Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan

Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation

We examine the empirical role of different explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich to poor countriesthe Lucas Paradox. The theoretical explanations include cross-country differences in fundamentals affecting productivity, and capital market imperfections. We show that during 19702000, low institutional quality is the leading explanation. Improving Perus institutional quality to Australias level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment. Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the specific mechanisms. Our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions affect long-run development.

Risk Sharing and Industrial Specialization: Regional and International Evidence

We provide empirical evidence that risk sharing enhances specialization in production. To the best of our knowledge, this well-established and important theoretical proposition has not been tested before. Our empirical procedure is summarized as follows. First, we construct a measure of specialization in production, and calculate an index of specialization for each of the European Community (EC) and non-EC OECD countries, U.S. states, Canadian provinces, Japanese prefectures, Latin American countries, and regions of Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Then, we estimate the degree of capital market integration (a measure of risk sharing) within each of these groups of regions: the EC countries, the non-EC OECD countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (and rely on another authors estimate for Latin America). Finally, we perform a regression of the specialization index on the degree of risk sharing, controlling for relevant economic variables. We find a positive and significant relation between the degree of specialization of individual members of a group of countries, provinces, states, or prefectures, and the amount of risk that is shared within the group. We perform regressions using variables such as shareholder rights and the size of the financial sector (relative to GDP) as instruments for the amount of inter-regional risk sharing. These regressions confirm that risk sharing--facilitated by a favorable legal environment and a developed financial system--is a direct causal determinant of industrial specialization.

Mortality decline, human capital investment, and economic growth

We examine the role of increased life expectancy in raising human capital investment during the process of economic growth. We develop a continuous time, overlapping generations model in which individuals make optimal schooling investment choices in the face of a constant probability of death. We present analytic results, followed by results from a calibrated version of the model using realistic estimates of the return to schooling. Mortality decline produces economically significant increases in schooling and consumption. Allowing schooling to vary endogenously produces a much larger response of consumption and capital to mortality decline than is observed when schooling is held fixed.

Economic Integration, Industrial Specialization, and the Asymmetry of Macroeconomic Fluctuations

We show empirically that regions with a more specialized production structure exhibit output fluctuations that are less correlated with those of other regions (less \symmetric fluctuations). Combined with the causal relation running from capital market integration to regional specialization found in an earlier study, this finding supports the idea that higher capital market integration leads to less symmetric output fluctuations. This mechanism counter-balances the effect of lower trade-barriers on the symmetry of fluctuations quantified by Frankel and Rose (1998). It is further argued that more asymmetric output shocks do not necessarily imply more asymmetric income shocks, since more cross-country ownership of productive assets may actually render income shocks more symmetric despite the greater asymmetry of output shocks. Some evidence in support of this claim is reported. Deriving a simple closed form expression for the gains from risk sharing for CRRA utility is an independent contribution of the present article.

FDI, Productivity and Financial Development

This paper examines the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth Factor accumulation - physical and human capital - does not seem to be the main channel through which countries benefit f rom FDI. Instead, we f ind that countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly

Leverage across firms, banks, and countries ☆

We present new stylized facts on bank and firm leverage during the period 2000–2009 using internationally comparable micro level data from many countries. We document the following patterns: a) there was an increase in leverage for investment banks prior to the sub-prime crisis; b) there was no visible increase in leverage for the typical commercial bank and non-financial firm; c) off-balance-sheet items constitute a big fraction of assets, especially for large commercial banks in the US, whereas investment banks do not report these items; d) the leverage ratio is procyclical for investment banks and for large commercial banks in the US; e) banks in emerging markets with tighter bank regulation and stronger investor protection experienced significantly less deleveraging during the crisis. The results suggest that excessive risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality rather than the quantity of assets.

Why Does Capital Flow to Rich States

The magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows do not fit neoclassical models. The fifty U.S. states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to capital flows, which makes them an ideal testing ground for neoclassical models. We develop a simple frictionless open economy model with perfectly diversified ownership of capital and find that capital flows among the states are consistent with the model. Therefore, the small size and wrong direction of net international capital flows are likely due to frictions associated with national borders, not to inherent flaws in the neoclassical model.

FDI Spillovers, Financial Markets, and Economic Development

This paper examines the role financial markets play in the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic development. We model an economy with a continuum of agents indexed by their level of ability. Agents can either work for the foreign company or undertake entrepreneurial activities, which are subject to a fixed cost. Better financial markets allow agents to take advantage of knowledge spillovers from FDI, magnifying the output effects of FDI. Empirically, we show that well-developed financial markets allow significant gains from FDI, while FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in contributing to development.

Risk Sharing Through Capital Gains

We estimate channels of international risk sharing between European Monetary Union (EMU), European Union, and other OECD countries, 1992–2007. We focus on risk sharing through savings, factor income flows, and capital gains. Risk sharing through factor income and capital gains was close to zero before 1999 but has increased since then. Risk sharing from capital gains, at about 6%, is higher than risk sharing from factor income flows for European Union countries and OECD countries. Risk sharing from factor income flows is higher for euro zone countries, at 14%, reflecting increased international asset and liability holdings in the euro area. On examine les canaux de partage international du risque entre l’Union monetaire europeenne, l’Union europeenne, et les autres pays de l’OCDE (1992–2007). On se concentre sur le partage du risque via les epargnes, les flux de revenus des facteurs, et les gains de capitaux. Le partage du risque via les revenus des facteurs et les gains de capitaux a ete presque nul avant 1999, mais s’est accru depuis. Le partage du risque via les gains de capitaux (a peu pres 6%) est plus grand que le partage du risque via les flux de revenus des facteurs pour les pays de l’Union europeenne et les pays de l’OCDE. Le partage du risque vis les flux de revenus des facteurs est plus eleve pour l’Euro zone (a quelques 14%), refletant le fait que les actifs et passifs internationaux detenus dans la zone Euro se sont accrus.

Quantifying Productivity Gains from Foreign Investment

We quantify the causal effect of foreign investment on total factor productivity (TFP) using a new global firm-level database. Our identification strategy relies on exploiting the difference in the amount of foreign investment by financial and industrial investors and simultaneously controlling for unobservable firm and country-sector-year factors. Using our well identified firm level estimates for the direct effect of foreign ownership on acquired firms and for the spillover effects on domestic firms, we calculate the aggregate impact of foreign investment on country-level productivity growth and find it to be very small.