Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
University of East Anglia
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Featured researches published by Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap.
Econometrica | 2014
Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; David Rojo Arjona; Robert Sugden
We test the portability of level‐0 assumptions in level‐k theory in an experimental investigation of behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek games with common, non‐neutral frames. Assuming that level‐0 behavior depends only on the frame, we derive hypotheses that are independent of prior assumptions about salience. Those hypotheses are not confirmed. Our findings contrast with previous research which has fitted parameterized level‐k models to Hide and Seek data. We show that, as a criterion of successful explanation, the existence of a plausible model that replicates the main patterns in these data has a high probability of false positives.
Scottish Journal of Political Economy | 1999
Robin P. Cubitt; Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
A two period, general equilibrium, model is analyzed in which agents foresee how the second period outcome is determined by the investment decisions which they make in the first period. These decisions concern the acquisition of human and physical capital. The paper considers the impact of a minimum wage in the second period. It shows that, in equilibrium, this policy increases both types of investment. There is a range of values of the minimum wage at which the increases in investment are obtained without any reduction in period 2 employment. This is welfare-improving for a range of parameter values. Under very specific circumstances, the minimum wage achieves a Pareto efficient outcome. Copyright 1999 by Scottish Economic Society.
Frontiers in Psychology | 2015
Philip J. Corr; Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; Charles R. Seger; Kei Tsutsui
Is parochial altruism an attribute of individual behavior? This is the question we address with an experiment. We examine whether the individual pro-sociality that is revealed in the public goods and trust games when interacting with fellow group members helps predict individual parochialism, as measured by the in-group bias (i.e., the difference in these games in pro-sociality when interacting with own group members as compared with members of another group). We find that it is not. An examination of the Big-5 personality predictors of each behavior reinforces this result: they are different. In short, knowing how pro-social individuals are with respect to fellow group members does not help predict their parochialism.
Journal of Economic Methodology | 2012
Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; Arjan Verschoor; Daniel John Zizzo
Do the insights into human behavior generated by laboratory experiments hold outside the lab? This is a crucial question that naturally troubles both experimentalists and their critics. We address this question by adopting Poppers injunction that hypotheses should be tested, not by seeking instances of confirmation, but through exposure to conditions where falsification is a serious possibility. We test the hypothesis ‘that experimental insights hold outside the lab’ by selecting a population where the non-experimental evidence points to behavior that is quite unlike what is typically found in the laboratory and we examine whether their experimental results track these untypical behaviors. In our case, they do.
Archive | 2009
Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; Arjan Verschoor; Daniel John Zizzo
In-group favouritism, the practice of treating fellow members of a group better than outsiders is commonplace in social life. It has been observed in the field and the laboratory. Treating people differently in this way is not only a source of tension between groups, when conflict occurs between groups, it may also be linked to the evolutionary development of altruistic or cooperative behaviour within the group. We report here on what may seem, in this context, a surprising experimental result: a form of out-group favouritism in a trust game that is played among the Gisu in Uganda. There is, however, some evidence in the experiment that the absence of in-group favouritism is accompanied by a negligible influence of group membership on trust between fellow group members. This is consistent with those evolutionary arguments which link parochialism (i.e. hostility to outsiders) to altruism (within the group) in the sense that the absence of one is also associated with the absence of the other. Both results reinforce the thought that evolutionary accounts of behaviour should not always assume inter-group hostility and more attention needs to be given to the circumstances under which the character of inter-group relations varies.
European Journal of Communication | 2015
Sara Connolly; Chris Hanretty; Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; John Street
We investigate the determinants of success in four international television awards festivals between 1994 and 2012. We find that countries with larger markets and greater expenditure on public broadcasting tend to win more awards, but that the degree of concentration in the market for television and rates of penetration of pay-per-view television are unrelated to success. These findings are consistent with general industrial organisation literature on quality and market size, and with media policy literature on public service broadcasting acting as a force for quality. However, we also find that ‘home countries’ enjoy a strong advantage in these festivals, which is not consistent with festival success acting as a pure proxy for television quality.
International Review of Economics | 2011
Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
Sugden’s analysis of conventions in The Economics of Rights Cooperation and Welfare is important. One reason for this is the way that it shows that some institutions, which are otherwise thought to require State intervention, can arise spontaneously. Another and less well-recognized reason is that this analysis provides a key insight into the origin of and stability in discriminatory behaviour and beliefs. There are difficulties with such discriminatory beliefs, and I argue that one of the less well-recognized virtues of markets is that they erode such beliefs. This is not because competition is likely to dissipate these beliefs rather it is because, and there is experimental evidence to support this, markets encourage the equal treatment of individuals in ways that undermine discriminatory practices.
The Review of Austrian Economics | 2008
Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
This paper argues that the social capital that comes from group identification has a mixture of effects on welfare. In this sense, this form of social capital is neither snake oil nor elixir but something in between. Strong group distinction and identification reduce the adverse impact that relative comparisons can have on happiness, and they probably help with existential anxieties. However, strong groups in this sense can also plausibly heighten inter-group animosity to the detriment of all. Whether they do, however, is likely to depend on the character of the beliefs that give identity to each group. The paper further argues that an ‘open’ set of beliefs in the Austrian or Hayekian sense are the ones least likely to spawn such animosity. In this way, the paper points public policy away from the encouragement to group formation to the character of the groups that are formed.
Journal of Media Economics | 2017
Henry Allen; Sara Connolly; Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
ABSTRACT Media pluralism is valued in most jurisdictions because it contributes to a well-informed citizenry. The authors examine what media policy and regulatory levers appear to affect five types of citizen knowledge across the European Union. They conclude that concentration of titles matters more than ownership in newsprint; and that neither type of concentration matters in broadcasting in the same way, but the regulatory regime for public service broadcasting does, particularly for political knowledge.
History of Economics Review | 2016
Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
...behavioural economics was a consequence of, and contributed to a much more fundamental shift of the economic discipline. From the late 1970s onwards, the epistemology of economics gradually changed from being grounded in generalized characterizations of, among others, human behavior, to being based on empirical claims of economic behavior that could be refuted and verified directly by experimental and statistical observation. This shift was represented most saliently by a transition from the economists’ distinction between positive facts and normative value judgments to a normative–descriptive dyad taken over from psychology. (p.193)