Simon Caney

Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change

It is widely recognized that changes are occurring to the earths climate and, further, that these changes threaten important human interests. This raises the question of who should bear the burdens of addressing global climate change. This paper aims to provide an answer to this question. To do so it focuses on the principle that those who cause the problem are morally responsible for solving it (the ‘polluter pays’ principle). It argues that while this has considerable appeal it cannot provide a complete account of who should bear the burdens of global climate change. It proposes three ways in which this principle needs to be supplemented, and compares the resulting moral theory with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’.

Climate change and the duties of the advantaged

Climate change poses grave threats to many people, including the most vulnerable. This prompts the question of who should bear the burden of combating ‘dangerous’ climate change. Many appeal to the Polluter Pays Principle. I argue that it should play an important role in any adequate analysis of the responsibility to combat climate change, but suggest that it suffers from three limitations and that it needs to be revised. I then consider the Ability to Pay Principle and consider four objections to this principle. I suggest that, when suitably modified, it can supplement the Polluter Pays Principle.

Justice and the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions1

The prospect of dangerous climate change requires Humanity to limit the emission of greenhouse gases. This in turn raises the question of how the permission to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed and among whom. In this article the author criticises three principles of distributive justice that have often been advanced in this context. He also argues that the predominantly statist way in which the question is framed occludes some morally relevant considerations. The latter part of the article turns from critique and advances a new way of addressing the problem. In particular, first, it proposes four key theses that should guide our normative analysis; and, second, it outlines how these four theses can be realised in practice.

Review Article: International Distributive Justice

The literature on global justice contains a number of distinct approaches. This article identifies and reviews recent work in four commonly found in the literature. First there is an examination of the cosmopolitan contention that distributive principles apply globally. This is followed by three responses to the cosmopolitanism, – the nationalist emphasis on special duties to co-nationals, the society of states claim that principles of global distributive justice violate the independence of states and the realist claim that global justice is utopian and that states should advance national interest.

Human rights, climate change, and discounting

It is widely recognised that climate change is having malign effects on human life. How though should we evaluate these changes? The dominant approach employs cost–benefit analysis. In this essay I defend an alternative. I argue that we should see climate change as a threat to human rights. The inter-temporal character of climate change poses a second question, namely should we subject these rights to a positive discount rate. I examine five arguments which purport to show that the human rights jeopardised by dangerous climate change should be subject to a positive discount rate and conclude that none of these succeed. I argue that the rights jeopardised by dangerous climate change do not diminish in importance throughout time.

Cosmopolitan justice and equalizing opportunities

This paper defends a global principle of equality of opportunity, which states that it is unfair if some have worse opportunities because of their national or civic identity. It begins by outlining the reasoning underpinning this principle. It then considers three objections to global equality of opportunity. The first argues that global equality of opportunity is an inappropriate ideal given the great cultural diversity that exists in the world. The second maintains that equality of opportunity applies only to people who are interconnected in some way and infers from this that it should not be implemented at the global level. The third, inspired by Rawlss The Law of Peoples, maintains that it is inappropriate to thrust liberal ideals (like global equality of opportunity) on nonliberal peoples. Each of these challenges, I argue, is unpersuasive.

Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights, and Global Climate Change

The paper has the following structure. In Section I, I introduce some important methodological preliminaries by asking: How should one reason about global environmental justice in general and global climate change in particular? Section II introduces the key normative argument; it argues that global climate change damages some fundamental human interests and results in a state of affairs in which the rights of many are unprotected: as such it is unjust. Section III addresses the complexities that arise from the fact that some of the ill effects of global climate change will fall on the members of future generations. Section IV shows that some prevailing approaches are unable to deal satisfactorily with the challenges posed by global climate change. If the argument of this paper is correct, it follows that those who contribute to global climate change through high emissions are guilty of human rights violations and they should be condemned as such.

Markets, Morality and Climate Change: What, if Anything, is Wrong with Emissions Trading?

This article explores whether emissions trading is morally defensible To do so it examines three different kinds of moral consideration Which might be used to judge emissions trading. The first kind makes what I term an ‘ethical’ objection, and holds that utilising market instruments to combat climate change is inherently objectionable. I examine three versions if this ‘ethical’ argument but find none persuasive. The remainder of the article considers two additional moral considerations, both of which appeal to principles of justice. Drawing on these it argues that emissions trading can be morally defensible but only it it meets these two demanding moral criteria. First, the costs of emissions trading should be shared equitably. The paper examines what this might mean and criticises the leading account of what constitutes a just distribution of emissions Second, emissions trading must make an appropriate contribution to climate mitigation. A number of ways in which current emissions trading schemes signally fail to meet this second criterion are then noted. The article concludes that emissions trading schemes could in principle be morally defensible but only if new schemes are introduced or existing schemes are radically redesigned in line with the principles outlined in the article.

Global Distributive Justice and the State

Many hold that the state has normative significance because its borders define the scope of egalitarian principles of distributive justice. On this view egalitarian principles of distributive justice should be applied within the state but should not be adopted at the global level. This article examines two reasons for accepting this view and for rejecting global egalitarianism, and finds both wanting. It then presents three challenges to any view that holds that the scope of principles of distributive justice should be determined by the boundaries of the state. It concludes by noting four distinct ways in which the state has normative significance, each of which can be endorsed by global egalitarians.

Carbon trading: unethical, unjust and ineffective?

Cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gas emissions are an important part of the climate change policies of the EU, Japan, New Zealand, among others, as well as China (soon) and Australia (potentially). However, concerns have been raised on a variety of ethical grounds about the use of markets to reduce emissions. For example, some people worry that emissions trading allows the wealthy to evade their responsibilities. Others are concerned that it puts a price on the natural environment. Concerns have also been raised about the distributional justice of emissions trading. Finally, some commentators have questioned the actual effectiveness of emissions trading in reducing emissions. This paper considers these three categories of objections � ethics, justice and effectiveness � through the lens of moral philosophy and economics. It is concluded that only the objections based on distributional justice can be sustained. This points to reform of the carbon market system, rather than its elimination.