Shigeto Kitano

Structural Change in Current Account and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics: Evidence from the G7 Countries

Lee and Chinn (2006) and Chinn and Lee (2009) decomposed current account and real exchange rate into temporary and permanent shocks and argued that a temporary shock creates the combination of a current account surplus (deficit) and real exchange rate depreciation (appreciation). This paper extends their framework by examining a possible structural break in current account and real exchange rate dynamics. Using G7 country data for 1980--2007, we find structural changes in two-variable dynamics for all G7 countries during the 1990s. Temporary shocks have not been the main source of fluctuation in the current account since the 1990s. Our empirical results imply that the conventional mechanism has played a limited role in explaining the dynamics of the two variables.

Macroeconomic Effect of Capital Controls as a Safeguard Against the Capital Inflow Problem

Concerns that a rapid surge in capital inflow leads to loss of autonomy in macroeconomic policy, and that its reversal has significant negative effects on an economy, have motivated capital controls during the 1990s. Under a fixed exchange rate system without capital-account restrictions, a decrease in world nominal interest rates causes in a small open economy a deterioration in the current account, real exchange rate appreciation, and inflationary pressure, as pointed out by Calvo et al. (1994, 1996). This paper examines macroeconomic effects of capital-account restrictions as a policy response to the capital inflow problem under fixed exchange rates. Theoretical analysis shows that capital-account restrictions not only stem the capital inflow but also reverse the associated macroeconomic effects. The model implies that capital-account restrictions are effective measures against the capital inflow problem of emerging markets in the 1990s.

Capital Controls as a Credit Policy Tool in a Small Open Economy

Abstract We develop a sticky price, small open economy model with financial frictions à la [Gertler, Mark, and Peter Karadi. 2011. “A Model of Unconventional Monetary Policy.” Journal of Monetary Economics 58 (1): 17–34.], in combination with liability dollarization. An agency problem between domestic financial intermediaries and foreign investors of emerging economies introduces financial frictions in the form of time-varying endogenous balance sheet constraints on the domestic financial intermediaries. We consider a shock that tightens the balance sheet constraint and show that capital controls, the effects of which are rigorously examined as a policy tool for the emerging economies, can be a credit policy tool to mitigate the negative shock.

CAPITAL CONTROLS, MONETARY POLICY, AND BALANCE SHEETS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY: CAPITAL CONTROLS AND MONETARY POLICY

We develop a small open economy, New Keynesian model that incorporates a financial accelerator in combination with liability dollarization. Applying a Ramsey-type analysis, we compare the welfare implications of an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates and an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates. In an economy without the financial accelerator, an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates is superior to an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates. In contrast, in an economy with the financial accelerator, an optimal capital control under fixed exchange rates yields higher welfare than an optimal monetary policy underflexible exchange rates.

External Debt and Taylor Rules in a Small Open Economy

We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which both price rigidity and financial friction exist. We compare two cases featuring different interest rate rules. Both cases use the standard Taylor-type interest rate rules, but the second case also considers external debt levels. We find that when friction in foreign borrowing is large, adding an external debt level to Taylor rules improves welfare. The welfare curve, however, exhibits a hump shape since excessive reactions to changes in external debt reduce welfare.