Simeon Djankov

The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations

We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. More than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholders family. Older firms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, significant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families.

Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings

This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.

Private credit in 129 countries

We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP, but that the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms also shows that improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing precede faster credit growth. We also find that creditor rights are extremely stable over time, contrary to the convergence hypothesis. Finally, we find that legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information sharing institutions.

Who Owns the Media

We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media. We then examine two theories of government ownership of the media: the public interest (Pigouvian) theory, according to which government ownership cures market failures, and the public choice theory, according to which government ownership undermines political and economic freedom. The data support the second theory.

Trading on Time

The authors determine how time delays affect international trade using newly collected World Bank data on the days it takes to move standard cargo from the factory gate to the ship in 126 countries. They estimate a modified gravity equation, controlling for endogeneity and remoteness. On average, each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 percent. Put differently, each day is equivalent to a country distancing itself from its trade partners by 70 kilometers on average. Delays have an even greater impact on developing country exports and exports of time-sensitive goods, such as perishable agricultural products. In particular, a days delay reduces a countrys relative exports of time-sensitive to time-insensitive agricultural goods by 6 percent.

Regulation and Growth

Using objective measures of business regulations in 135 countries, we establish that countries with better regulations grow faster. Improving from the worst quartile of business regulations to the best implies a 2.3 percentage point increase in annual growth.

Courts: The Lex Mundi Project

In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

Horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade between Eastern Europe and the European union

Horizontal and Vertical Intra-Industry Trade Between Eastern Europe and the European Union. — The share of intra-industry trade (IIT) in total trade between central and east European nations and the EU is broken down into various components. Vertical IIT is found to account for 80 to 90 percent of total IIT. Controlling for country-specific effects, it is positively associated with product differentiation, labor intensity of production, economies of scale, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Horizontal IIT is also positively correlated with FDI and product differentiation; however, a significant negative relationship is found for scale and labor intensity.ZusammenfassungHorizontaler und vertikaler intra-industrieller Handel zwischen Osteuropa und der Europäischen Union. — Die Verfasser teilen den Anteil des intra-industriellen Handels (IIH) am gesamten Auβenhandel zwischen den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern und der EU in verschiedene Komponenten auf. Es stellt sich heraus, daβ der vertikale IIH 80 bis 90 vH des gesamten IIH ausmacht. Unter Berücksichtigung länderspezifischer Effekte steht er in positiver Beziehung zu Produktdifferenzierung, Arbeitsintensität der Produktion; Skalenerträgen und ausländischen Direktinvestitionen. Horizontaler IIH ist ebenfalls positiv korreliert mit ausländischen Direktinvestitionen und Produktdifferenzierung, während hinsichtlich der Skalenerträge und der Arbeitsintensität eine signifikant negative Beziehung festgestellt wird.

Who are China's Entrepreneurs?

It has been increasingly recognized that entrepreneurship plays a crucial role in successful economies. The Schumpeterian approach to growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1997) advances the view that entrepreneurial dynamism is the key to innovation and growth. A growing body of policy work emphasizes the important role of entrepreneurs in economic development (World Bank, 2003). Yet, research on entrepreneurship in economics is rather limited. There are three distinct perspectives on entrepreneurship in social sciences. The first perspective focuses on the role of economic, political, and legal institutions in fostering or restricting entrepreneurship. Institutional problems are seen in credit constraints that make it impossible to borrow and set up businesses; insecurity of property rights that provides insufficient incentives for entrepreneurs; and regulatory burdens that make setting up new enterprises difficult. The second perspective focuses on the sociological variables shaping entrepreneurship. For example, sociologists study the role of values and social networks in promoting or discouraging entrepreneurial activities. Social networks may work through a variety of channels, such as family, friends, or ethnic groups. The third perspective emphasizes individual characteristics of entrepreneurs. Psychologists have studied the traits associated with entrepreneurship such as a personal need for achievement, belief in the effect of personal effort on outcomes, attitudes towards risk, and individual self-confidence. Although there are studies on each perspective, little work looks at each of these factors taking the other into account. This is precisely what we do in this paper, using a new data set of Chinese entrepreneurs and a matching sample of non-entrepreneurs with similar age, gender, and educational characteristics. The survey covers both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in order to understand how they differ in individual characteristics, family background, social networks, values and beliefs, and perceptions of the institutional environment. The data further allow us to separate Chinese entrepreneurs into two groups, by necessity and by opportunity, and to differentiate non-entrepreneurs in three groups, those who never thought to be entrepreneurs, those who thought but never became entrepreneurs, and those who became entrepreneurs but eventually failed. This is a richer data set than a previous survey in Russia.

Ownership and corporate governance : evidence from the Czech Republic

The Czech Republics mass-privatization scheme changed the governance of many firms in a short time. The authors show that mass privatization was effective in improving firm management because of the concentrated ownership structure that resulted. For a cross section of 706 firms for the period 1992-95, they find that the more concentrated the firms ownership, the higher the firms market valuation and profitability. Large ownership through bank-sponsored investment funds and strategic investors appears to be particularly important in improving corporate governance and turning firms around. They find no evidence that market valuation or profitability were lower for firms in which investment funds sponsored by a firms main bank represented a large ownership stake. It is often argued that the firms main bank having (indirect) ownership control could represent a conflict of interest. The empirical analysis here shows, quite the contrary, that such indirect ownership control has a significant positive influence. On balance, banks that had an (indirect) equity stake in a firm have a positive influence on the firms corporate governance.