Seiki Tanaka

The microfoundations of territorial disputes: Evidence from a survey experiment in Japan:

Although territorial disputes are one of the most fraught issues among states, how public opinion on territorial disputes varies within states and what explains the variation are often overlooked. This paper argues that citizens who prioritize economic considerations are more likely to support compromises over such disputes, while those who prioritize a country’s reputation tend to reject any compromise. Further, the paper hypothesizes that such variation in individual preferences can be explained by proximity to disputed territories. Counterintuitively, residents closer to disputes are more likely to support a compromise than those who live further away, because they are more affected by economic considerations. Those far from the disputed territory can afford to focus on its political aspects, which leads to a more hawkish stance. By using an experimental approach within Japan, this paper examines the validity of the spatial argument, and tests the relative salience of economic and political aspects of territorial disputes. The findings, based on original survey data, show that distance from disputed territories shapes individual preferences, and under some conditions, people living further away from disputed territories are more hawkish.

Does taxation lose its role in contemporary democratisation? State revenue production revisited in the third wave of democratisation: DOES TAXATION LOSE ITS ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATISATION?

Echoing the call for ‘no taxation without representation’, the development of modern taxation went hand‐in‐hand with Western democratisation. However, taxation appears to have lost its role in the third wave of democratisation. Unlike early democratisers, contemporary autocracies tend to introduce a ready‐made modern taxation system before democratisation. With advice from international organisations, the value added tax (VAT), which mature democracies innovated, has been adopted for economic adjustment and development in globalised markets. Despite these divergences, it is argued in this article that a fundamental relationship between taxation and representation remains. Taxation inherently involves a social contract between revenue‐seeking rulers and citizens, and thus involves their bargaining over representation. Therefore, the production of state revenue intervenes in contemporary democratisation as well. By factoring in the effect of the VAT in 143 developing countries between 1960 and 2007, an entropy‐balancing analysis has confirmed its important role in contemporary democratisation. The taxation‐democratisation linkage has travelled from early to contemporary democratisation.

Aging gracefully? Why old autocrats hold competitive elections

This article examines the conditions under which dictators hold competitive elections, and looks specifically at the role played by a dictator’s age. Drawing on previous studies arguing that uncertainty increases the likelihood of competitive elections, I argue that as a dictator ages, uncertainty over the future increases within the regime, because government insiders’ expected payoffs for supporting the incumbent decline as s/he ages. As a result, I argue that older dictators are more likely to hold competitive elections in order to reduce uncertainty. The article also tests an implication of the argument: if uncertainty over the future drives elections, then it should be mitigated in regimes with a clear successor. Using a large-N, cross-national dataset on autocrats and competitive elections between 1960 and 2012, this article examines the argument and finds that as dictators age, they are more likely to hold competitive elections, all else equal. The analysis also finds that the effect of autocrats’ age on competitive elections is mitigated in one-party regimes where there exists an established succession rule, while the effect is more apparent in personalist regimes without such a system.

Does Regressive Taxation without Democratic Accountability Contribute to Human Development? The Effect of Recent Trends in State Revenue Production in Developing Countries

State revenue production since the third wave of democratization contrasts sharply with the experiences of the first and second waves of democratization. The later democratizers tend to adopt and raise revenue from a regressive tax on consumption (the value-added tax: VAT), which is more compatible with economic development in global markets. How does the weak redistributive effect of this form of taxation affect the welfare of people? Previous studies argue that democratic accountability through multiparty contestation improves human development. Focused on taxation, we argue that an increasing state financial capacity contributes to an increase in human development even without electoral contestation. Empirical analyses specifically examine the effect of the VAT on infant mortality. The results demonstrate that although state revenue production relies on a regressive form of taxation, taxation contributes to human development in countries with less democratic accountability. The states capacity to gain tax compliance intervenes critically in such development. Moreover, the increasing capacity to finance the state goes hand-in-hand with democratization and thus further promotes human development in newly emerging democratic states.

Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict

ABSTRACT Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China.