Shaakirrah R. Sanders
University of Idaho
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Archive | 2016
Shaakirrah R. Sanders; Aníbal Rosario Lebrón; Kathryn M. Stanchi; Linda L. Berger; Bridget J. Crawford
INTRODUCTION United States v. Morrison involved the constitutionality of the private cause of action authorized by the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The District Court and the Fourth Circuit en banc dismissed Christy Brzonkalas complaint against James Crawford, Antonio Morrison, and Virginia Polytechnic Institution. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and held that: (1) VAWAs private cause of action exceeded congressional authority under Article Is Commerce Clause because gender-motivated violence was a noneconomic local activity that did not substantially affect interstate commerce; and (2) the Fourteenth Amendments Enforcement Clause did not allow remedial measures against private actors. Justices Souter and Breyer wrote separate dissents. Both dissenters argued that gender-motivated violence was well within the purview of the commerce power, and neither discussed the validity of VAWAs private right of action under the enforcement power. Professor Anibal Rosario Lebron, writing as a dissenting Justice, details the facts in Morrison quite differently than do the original majority and dissenting opinions. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquists majority opinion briefly and succinctly described Crawford and Morrisons alleged attack on Brzonkala as an “assault[]” and “repeated[] rape[].” Morrisons debasing remarks about what he liked to do with women (delivered some months after the alleged rape) were vaguely described as “vulgar remarks that cannot fail to shock and offend.” The dissenting opinions authored by Justices Souter and Breyer did not mention the terms rape or assault in relation to Brzonkala, nor did the dissenters refer to Morrisons post-attack comments. Rosario Lebrons narrative explicitly adopts a situated perspective. Rosario Lebron challenges neutrality as the proper tone of judicial opinions, as well as the concept that judicial language is somehow disconnected from patriarchy. Rosario Lebron intentionally excludes a discussion of Brzonkalas race and the race of her alleged attackers, believing that such a discussion detracts from how gender-motivated violence perpetuates both physical and economic dominance over women. Nor does Rosario Lebron mention that Brzonkala had been drinking prior to the alleged rape, believing that to do so would constitute re-victimization. Rosario Lebrons personalization of Brzonkalas story offers more than a strict and legalistic narrative of her “encounter” with Crawford and Morrison.
William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal | 2015
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore rests, in part, on the “understandable relationship” between a civil jury’s award of compensatory and punitive damages. Gore identifies three guideposts to determine whether a jury’s award of punitive damages are excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between compensatory and the punitive damages; and (3) the difference between punitive damages and civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. This Article argues that Gore’s second guidepost is based on a false premise as it applies in States that have capped compensatory damage awards: that the plaintiff has been fully reimbursed for actual losses. This Article contributes to existing scholarship on state law compensatory damage caps and the Gore punitive damage analysis by identifying the defect the former produces in the latter. This Article maintains that capped compensatory damages in State law tort actions also caps the Gore punitive damage analysis. This Article advocates uncapping Gore where state procedures do not allow trial judges the opportunity to review a civil jury’s award for reasonableness, where the civil jury is not informed of the cap, or where the civil jury has no opportunity to reconsider an award that exceeds the cap. Without such protections, Gore fails its dual obligation in civil litigation to protect civil defendants against unreasonably high awards and guard severely injured plaintiffs against arbitrarily low awards.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review | 2003
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Archive | 2018
Robin Fretwell Wilson; Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Archive | 2016
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Archive | 2016
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal | 2015
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Archive | 2014
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Archive | 2014
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform | 2013
Shaakirrah R. Sanders