Seger M. Breugelmans

Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt

For centuries economists and psychologists (Frank, 1988; Ketelaar, 2004; Smith, 1759) have argued that moral emotions motivate cooperation. Ketelaar and Au (2003) recently found first evidence that guilt increases cooperation for proselfs in social bargaining games. We investigated whether this effect would also occur for shame, another moral emotion. Using a dyadic social dilemma game in Experiment 1 and an everyday cooperation measure in Experiment 2 as measures for short-term cooperation, we replicated Ketelaar and Aus findings for guilt. However, as predicted on the basis of previous emotion research, we found no such effect for shame. These results clearly indicate that the effects of moral emotions on cooperative behaviour can only be understood if the specific moral emotion is known.

Not so ugly after all: When shame acts as a commitment device

Most psychological theories and research on shame focus on the ugly aspects and negative consequences of this emotion. Theories on moral emotions, however, assume that shame acts as a commitment device motivating prosocial behavior. To solve this apparent paradox, the authors studied the effects of shame on prosocial behavior. Shame was hypothesized to motivate prosocial behavior when it was relevant for the decision at hand (endogenous). In contrast, shame that was not relevant for the decision at hand (exogenous) was hypothesized to have no such effects. Four experiments with three different shame inductions and two different measures of prosocial behavior confirmed that endogenous shame motivated prosocial behavior for proselfs but that exogenous shame did not. Shame is shown to have a clear interpersonal function in the sense that it acts as a commitment device.

Restore and protect motivations following shame

Shame has been found to promote both approach and withdrawal behaviours. Shame theories have not been able to explain how shame can promote such contrasting behaviours. In the present article, the authors provide an explanation for this. Shame was hypothesised to activate approach behaviours to restore the threatened self, and in situations when this is not possible or too risky, to activate withdrawal behaviours to protect the self from further damage. Five studies with different shame inductions and different dependent measures confirmed our predictions. We therefore showed that different behavioural responses to shame can be understood in terms of restore and protect motives. Implications for theory and behavioural research on shame are discussed.

What is moral about guilt? Acting “prosocially” at the disadvantage of others.

For centuries economists and psychologists have argued that the morality of moral emotions lies in the fact that they stimulate prosocial behavior and benefit others in a persons social environment. Many studies have shown that guilt, arguably the most exemplary moral emotion, indeed motivates prosocial behavior in dyadic social dilemma situations. When multiple persons are involved, however, the moral and prosocial nature of this emotion can be questioned. The present article shows how guilt can have beneficial effects for the victim of ones actions but also disadvantageous effects for other people in the social environment. A series of experiments, with various emotion inductions and dependent measures, all reveal that guilt motivates prosocial behavior toward the victim at the expense of others around-but not at the expense of oneself. These findings illustrate that a thorough understanding of the functioning of emotions is necessary to understand their moral nature.

The role of interpersonal harm in distinguishing regret from guilt.

Regret and guilt are emotions that are produced by negative outcomes for which one is responsible. Both emotions have received ample attention in the psychological literature; however, it is still unclear to what extent regret and guilt represent distinct psychological processes. We examined the extent to which the distinction between interpersonal harm (negative outcomes for others) and intrapersonal harm (negative outcomes for self) is crucial in differentiating these two emotions. In a series of 3 studies we found that guilt is predominantly felt in situations of interpersonal harm, whereas regret is felt in both situations of interpersonal harm and intrapersonal harm. Moreover, the results show that in situations of interpersonal harm the phenomenology of regret shares many, but not all features with the phenomenology of guilt. We conclude that the emotion processes resulting from interpersonal and intrapersonal harm are clearly distinct, but that regret as an emotion label is applied to both types of processes whereas the emotion label guilt is primarily used to refer to experiences of interpersonal harm. Implications for emotion research are discussed.

Emotion without a word: shame and guilt among Rarámuri Indians and rural Javanese.

The Rarámuri Indians in Mexico use 1 word for guilt and shame. In this article, the authors show that the Rarámuri nevertheless differentiate between shame and guilt characteristics, similar to cultural populations that use 2 words for these emotions. Emotion-eliciting situations were collected among the Rarámuri and among rural Javanese and were rated on shame and guilt by Dutch and Indonesian students. These ratings were used to select 18 shame-eliciting and guilt-eliciting situations as stimuli. The Rarámuri (N = 229) and the Javanese (N = 213) rated the situations on 29 emotion characteristics that previously had been found to differentiate shame from guilt in an international student sample. For most characteristics, a pattern of differentiation similar to that found among the students was found for both the Javanese and the Rarámuri.

A Historical Analysis of Empirical Studies Published in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 1970-2004

Based on a random sample of 200 empirical articles, the present study made a historical analysis of the contents of Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (JCCP) in the period between 1970 and 2004. In comparison to older studies, recent studies tended to be more social-psychological, and more often employed self-reports, based the choice of cultures on theoretical grounds, and adopted a hypothesis-testing approach. A persistent strong focus on cross-cultural differences and a simultaneous underrating of cross-cultural similarities was found. The majority of studies in which only cross-cultural differences were expected, reported differences and similarities. Methodological and conceptual improvements characterized the past 35 years of publications in JCCP.

Fundamental questions in cross-cultural psychology

Cross-cultural psychology has come of age as a scientific discipline, but how has it developed? The field has moved from exploratory studies, in which researchers were mainly interested in finding differences in psychological functioning without any clear expectation, to detailed hypothesis tests of theories of cross-cultural differences. This book takes stock of the large number of empirical studies conducted over the last decades to evaluate the current state of the field. Specialists from various domains provide an overview of their area, linking it to the fundamental questions of cross-cultural psychology such as how individuals and their cultures are linked, how the link evolves during development, and what the methodological challenges of the field are. This book will appeal to academic researchers and post-graduates interested in cross-cultural research.

On the valence of surprise

While surprise is a common emotion in everyday life, some of its fundamental characteristics are still unclear. For example, what does surprise feel like, positive or negative? The emotion literature has been somewhat unclear about the experiential valence of surprise. Surprise has been depicted as a pre-affective state, or as an emotion that can be both positive and negative, depending on the goal conduciveness of the surprising event. Based on recent work on cognitive consistency and neuroscientific/psychophysiological studies on surprise, we explored the possibility that surprise may be a (mildly) negative emotion in a study of autobiographical recall of unexpected and surprising events (Experiment 1) and in two studies of facial expressions of surprise (Experiments 2 and 3a/b). The studies show that experience of surprise and the perception of surprise in others may indeed be initially negative. We furthermore show how linguistic features of surprise and the temporal dynamics may have contributed to previous confusion regarding its valence.

Perceived Intergroup Difference as an Organizing Principle of Intercultural Attitudes and Acculturation Attitudes

The present article forwards perceived intergroup difference as an organizing principle for both intercultural attitudes and acculturation attitudes. A study among 5,824 majority Dutch and five minority groups revealed that the position of a group on a dimension of perceived intergroup difference organized scores on a wide range of measures of intercultural attitudes and acculturation attitudes. Minority groups that were perceived by majority members as being more different from themselves received less support for multiculturalism, were seen as more threatening, were stereotyped as less warm and competent, were seen to adopt mainstream culture less and to maintain ethnic culture more, and showed more discordance between majority and minority preferences of acculturation strategies; minority groups that perceived themselves as more different from majority Dutch were more in favor of multiculturalism, held stronger ethnic identities, adopted mainstream culture less, and maintained minority culture more. The authors conclude that perceived intergroup difference may be an important organizer of intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies.