in the US presidential system, notably during periods of split-party government. Knowing to what extent the impact of US style divided government on policy processes and outputs carried over to cohabitation therefore imposed itself as a worthwhile and important object of study. This book aimed at treating this question comprehensively. In it, I presented a theory of the policymaking process that highlighted how the institutional mechanics of a split executive affected the crafting and enactment of major legislation. This theory was later supported using both qualitative and quantitative data on policymaking in France under periods of unified government and cohabitation.

Institutional Dynamics and Policymaking Efficiency

The locus of studies on French cohabitation is naturally on the relationship between the president and the prime minister. After all, the combination of the political antagonism between the two heads of the executive branch and the vagueness of their respective institutional prerogatives make for appealing storylines in political conflict. This book does not differ from other studies in that regard. However, it does stand apart from other accounts of cohabitation by highlighting that a true understanding of intra-executive relations and of the policy options available to the president and prime minister necessitates recognition that these relations are connected to the relationship between the prime minister and his legislative majority. In fact, these two levels of interactions are interwoven in complex ways, with regular feedback effects from one to the other.

Cohabitation and Policymaking in Semi-Presidential Systems

The capacity of political systems to promote policymaking efficiency is an essential question in democratic polities. By policymaking efficiency, I mean the ability of a legitimately elected government to enact important and needed reforms without undue obstructions from the minority. Obviously, the role and impact of the opposition on policymaking remains a matter for discussion, especially regarding what “undue obstructions” are. Should the minority be shunned from the policy process completely? Should it be able to block legislation engaged by the government, even if it is supported by an extreme majority of the citizenry? The perception of policymaking efficiency developed here stands equally apart from both propositions. It considers that the minority has a role to play in policymaking; but it also recognizes that the government should be able to take minority inputs into consideration while being able to govern following the electoral mandate it received.

Policymaking under Cohabitation

Students of policymaking in industrialized democracies have often conceptualized this process as a series of separate stages (DeLeon, 1999). These stages include an agenda-setting stage (an initial demand for a policy response to a perceived problem emerges), a formulation stage (a policy proposal to solve this problem is crafted), a decision-making stage (the proposal is debated, amended, and adopted), an implementation stage (the terms of the statute are applied), and, finally, an evaluation stage (the chosen policy response is gauged for its ability to solve the problem).

Cohabitation and Policymaking Efficiency: An Empirical Test

In Chapter 3, I presented a qualitative account of three periods of cohabitation under the French Fifth Republic. This analysis provided strong empirical support for the model I presented in Chapter 2. Some cohabitationist prime ministers, like Prime Minister Balladur or Jospin, were seen as likely winners of the next presidential contest. Their respective parties had significant support in opinion polls and in local and European elections. All these signals indicated that the majority was likely to remain in power after the next legislative election cycle and that it was likely to capture the presidency. Hence, the premiers were not pressured to pursue an active legislative agenda and could engage in legislative restraint. Conversely, Premier Chirac was, from the start of his tenure as prime minister, contested as the best conservative candidate for the next presidential contest. His coalition received less support in opinion polls than the opposition. In this context, his slim two-member majority would be hard to maintain — or even extend – in the next legislative electoral cycle, and the conservatives seemed unlikely to remain in power for more than the two years preceding the next presidential elections. Pressured by his majority to act, Chirac was compelled to produce large-scale reforms.

Cohabitation and Prime Ministerial Policymaking Strategies

In Chapter 2, I represented cohabitation as a political situation where the prime minister has a strong interest in pursuing a limited legislative agenda and in enacting as few important laws as possible. This strategy is designed largely to avoid being politically harmed by the president’s constant public criticisms against the governmental actions. I later showed empirically that cohabitation, under certain circumstances, indeed leads to policy paralysis.