Serkan Kucuksenel

Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets

We analyze markets in which the price of a traded commodity is such that the supply and the demand are unequal. Under standard assumptions, the agents then have single peaked preferences on their consumption or production choices. For such markets, we propose a class of Uniform trade rules each of which determines the volume of trade as the median of total demand, total supply, and an exogenous constant. Then these rules allocate this volume “uniformly” on either side of the market. We evaluate these “trade rules” on the basis of some standard axioms in the literature. We show that they uniquely satisfy Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, no-envy, and an informational simplicity axiom that we introduce. We also analyze the implications of anonymity, renegotiation proofness, and voluntary trade on this domain.

Microdroplet identification and size measurement in sprays with lasing images

Two-dimensional fluorescence and lasing images of a Rhodamine-6G doped water spray are observed with color photography. The orange-red lasing microdroplets are identified by their two reciprocal lasing spots. The microdroplet sizes are measured using the digitized images. The obtained microdroplet size distribution compares favorably with the normal Gaussian size distribution.

Quota implementation of the maximum sustainable yield for age-structured fisheries

One of the main goals stated in the proposals for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform was achieving maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for all European fisheries. In this paper, we propose a fishing rights allocation mechanism or management system, which specifies catch limits for individual fishing fleets to implement MSY harvesting conditions in an age-structured bioeconomic model. An age-structured model in a single species fishery with two fleets having perfect or imperfect fishing selectivity is studied. If fishing technology or gear selectivity depends on the relative age composition of the mature fish stock, fixed harvest proportions, derived from catchability and bycatch coefficients, is not valid anymore. As a result, not only the age-structure and fishing technology but also the estimated level of MSY is steering the allocation of quota shares. The results also show that allocation of quota shares based on historical catches or auctioning may not provide viable solutions to achieve MSY.

Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter

This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents’ preferences.