Shyama V. Ramani
Institut national de la recherche agronomique
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Featured researches published by Shyama V. Ramani.
Research Policy | 2002
Shyama V. Ramani
This paper addresses three main questions on Indian pharmaceutical firms that have integrated biotechnology in their marketing, production or research activities: (i) What kind of labour stocks of the knowledge base have an impact on market sales? (ii) Which components of the R&D strategy are strategic substitutes and which are strategic complements? (iii) What are the distinguishing features of firms that have already integrated biotechnology in their research activities? The paper shows that market sales are an increasing function of qualified labour stocks. Internal R&D and foreign collaborations are strategic substitutes, while patents and publications are strategic complements. Firms that are active in biotechnology research are likely to be younger and implementing more aggressive learning strategies.
Scientometrics | 2002
Shyama V. Ramani; Marie-Angèle de Looze
In order to formulate firm, national or regional technology policy, it is necessary to have indicators that can measure technological competence. This paper develops a set of indicators using patent statistics to compare the “knowledge base” of individuals, laboratories, firms or nations. These indicators are then applied to the patent applications in France, Germany and the U.K. in the biotechnology sectors. The paper shows that France is lagging behind Germany and the U.K. in technology stocks (or its patent applications) in all biotechnology fields. However it is the leader in the technology network supporting the foods industry. It has a comparative advantage in terms of either technology stock counts or networks in Genetic Engineering, Pharmaceuticals, Foods, Chemicals, Cell Culture and Biocatalysis. Germany is leading in many sectors, but in all sectors in which it is a leader, it is a specialized leader, i.e. its technology networks need to be more extensive. It has a comparative advantage in terms of either technology stock counts or networks in all sectors except Genetic Engineering, Pharmaceuticals, Agriculture and Cell Culture. The U.K. is the leader in the important field of Genetic Engineering and in terms of the entire technology networks in the biotechnology sectors. It has a comparative advantage in terms of either technology stock counts or networks in Genetic Engineering, Pharmaceuticals, Agriculture and Purification.
Nature Biotechnology | 2003
Roger Coronini; Marie-Angèle de Looze; Pierre Puget; Gérard Bley; Shyama V. Ramani
A survey of the scientific and patent literature on single-nucleotide variants reveals the dominance of research centers in the United States and the prolific patenting of SNP technology by a select group of biotechnology companies.
Theory and Decision | 1993
Shyama V. Ramani; Alban Richard
In a seminal article C. Henry (1974) presented the irreversibility effect, which pointed out that under uncertainty, the optimal sequence of decisions depends on not only the payoffs, but also the flexibility, in terms of availability of future options, associated with each decision. But the irreversibility effect pertained to certain particular conditions and definitions. In this paper, a more general model is developed to re-examine the notion of an irreversible decision, its relation with flexibility and the irreversibility effect. It is shown through two propositions that the irreversibility effect need not hold always and the notion of irreversibiity can be used only under certain circumstances to derive the optimal sequence of decisions ex-ante.
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management | 1998
Jacqueline Estades; Shyama V. Ramani
The objective of this paper is to examine the role of external networks not only as a resource but also as a constraint for the evolution ofthe technological competence of twenty new biotechnology firms (NBFs) in France and Britain. The analysis is bared on extensive interviews conducted with the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of twenty NBFs, ten in France and ten in Britain. The paper identifies the network structures ofthe tweng NBFs and the impact of netmorks on the evolution of their technologial competence. The paper also attempts to identify the differences between NBFs in France and Britain in terms of the framework developed. It clearly illustrates that the capacity of NBFs to construct appropriate external linkages with other firms andfinanckrs is crucial to their success.
Social Science & Medicine | 2015
Shyama V. Ramani; Eduardo Urias
Governments of developing countries can be in a vulnerable position with respect to patent protected drugs supplied by foreign firms, if the technology cannot be licensed or independently developed by local firms. In such instances, one possible solution is to negotiate for a price-drop with the patent holder in lieu of issuing a compulsory license. The present paper develops a game theoretic model of such bargaining and shows that while compulsory licenses do not occur under complete information, they can be issued under incomplete information. The model is tested against real episodes of compulsory licenses to derive policy insight.
Rationality and Society | 2007
Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin; Shyama V. Ramani
Even when there is a potential danger of opportunism, economic agents often initiate contracts or engage in trust. Considering a world with two types of agents, opportunists and non-opportunists, interacting under incomplete information, this article develops a simple two-stage game theoretic model to show how trust and cooperation can emerge in a one-shot interaction, even in the absence of a supporting incentive mechanism. Two classic paradigms are considered: the prisoners dilemma and the game of chicken. In the context of the prisoners dilemma, trust depends on the exogenous probability of having a non-opportunist partner, while in the game of chicken trust is purely a function of the payoffs. Contrary to intuition, a high ratio of non-opportunistic agents in the population does not favor contract initiation in the game of chicken and a strong presence of opportunists does not act as an impediment to respecting commitments.
Economics Letters | 2000
Shyama V. Ramani
The paper presents a game theoretic model of technology cooperation where a developing country firm has the options of either developing an innovation alone, purchasing information or collaborating with a developed country firm. Technology cooperation changes the probability of success of commercialization.
Nature Biotechnology | 1999
Marie Angele de Looze; Shyama V. Ramani
A look at the differences between French, British, and German patent application trends.
Scientometrics | 2000
Shyama V. Ramani; Marie-Angèle de Looze
In a recent article a set of indicators have been proposed drawing upon patent statistics, which are meant to describe and compare firm and national research competence. However this article has raised more questions on the validity of such indicators as well as on their use. We have thus examined these issues so as to clarify the nature of the problems involved in the construction of competence and competitive indicators of firms and nations and their subsequent implementation on data bases.