Shiuh-Shen Chien

Institutional innovations, asymmetric decentralization, and local economic development: a case study of Kunshan, in post-Mao China

The author provides an understanding of the concept of institutional innovations for local economic development in post-Mao China. With Kunshan, one of the most dramatically developed regions in Yangtze Delta, used as a case study, the aim is to understand how, under what circumstances, and by whom, locally initiated projects can be institutionalized and evolved in the context of Chinas transition. ‘Projects’ here refer to those reforms implemented by local governments initially without any permission from the centre. It is argued that the development of those projects can be understood as an evolutionary process, consisting of three mechanisms of local-central interactions: states intention to connive; ex-post state endorsement, and ex-ante state adoption. Moreover, the innovations would be successful not only because of general contexts such as marketization, liberalization, and globalization, but also because of a particular process of economic decentralization to the local and political centralization under the party, or, as is proposed, asymmetric decentralization. Careerist local officials would like to utilize their decentralized resources to strive for more development opportunities, which could in turn become their ‘political capital’, enabling them to attract the attentions of upper level governments and hence gain promotion.

Territorial Competition in China and the West

Chien S.-S. and Gordon I. Territorial competition in China and the West, Regional Studies. In modern western societies, and most other economies to which it has spread, territorial economic competition is associated with a combination of competitive electoral politics and private land-ownership. In mainland China, however, a very strong form of this competition has emerged without either of these supports. In general, the development of such local collective action and its particular effects reflect an interaction between materially interested local agents and structural pressures. The difference in China is that these agents are principally local government leaders whose career prospects within a still centralized system depend upon performance in terms of economic criteria set from above. Chien S.-S. et Gordon I. La compétition territoriale en Chine et dans lOuest, Regional Studies.u2002 Dans les sociétés occidentales daujourdhui, et dans la plupart des autres économies auxquelles elle sest étendue, la compétition économique territoriale sexplique par une combinaison de la politique électorale compétitive et de la propriété foncière privée. Cependant, dans la Chine continentale il sest fait le jour un genre de compétition très fort qui exclut ces deux variables. En règle générale, le développement dune telle action locale collective et de ses effets annexes traduisent linteraction entre des agents locaux, qui ne sont pas intéressés que sur le plan matériel, et des contraintes structurelles. En Chine, la différence cest que ces agents sont principalement des chefs de ladministration locale dont les perspectives de carrière au sein dun système toujours centralisé dépendent de la performance pour ce qui est des critères économiques imposés den haut. Compétition territorialeu2003Chineu2003Rapports centre-périphérieu2003Administration localeu2003Développement économique urbainu2003Réajustement à léchelle Chien S.-S. und Gordon I. Territorialer Wettbewerb in China und im Westen, Regional Studies.u2002 Ein territorialer Wirtschaftswettbewerb wird in den modernen westlichen Gesellschaften (und den meisten sonstigen Wirtschaftsräumen, in die er sich ausgebreitet hat) mit einer Kombination aus um Wähler konkurrierenden Politiken und privatem Landeigentum in Verbindung gebracht. In der Volksrepublik China ist hingegen auch ohne diese unterstützenden Faktoren eine äußerst starke Form dieses Wettbewerbs entstanden. Im Allgemeinen spiegelt sich im Entstehen einer solchen lokalen Kollektivaktion und ihrer konkreten Auswirkungen eine Wechselwirkung zwischen materiell interessierten Akteuren vor Ort und strukturellem Druck wider. Der Unterschied im Fall von China liegt darin, dass es sich bei diesen Akteuren in erster Linie um lokale Regierungsführer handelt, deren Karriereaussichten innerhalb eines nach wie vor zentralisierten Systems von der Leistung hinsichtlich der von oben festgelegten ökonomischen Kriterien abhängig sind. Territorialer Wettbewerbu2003Chinau2003Zentral-lokale Beziehungenu2003Lokalregierungu2003Urbane Wirtschaftsentwicklungu2003Maßstabsänderung Chien S.-S. y Gordon I. Competencia territorial en China y occidente, Regional Studies. En las sociedades modernas de Occidente y en la mayoría de otras economías en las que se ha extendido la competición económica territorial, se relaciona ésta con una combinación de políticas electorales competitivas y la propiedad privada de tierra. Sin embargo, en la China continental ha surgido un tipo de competencia muy fuerte sin ninguno de estos apoyos. En general, el desarrollo de estas acciones colectivas de carácter local y sus efectos particulares reflejan una interacción entre los agentes locales de interés material y las presiones estructurales. La diferencia en China es que estos agentes son sobre todo líderes de gobiernos locales cuya perspectiva profesional dentro de un sistema todavía centralizado depende del rendimiento en términos de los criterios económicos establecidos por los círculos más altos. Competencia territorialu2003Chinau2003Relaciones entre los niveles central y localu2003Gobierno localu2003Desarrollo económico urbanou2003Reescalamiento

The Isomorphism of Local Development Policy: A Case Study of the Formation and Transformation of National Development Zones in Post-Mao Jiangsu, China

It is often the case, although it has not been well-documented, that local governments aiming for economic growth tend to formulate and implement very similar, or even identical, policies. This phenomenon is referred to as the `isomorphism of local development policy, or `local policy isomorphism. Five mechanisms are theoretically elaborated in order to explain the phenomenon of local policy isomorphism. The different regions formulate similar development strategies for the following reasons: they face similar pressure from the central government (or international organisations); they are competing for investments that are highly mobile; they engage in mimetic learning attributable to the uncertainties of development; experienced personnel move from advanced regions to underdeveloped areas; and, professional organisations are involved on a consultancy basis. The case of the formation and transformation of national development zones in the Jiangsu province in post-Mao China is used to illustrate the empirical applications of these five mechanisms.

Economic Freedom and Political Control in Post-Mao China: A Perspective of Upward Accountability and Asymmetric Decentralization

Abstract With post-Mao China as a case study, this article aims to examine the political economy of asymmetric decentralization in relation to development at the national, regional (inter-local) and local levels. Economically, sub-national governments have been granted greater autonomy with huge decentralized fiscal and administrative powers and competencies. Politically, however, China is still a state under Communist Party domination. Local officials are not elected locally but are assigned by the party. This phenomenon of ‘economic decentralization to the local’ along with ‘political centralization under the party’ is described as ‘asymmetric decentralization’. The mechanism behind asymmetric decentralization is upward accountability—the greater the economic growth, the better chances there are for local leaders to receive political promotions, administrative power and many tangible and intangible perks. The article further discusses six Janus-faced consequences of asymmetric decentralization, which can be grouped into three pairs of administrative levels: (1) at the national level—positive for relative national economic stability but negative for uneven development across the country; (2) at the regional (inter-local) level—bad for inter-local fragmentation but good for cross-regional cadre transfer; and (3) at the local level—where local policy innovation is a strength but local unsustainable development is a weakness. These consequences, which look contradictory or incompatible on the surface, can be better understood through the analytic framework of ‘asymmetric decentralization with upward accountability’.

LOCAL RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION IN CHINA: A TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING PROCESS PERSPECTIVE

This paper argues that the formation and transformation of local entrepreneurial governances can be understood as a process of local responses to challenges presented by global economic restructuring. Two kinds of local responses are theoretically identified. At the structure level, local entrepreneurial governances happen when places are embedded in the situation of competition between cities and regions. At the agent level, the emergence of local entrepreneurial governances requires local actors who pursue their own political and economic interests. The theoretical framework, what I term territorial restructuring process, is empirically explained by the context of the West and China.

Industrial upgrading and interaction between the advanced small south and China: the case of Taiwan’s machine tool industry

ABSTRACT Existing studies of late industrialization emphasize the significance of learning mechanisms associated with North–South linkages for the technological and manufacturing capabilities of the South. With reference to investments by Taiwan’s machine tool industry in China, this paper shows how and why a small and relatively advanced latecomer in the South (Taiwan) developed multiple capabilities by exploring and exploiting the technological and market resources of a relatively laggard, late industrializing counterpart with a large domestic market (China). In this way, it demonstrates the significance of South–South interactions and a wider range of capabilities.

Self-learning through teaching: Singapore's land development policy transfer experience in China

As a rising market, China has attracted many transnational agents seeking to tap new resources and/or do business overseas. These agents include international governmental and non-governmental organizations, multi-national corporations, and foreign states. We propose a theoretical concept of ‘self-learning through teaching’ to empirically examine the process by which the government of Singapore does business via policy transfer in China, specifically in Suzhou and Tianjin. Most of the existing literature argues that Singapore has leveraged its experience of rapid economic growth to teach China how to pursue development. Our findings suggest that, in addition to providing China with the benefit of its experience, the Singaporean government has also self-learned a great deal through interaction with China in terms of the political complexities of conducting transnational business, such as how to improve budgeting control over land development, negotiating local interests, and coordinating central fragmentation.

‘Summoning’ Wind for Urban Cooling: Urban Wind Corridor Projects in China

Rapid development in East Asian cities over past decades has not only brought a wealth and economic boom but also has caused various environmental problems, one of which is the urban heat island effect and related dust and haze. This chapter focuses on an urban-cooling governance with a focus on building an urban ventilation corridor project in Wuhan, a well-known ‘stove city’ in China suffering high temperature during summer. The pioneer project in Wuhan aims to cool the urban temperature by institutionally creating a pathway of wind through the city-level master plan. Wuhan also has the knowledge network of the plan of ventilation corridors, given that the Huazhong University of Science and Technology based in Wuhan is one of the leading research nodes of the urban ventilation corridors with interacting overseas research institutes to transfer related knowledge to other Chinese cities. Research questions for this chapter include: what is the social and political process of the weather governance, including the establishment of urban ventilation corridors and implementation of rain enhancement? What stakeholders and professional communities should be mobilised? And how is meteorological knowledge produced and institutionalised to be used on the cooling issue? We argue that the case of Wuhan represents a specific way that the Chinese state attempts to mitigate environmental problems by integrating and implementing new meteorological technologies and services. While new technologies and a powerful state together enable the implementation of weather governance to influence the nature system more than ever before, the huge influence also brings about unpredictable results environmentally and socially.

The Political Economy of Urban and Regional Development

This is a four unit graduate seminar that relies extensively on graduate student engagement in seminar discussion of selected critical readings that have shaped the current boundaries of the theoretical and practical discourse on urbanism and urban development in the social sciences. The objective of the course is to stretch these boundaries and open up new spaces for theory, research, and social action.