Shanna Rose

Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits

We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant, differences in performance by reelection-eligible and term-limited incumbents identify an accountability effect: reelection-eligible governors have greater incentives to exert costly effort on behalf of voters. Holding term-limit status constant, differences in performance by incumbents in different terms identify a competence effect: later-term incumbents are more likely to be competent both because they have survived reelection and because they have experience in office. We show that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents (accountability), and under reelected incumbents than under first-term incumbents (competence), all else equal. In addition to improving our understanding of the role of elections in...

The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the U.S. States

We use unique panel data on the evolution of transparent budget procedures in the U.S. states over the past three decades to explore the political and economic determinants of fiscal transparency. Our case studies and quantitative analysis suggest that both politics and fiscal policy outcomes influence the level of transparency. More equal political competition and power sharing are associated with both greater levels of and increases in fiscal transparency during the sample period. Political polarization and past fiscal conditions, in particular state government debt and budget imbalances, also appear to affect the level of transparency. Copyright 2006, International Monetary Fund

The Political Manipulation of U.S. State Rainy Day Funds Under Rules Versus Discretion

Anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. state politicians manipulate rainy day funds for political purposes, but such claims remain untested in the literature. This article finds that lawmakers withdraw nearly three times more funds in response to a deficit shock of a given size if it occurs in an election year rather than in a non-election year; this occurs despite the fact that the magnitude of shocks does not vary over the electoral cycle. This effect is stronger when incumbents are eligible for re-election than when they are term-limited. When it comes to preventing political manipulation of funds, rainy day fund rules that increase the number of veto players who must approve of withdrawals seem to be more effective than rules that specify the economic conditions under which funds may be withdrawn.

Opting In, Opting Out: The Politics of State Medicaid Expansion

Abstract As the list of Republican-led states participating in the Medicaid expansion grows, it is becoming increasingly clear that partisanship and ideology alone cannot fully explain states’ choices. This paper examines the political and practical dynamics influencing state Medicaid expansion decisions. Whereas resources and history have served to reinforce the effects of partisanship and ideology, several countervailing forces – including public opinion, interest group pressure, budgetary considerations, and need – are pushing even the reddest states toward expansion. The relative force of these competing pressures within a state can help explain not only whether or not the state expands Medicaid, but also the manner in which it does so, such as through a waiver or executive action. I present five case studies – Nevada, Arizona, Ohio, Arkansas, and Tennessee – to illustrate how these various dynamics are shaping states’ decisions.

States as Stakeholders: Federalism, Policy Feedback, and Government Elites

Politicians and program administrators played a central role in early studies of policy feedback but have largely been superseded by a focus on mass publics. This article attempts to revive and reorient the study of elite feedback effects by investigating, in the context of American federalism, whether and how national programs can influence the incentives and resources of state government officials. It examines four case studies in which national officials adopted a new program and subsequently tried to alter it by diminishing the states’ administrative role, reducing the financial resources available, or terminating the program. State-level actors emerged as critical stakeholders and strongly resisted national efforts to reform unemployment insurance and Medicaid, but neither the Sheppard-Towner Act nor general revenue sharing generated strong elite-level feedback effects. This variation suggests that timing (i.e., the political, economic, and administrative context), policy design (financial generosity, administrative discretion, duration of authorization, and coalition potential), and their interaction can prompt or discourage government elites to mobilize.