Sharon Pardo

Normative Power Europe and the Power of the Local

In this article, the unfolding events surrounding the publication of the EU Guidelines prohibiting the allocation of funds to Israeli entities in the Occupied Territories are used to offer three observations about the impact of ‘the local’ on ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE). First, the case study reveals the growing influence of the power of ‘the European local’ on the decision of whether or not to deploy normative power. Second, it underscores the fact that local power relations in the target country often determine the reaction to NPE, while the reaction often produces the visibility of the normative edicts and thus helps empower NPE. And third, NPE’s visibility has an impact on the EU’s self-identification, but not necessarily on the policies it criticizes. These observations underscore the importance of analyzing the various levels of ‘the local’ and their relation to NPE in order to understand the latter’s political impact.

Europe of Many Circles: European Neighbourhood Policy

The Mediterranean gave birth to some of the world’s great civilisations, religions and cultures. Europe and the Mediterranean are joined by both history and geography. The Mediterranean is also a sea of cultures, languages and religions that binds the peoples of its shores. A growing number of EU residents have their roots in the Mediterranean, a region that affects Europe to an increasing extent. Hence, as Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission, stated, ‘It does not seem conceivable to the Europeans that new Europe could be constructed by neglecting its “birthplace”, the Mediterranean.’ Yet today, and especially since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and 11 March 2004 in Spain, the Mediterranean countries, primarily the Arab-Islamic countries, embody the concept of ‘otherness’ for Christian Europe. Nonetheless Europe and the Mediterranean are not doomed to conflict and Europe’s strength lies in a diversity of traditions underpinned by common, universal values that also prevail in the aspirations of the peoples surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, on 11 March 2003, exactly one year before the deadly terrorist attack in Madrid, the European Commission adopted a new Communication, Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (hereinafter referred to as ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’). The Emerging Euro-Mediterranean System by Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris Chryssochoou and The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean

The Year that Israel Considered Joining the European Economic Community

The history of Israel–EU relations has received considerable scholarly attention. The conventional starting point for this history is almost invariably April 1958, when Israel became the third country in the world to request the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Brussels. The background and the lead up to that request, however, have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill this scholarly lacuna by relating the hitherto untold story of Israels exploration in 1957 of the possibility of obtaining full economic and political EEC membership. A centrepiece of the article is the revelation of the 1957 clandestine meeting(s) between Shimon Peres, then director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defence and special envoy of Prime Minister David Ben‐Gurion, and Jean Monnet, in which the two discussed possible full Israeli membership in the EEC. The article is based on some newly revealed archival documents and interviews with former high‐ranking Israeli officials.

The European Union and Israel's Occupation: Using Technical Customs Rules as Instruments of Foreign Policy

This article describes the rules of origin dispute between the European Union and Israel, and argues that these technical customs rules are also instruments of foreign policy. Although the rules have had no direct impact on Israel’s industry in the Occupied Territories, they have bolstered the European Union’s self-identification as a “normative power” while constituting an important legal precedent that has served to legitimize other actions against Israel’s occupation.

Going West: Guidelines for Israel's Integration into the European Union

It has been argued that historically, geographically and even religiously “Israel is from Europe, but not in Europe.”1 Indeed, the European Union (EU) is Israel’s economic, cultural and, in many respects, political hinterland. Yet for all its desire to partake in the European project, Israel is only now beginning to evaluate its relationship with the EU. Israel, however, has not yet made a strategic determination as to its desired relations with the EU.2 In June 2008, the EU–Israel Association Council expressed the political will to intensify EU–Israeli relations and agreed to upgrade them gradually within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).3 In December 2008, the EU External Relations Council adopted guidelines for strengthening political dialogue structures with Israel. The success of this process, however, requires that Israel and the EU both agree on how they want to craft a tailor-made model for their relations.

Euroscepticism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

Abstract This article advances three arguments about Euroscepticism. First, using Israel as a case study we describe its alliances with Eurosceptic political actors, claiming that while each side hopes to benefit from these alliances to advance particular interests, the attraction among the actors are based on ideological affinities that do not align with the norms informing EU policies. If these norms become more contested, it may make it more difficult to construct a ‘normative power’-based approach in EU foreign policy. Second, we reveal how third parties can use Euroscepticism as an instrument for shaping EU foreign policy. Finally, we expose how this strategy produces a political paradox. By allowing itself to become an instrument deployed by a third party, the Eurosceptic member state also agrees to be pushed back into the fold of the EU apparatus, thus reconstituting itself as an internal actor, one which has stakes in the process and is willing to play by the rules of the game.

What Can Pro-Democracy Activists in Arab Countries Expect from the European Union? Lessons from the Union's Relations with Israel

In this article, we analyze the European Unions (EU) approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, showing that there is a wide gap between its normative opposition to the occupation, Israels expanding settlement project, and the EUs foreign trade policy. Our argument is not only that there is no evidence of norm diffusion from the EU to Israel, but that within the EU itself there is no diffusion from the normative political stance to the EUs economic interests. The Israeli case suggests that the pro-democracy activists of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria should be aware that the trade interests of the EU Member States will ultimately trump the EUs political declarations.

The Instrumentalization of Euroscepticism by Third Parties

In January 2016, the European Union’s (EU) Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) reinforced its “differentiation policy” in the “conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process” (MEPP). It highlighted the Union’s position that Israeli settlements products must be clearly labeled in all the 28 member states, and expressed the Union’s “commitment to ensure that—in line with international law—all agreements between […] Israel and the EU must unequivocally and explicitly indicate their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967” (Council of the EU 2016, Clause 8). While the Council’s conclusions were hailed as a great success by several member states, in the days leading up to the vote the foreign policy document was constantly changed and its criticism of Israel’s colonial project was softened.

An American Military Organization or a European Political Alliance? Israeli Views of NATO

Sharon Pardo is a Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in European Studies in the Department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) and the Chair of the National Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence—The Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society (CSEPS) at BGU. Prof. Pardo has published widely on European Union–Israeli relations, and his most recent (2015) book is Normative Power Europe Meets Israel: Perceptions and Realities.

Bordering Disputed Territories: The European Union’s Technical Customs Rules and Israel’s Occupation

In January 2005, the European Union (EU) decided to implement fully the rules of origin (ROO) clause (Pardo and Peters, 2012, Doc. 5/12)1 of the 1995 European Community (EC)-Israel Association Agreement (Doc. 4/23) and to subject products manufactured in the territories Israel had occupied during the 1967 war to customs duty. The EU’s decision spurred a scholarly debate about its legal basis (Hirsch, 1998, 2002–2003; Paasivirta, 1999; Hauswaldt, 2003; Zemer and Pardo, 2003; Aoun, 2003; Harpaz, 2004; Pardo and Peters, 2010), the implications it would likely have on Europe’s normative positions (Harpaz, 2008; Harpaz and Rubinson, 2010; Pardo and Zemer, 2011), and on whether it is consistent with the EU’s policies involving rules of origin in other regions (Pardo and Zemer, 2011; Rubinson, 2011). Surprisingly, though, no one has examined the actual economic and political implications of applying the ROO on Israeli products manufactured in the Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and the Golan Heights.2 Put differently, the implementation of the ROO is the EU’s attempt to use technical customs rules to reassert the Green Line, and it is important to determine whether the effort to redraw an international border — that the Israeli government has wittingly tried to erase — has actually had an impact on Israeli industry in the occupied territories (OT) or on Israel’s settlement policies.