Shana Clor-Proell

The Effects of Presentation Salience and Measurement Subjectivity on Nonprofessional Investors’ Fair Value Judgments

Fair value estimates reported in the financial statements differ in the subjectivity with which the estimates are measured. Mandated supplemental disclosures are intended to enable users to assess the nature of the inputs used to develop the fair value measurements, including their relative reliability, although prior research suggests some investors may have difficulty doing so. We draw on information processing research to predict and find that isolating fair value information in a separate column on the face of the income statement facilitates nonprofessional investors’ ability to incorporate into their perceived reliability and P/E judgments not only the fair value estimates, but also the disclosed measurement differences that underlie those estimates. Our results have implications for standard setters and researchers concerned with the effects of financial statement presentation on nonprofessional investors. Namely, we demonstrate how income statement presentation can improve reliance on mandated supplemental disclosures, thereby resulting in greater financial statement transparency.

How Disaggregated Forecasts Influence Investor Response to Subsequent Earnings Announcements

Firms often issue disaggregated earnings forecasts, and prior research reveals benefits to doing so. However, we hypothesize and experimentally find that the benefits of disaggregated forecasts do not necessarily carry over to the time of actual earnings announcements. Rather, disaggregated forecasts create multiple points of possible comparison between the forecast and the subsequent earnings announcement. Thus, when firms disaggregate forecasts and subsequently release disaggregated actual earnings numbers, investors reward firms that beat those multiple benchmarks, but punish firms that miss those multiple benchmarks. Thus, we show that issuing a disaggregated earnings forecast to achieve the associated benefits can backfire after the announcement of actual earnings. Our results have implications for researchers and firm managers.