Seumas Miller

Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher’s work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of “experiments of concern” in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.

Privacy, the Workplace and the Internet

This paper examines workplace surveillance and monitoring. It is argued that privacy is a moral right, and while such surveillance and monitoring can be justified in some circumstances, there is a presumption against the infringement of privacy. An account of privacy precedes consideration of various arguments frequently given for the surveillance and monitoring of employees, arguments which look at the benefits, or supposed benefits, to employees as well as to employers. The paper examines the general monitoring of work, and the monitoring of email, listservers and the World Wide Web. It is argued that many of the common justifications given for this surveillance and monitoring do not stand up to close scrutiny.

Joint Action: The Individual Strikes Back

Joint actions are actions involving a number of agents performing interdependent actions in order to realise some common goals. Examples of joint action are: two people dancing together, a number of tradesmen building a house and a group of robbers burgling a house. Joint action is to be distinguished from individual action on the one hand, and from the ‘actions’ of corporate bodies on the other. Thus an individual walking down the road or shooting at a target are instances of individual action. A nation declaring war or a government taking legal action against a public company are instances of corporate action. Over the last decade or two a number of analyses of joint action have emerged, of which John Searle’s is one of the most important.1 These analyses can be located on a spectrum at one end of which there is so-called (by Frederick Schmitt 2003) strict individualism, and at the other end of which there is so-called (again by Schmitt [ibid.]) supra-individualism. Roughly speaking, Searle is somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. A number of these theorists have developed and applied their favoured basic accounts of joint action in order to account for a range of social phenomena, including conventions, social norms and social institutions. Moreover, a variety of arguments have been offered for and against many of these differing accounts. At the risk of oversimplification, I suggest that the tendency has been to eschew individualist accounts in favour of supra-individualist accounts, or at least in favour of the occupancy of hoped for anti-reductionist middle ground. In this chapter I defend a relatively strong form of individualism, namely the Collective End Theory (CET)2 against arguments emanating from the supraindividualists and from their fellow traveller anti-reductionists, such as Searle, who try to occupy middle ground. Individualism, as I see it, is committed to an analysis of joint action such that ultimately a joint action consists of: (1) a number of singular actions; (2) relations between these singular actions. Moreover, the constitutive attitudes involved in joint actions are individual attitudes; there are no sui generis we-attitudes. Here, it is important to stress that individualism can be, and in the case of CET certainly

Ethical Issues in Policing

Contents: Introduction A theory of policing: the enforcement of moral rights Authority and discretion in policing The moral justification for police use of deadly force Privacy, confidentiality and security in policing Corruption and anti-corruption in policing Restorative justice in policing Bibliography Index.

Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden

Abstract The Edward Snowden leaks challenge policy makers and the publics understanding and perspectives on the role of security intelligence in liberal democratic states. This article explores the challenges confronting security intelligence collection by the ‘Five Eyes’ countries – particularly those most affected by the leaks. We argue that the debate now needs to move beyond simplistic notions of privacy vs. security to a more detailed understanding of the policy and ethical dilemmas confronting policy makers and intelligence agencies. To that end, we provide a schematic framework (methods, context and target) to promote a better understanding of the practical, policy and ethical problems for security intelligence collection emerging post Snowden. The framework is a first step in identifying common principles that could be used develop an ethically informed set of policy guidelines to help decision makers better navigate between citizens two basic rights: security and privacy.

Privacy and confidentiality in social work

Abstract In the human services confidentiality is a central principle defining the relationship between the worker and the client. In this paper the authors argue that the human services have privileged the notion of confidentiality over the more fundamental right of privacy. They argue there is a persistent confusion between these two concepts and that privacy is an important but neglected ethical concept within human services. The authors discuss the relationship between privacy and confidentiality and identii some of the implications of the privacy concept for practice.

Integrity Systems and Professional Reporting in Police Organizations

An integrity system is an assemblage of institutional entities, mechanisms, and procedures whose purpose is to ensure compliance with minimum ethical standards and to promote the pursuit of ethical ideals. Integrity systems can be contrasted with regulatory frameworks. A regulatory framework is a structured set of explicit laws, rules, or regulations governing behavior, issued by some institutional authority and backed by sanctions. It may serve to ensure compliance with minimum ethical standards (namely, those embodied in a law, rule, or regulation), but this is only one of its purposes. There are numerous laws, rules, and regulations that have little or nothing to do with ethics. The term ‘‘system’’ is, admittedly, somewhat misleading in that it implies a clear and distinct set of integrated institutional mechanisms operating in unison and in accordance with determinate mechanical, or at least quasi-mechanical, principles. In practice, however, integrity ‘‘systems’’ tend to be a messy assemblage of formal and informal devices and processes, and they operate in often indeterminate and unpredictable ways. The integrity of an occupational group is dependent on the individual integrity of its members and, therefore, the integrity system of an occupation is in large part focused on developing and maintaining the individual integrity of its members. The notion of individual integrity implies a person’s compliance with moral principles and being of good character. Many of the moral principles governing the actions of individual persons seem to be universal; they apply to individuals at all times, both in private and in public. For example, the moral principle prohibiting *Seumas Miller, author of Ethical Issues in Policing (2006), is Foundation Director of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (an Australian Research Council Special Research Centre) at the Australian National University and Charles Sturt University, and a senior research fellow in the Centre for Ethics and Technology at Delft University of Technology. Email: seumas.miller@anu.edu. au Criminal Justice Ethics Vol. 29, No. 3, December 2010, 241 257

Filial responsibility and the care of the aged

What obligations and responsibilities, if any, do adult children have with respect to their aged parents? This paper briefly considers the socio-historical and legal bases for filial obligations and suggests there is a mismatch between perceptions in the community over what they see as their obligations, what policy makers would like to impose and how philosophers identify and ground these obligations. Examining four philosophical models of filial obligation, we conclude that no one account provides an adequate justification for the types of responsibility that might be assumed in a family relationship.

Ethical theory, "common morality," and professional obligations.

We have two aims in this paper. The first is negative: to demonstrate the problems in Bernard Gert’s account of common morality, in particular as it applies to professional morality. The second is positive: to suggest a more satisfactory explanation of the moral basis of professional role morality, albeit one that is broadly consistent with Gert’s notion of common morality, but corrects and supplements Gert’s theory. The paper is in three sections. In the first, we sketch the main features of Gert’s account of common morality in general. In the second, we outline Gert’s explanation of the source of professional moral rules and demonstrate its inadequacy. In the third section, we provide an account of our own collectivist needs-based view of the source of the role-moral obligations of many professional roles, including those of health care professionals.

Collective Responsibility, Epistemic Action and Climate Change

This article undertakes four tasks: (1) outline a theory of joint action, including multi-layered structures of joint action characteristic of organizational action; (2) utilize this theory to elaborate an account of joint epistemic action – joint action directed to the acquisition of knowledge, e.g. a team of scientists seeking to discover the cause of climate change; (3) outline an account of collective moral responsibility based on the theory of joint action (including the account of joint epistemic action); (4) apply the account of collective moral responsibility to the issue of human-induced, harmful, climate change with a view to illuminating both retrospective responsibility for causing the harm and also prospective responsibility for addressing the problem in terms of mitigation and/or adaptation.