Simon Derpmann

Ethical Reasoning in Pandemic Preparednes Plans – Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific

The emergence of H1N1 in 2009 shows that it is a mistake to regard the scenario of having to implement pandemic plans as merely hypothetical. This recent experience provides an opportunity to inquire into the current state of pandemic preparedness plans with regard to their ethical adequacy. One aspect that deserves consideration in this context is the disclosure of ethical reasoning. Accordingly, the following is an analysis of examples of pandemic plans and drafts of plans from Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. It is an analysis of the occurrence of explicit ethical reflection in these documents as well an inquiry into the related question of how ethical reflection can be understood as a constitutive element of ethical pandemic preparedness. In the analysis, different fields of ethical consideration concerning equity, personal rights and accountability are distinguished. There are both pragmatic and genuinely ethical reasons to explicitly address issues of these types in pandemic plans. The extent to which ethical language appears in the national plans in South East Asia and the Western Pacific suggests that there is limited awareness of ethical considerations, or at least insufficient ethical substantiation of pandemic action. The aim of the analysis is to show that further inclusion of ethical considerations into pandemic plans is ethically demanded. It is of particular significance that these considerations are formulated and remain discernible as instances of ethical deliberation.

Money for Blood and Markets for Blood

Ontario’s Bill 178 proposing a Voluntary Blood Donations Act declares the offer or acceptance of payment for the donation of blood a legal offence and makes it subject to penalty. The bill reinvigorates a fundamental debate about the ethical problems associated with the payment of money for blood. Scarcity of blood donors is a recurring problem in most health systems, and monetary remuneration of the willingness to donate blood is regularly discussed—and sometimes practiced—as a means to overcome scarcity in blood. However, making blood an object of economic exchange has long aroused ethical concerns that often refer to the specific meaning of blood. From the perspective of a modern understanding of money as a metric of economic value, the exchange of money for blood—shed or given—is seen as ethically troubling, because it appears to imply a commensurability of the value of human life and economic wealth. In this paper, we begin with a general taxonomy of the types of arguments that speak in favour or against compensating donors for giving blood. We then describe the context in which the discussion about payment for blood arises, and of the specific aims and concerns that are brought forward in this context. This is used to reconstruct the normative background that supports the rejection of payment for blood as it is envisaged in Bill 178 and the aims of the proposal. We then argue that while a payment indeed changes the nature of a blood donation in an ethically considerable way, we do not believe that decisive arguments against the monetary remuneration of blood donations can be substantiated, at least not independently of assuming specific societal circumstances. Thus it may be possible to establish a stable and safe blood supply through just gratification while at the same time taking strong provisions against social disconnection, injustice, exploitation or heteronomy.

Money as a Generic Particular: Marx and Simmel on the Structure of Monetary Denominations

ABSTRACT This article is concerned with the structure of monetary denominations of economic value. Marx and Simmel analyze this structure by means of references to objects of mere catallactic validity. These objects are ontologically atypical insofar as they are particulars of the genus commodity. Understanding money through generic particulars elucidates the conceptual link between money as a unit of account and money as a means of payment. This initially perplexing idea captures a fundamental characteristic of money without committing to either a commodity theory or a claim theory of money. A modification of the notion ‘commodity’ allows for a conception of money as a generic particular that is consistent with contemporary accounts of money as abstract purchasing power residing in different forms of liabilities and claims denominated in a common quantitative scale.

Evaluating Philosophy: Susan Haack’s Contribution to Academic Ethics

In this paper we discuss Susan Haack’s contribution to Academic Ethics. The paper is divided into three sections. After the introduction we firstly reconstruct Haack’s critique of what she calls “preposterism” in academia. Secondly, we focus on the measurement of academic quality of philosophical work, scholars, or institutions through surrogate measures. We try to show that a total refusal of surrogate measures in academia is no solution, but that using these measures needs to be restricted in order not to corrupt philosophical research. The third part discusses the question which additional criteria might be required for an adequate evaluation of philosophical research.

Indirect Consequentialism and Moral Psychology

In this paper we discuss Pettit’s attempt to prove the compatibility of consequentialism with common moral psychology. By specifying how moral agents should deliberate, Pettit’s indirect consequentialism allegedly saves pure consequentialism from becoming revisionary or self-effacing. After discussing various possibilities of understanding his model of moral deliberation, we object that indirect consequentialism cannot meet both challenges at once. If it does not turn into a self-effacing theory, it still runs counter to common moral psychology. Ultimately, we suggest that the aspiration to stay true to ordinary moral psychology gives moral philosophers a reason to abandon strict value neutrality.

Not und die Grenzen der Moral

Abstract A philosophical inquiry into the ethics or the morals of distress has to address a distinction regarding its very own scope. On the one hand, situations of distress can be understood to involve particular moral considerations. On the other hand, distress can be understood as the presence of specific characteristics that may allow for a divergence from what is obliged from the moral point of view. The article reflects on the idea of distress as setting limits to moral reflection and obligation, considering particular examples that illustrate the meaning of integrity and personal ties and their practical relevance in situations of distress. In the light of these reflections it seems inadequate to claim that distress exempts one from relying on moral reasoning altogether, but rather that situations of distress engender specific moral considerations.