Simon C. Smith

CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION

The establishment of workable collaborative relations with indigenous elites formed a vital part of the maintenance of the British Empire. This was especially so in the Malay States, where the Malay rulers enjoyed considerable local prestige as religious leaders and as the organising principle of Malay society itself. As the case of Sultan Ibrahim of Johore demonstrates, nevertheless, indigenous collaborators were no mere puppets and enjoyed considerable freedom of action to frustrate and impede the policies of their imperial overlords. Sultan Ibrahim presents a particularly interesting case study as his 64-year reign more or less spanned the entire period of formal British rule in Malaya.

Power Transferred? Britain, the United States, and the Gulf, 1956–71

The 1956 Suez crisis and its aftermath have conventionally been seen as marking a turning point not merely in Anglo-American relations, but also in Britains imperial destiny in the Middle East. From this time, it has been argued, a transfer of power took place, with the US assuming Britains once dominant position. Some even claim that this development was welcomed by the British. Focusing on the Gulf region, this article reinterprets notions of British subservience to America and British eclipse in the Middle East. Far from anticipating a transfer of power to America in the wake of Suez, Britain clung tenaciously to its remaining assets in the region, while British statesmen were prepared to adopt policies in defiance of Washington. As regards US policy-makers, there was a marked reluctance to take over British positions in the Gulf, not least against the background of Americas mounting preoccupation with the conflict in Vietnam.

Integration and disintegration : the attempted incorporation of Malta into the United Kingdom in the 1950s

Existing interpretations stress that challenges to British interests elsewhere in the Mediterranean were central to Britains initial support for Maltese incorporation into the United Kingdom. Through a close examination of official British records, this article demonstrates, by contrast, that Britain saw integration primarily as a means of solving the complex constitutional and financial problems which had impeded smooth Anglo-Maltese relations since the restoration of responsible government in 1947. Equally, the waning of British enthusiasm for integration can be traced to concerns about the costs of the scheme, especially in the face of Maltese insistence on ‘economic equivalence’, rather than to any downgrading of Maltas importance in the wake of the 1956 Suez debacle. The Maltese premier Dom Mintoffs insistence on equivalence as the price of integration and Britains equal determination to resist such claims provide the key to explaining the schemes demise. Ultimately, Malta followed a more conventional path to independence within the Commonwealth by September 1964.

‘Moving a little with the tide’: Malay monarchy and the development of modern malay nationalism

From the early twentieth century, the ideological hegemony of Malay monarchy has been challenged by emerging Malay nationalism. Despite the more radical manifestations, however, nationalism has rarely sought to overturn monarchy. Indeed, monarchy and nationalism have co-existed, sometimes uneasily, until the present. This co-existence has been facilitated by a number of factors, not least the linkages between the two: during the colonial period and beyond many prominent nationalists came from aristocratic, even royal backgrounds, while the Malay Rulers themselves were prepared to give their patronage to conservative forms of nationalism. Mutual interest in maintaining political and religious conservatism, nevertheless, has not prevented periodic disputes between princes and politicians as the two have competed for the loyalty of the Malay community. Despite such controversies, the continuing hold exercised by monarchy over Malays has placed a limit on the extent to which the Rulers have been supplanted by alternative representations of loyalty and identity. The ability of Malay monarchy to ‘move a little with the tide’, moreover, has assisted its weathering of the nationalist challenge during Malayas transition from colonialism to independence.

Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle

ABSTRACT The reasons for the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf are highly contentious. While some scholars have focused on short-term considerations, especially the devaluation of sterling towards the end of 1967, in the British determination to quit the Gulf, others have concentrated on longer-term trends in British policy-making for the region. This article sides with the latter. Britains Gulf role came under increasing scrutiny following the 1956 Suez crisis as part of an ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of Britains Gulf presence. In this sense, British withdrawal fitted into a wider pattern of British decolonisation. By the 1960s, the Treasury, in particular, strongly questioned the necessity and cost-effectiveness of the maintenance of empire in the Gulf to safeguard British economic interests there. Recent interpretations which seek to disaggregate the British decision to leave Southeast Asia from the decision to depart from the Gulf are also questionable. By mid-1967, it had already been determined that Britain would leave both regions by the mid-1970s, the only difference being that this decision was formally announced with respect to Southeast Asia, but not with regard to the Gulf. The devaluation of sterling in November 1967, therefore, merely hastened and facilitated decisions which had already been taken. Despite the end of formal empire in the Gulf, Britain did seek, not always successfully, to preserve its interests into the 1970s and beyond.

‘America in Britain's place?’: Anglo-American relations and the Middle East in the aftermath of the Suez crisis

Much historical scholarship has depicted Suez as a watershed not merely in British imperial history, but also in Anglo-American relations, marking a decisive shift away from empire and the assumption of British burdens in the Middle East by the USA. The present article, however, argues that this line of argument is too determinist, and indeed simplistic. On the one hand, British policy-makers remained determined to retain as many of their imperial interests in the Middle East as possible and robustly defended these from any signs of US encroachment. On the other hand, the USA demonstrated little interest in replacing the British in the region and indeed sought to preserve as much of the British presence as possible, especially in context of America’s ever-deepening commitment to the conflict in Vietnam. The unilateral British decision to withdraw from ‘East of Suez’ by the end of 1971 dismayed US policy-makers who, rather than seeking to replace the departing British, sought to persuade them to maintain as much of their influence and as many of their interests as possible, especially in the Gulf, beyond 1971.

Failure and success in state formation: British policy towards the Federation of South Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

ABSTRACT Despite the apparent similarities in Britains relationship with the Sheikhdoms of the Lower Gulf and the traditional states of southern Arabia, British policy-makers pursued contrasting policies towards the two sets of territories in the era of decolonization. As regards South Arabia, Britain followed a policy of amalgamating the states into a ‘Whitehall’ federation. The fact that the Federation of South Arabia remained dependent on British backing, and in consequence became ineffably associated with British imperialism in an era of anti-colonial Arab nationalism, fatally damaged its chances of longevity. Applying the lessons of failure in South Arabia, the British were far more inconspicuous in the discussions which led to the creation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Indeed, the fact that the UAE essentially emerged from the initiative of Sheikhs Zaid of Abu Dhabi and Rashid of Dubai, rather than the British, was one of the key factors in its survival. By contrast, the Federation of South Arabia collapsed ignominiously once the ballast provided by the British had been removed.

French imperial outposts in post‐imperial India, 1947–54

ABSTRACT Despite the end of the British Raj on 15 August 1947. the French initially sought to retain their imperial possessions on the Indian sub‐continent. By focusing on the conflict in Vietnam, however, conventional studies of French decolonisation tend to ignore French India. Nevertheless, the two problems of French India and Vietnam were closely linked, not least by the role played in both disputes by the government of India: the ending of the conflict in Vietnam in 1954, in which India played an important part, smoothed the French transfer of power in India.

Centurions and Chieftains: Tank Sales and British Policy towards Israel in the Aftermath of the Six-Day War

Britains attempt to distance itself from Israel as London sought to conciliate the Arab world in the aftermath of the Six-Day War has entered the historiography of Anglo-Israeli relations. A neglected aspect of the development of British policy towards Israel has been the intense debates among British decision-makers regarding the supply of tanks to Israel following the 1967 conflict. British reluctance to export the powerful Chieftain tank to Israel stemmed not only from an unwillingness to fuel an arms race in the Middle East, but also from a determination to protect ongoing and extensive British economic interests in the Arab world, especially oil supplies. In keeping with efforts to dissociate itself from Israel, Britain also sought to downplay, and even conceal from the Arab world, ongoing sales of the less sophisticated Centurion tank to Israel. In many ways, British policy towards Israel culminated in the decision during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to maintain an arms embargo to the region which, while not extending to all Arab countries, hit Israel especially hard as it desperately sought ammunition and spares for its Centurion tanks.

The Business of Decolonization: The Foreign Office, British Business, and the End of Empire in Kuwait and Qatar

The Gulf States, while small in size, were of increasing economic and financial significance to the British economy in the post-war period. While the loss of India in 1947 reduced the strategic importance of the Gulf, this was more than compensated for by the exponential growth in oil production in states such as Kuwait and Qatar, the focus of this chapter. The transfer of responsibility for British relations with the Gulf States from the defunct India Office to the Foreign Office in 1948 left the Foreign Office with the task of managing the challenges and opportunities associated with the advent of oil wealth in the Gulf.