Simon Duke

The Return of Geopolitics and Relations to the East

Geopolitics is often associated with realism and for this reason not readily associated with the EU. The notion is, however, often associated with ideas of exclusion. This chapter argues that geopolitical perspectives are relevant to the EU if Richard Youngs’ notion of the ‘geopolitics of inclusion’ and Luis Simons’ idea of ‘middle spaces’ are embraced. This chapter argues that the EU and its members have become default geopolitical actors since they are perceived to be such, most notably by President Putin. The development of the EU’s Eastern Partnership from 2004 onwards coincided with a period of strategic unconsciousness, when there was a general failure to think through the impact of the Union’s economic, political and even security engagement with Russia’s ‘near abroad’. This was a major contributory factor to the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and the parlous state of the Donbass region. Engagement with Russia will be difficult, but also necessary. This will require a keener awareness of the EU’s interests in the neighbourhood and how these relate to Russia.

The Pre- and Post-Brexit Evolution of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy

The second half of 2016 saw several initiatives by the EU in security and defence. These were based on the June 2016 adoption by the EU of a Global Strategy, in which security and defence were to the fore. The background to the 2016 initiatives cannot be laid at the doorstep of Brexit, but more as a result of a series of changes in global security and, more specifically, to the Union’s east and south. Nevertheless, the confluence of doubts about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its subsequent meddling in east Ukraine, alongside the emergence of IS to the south, sharpened the political rationale for cooperation at the European level on security and defence. The UK’s historical role in this regard had been instrumental, but occasionally obstructive. The prospect of the removal of the British foot from the brake has accelerated the pace of planning at the European political level to work towards an eventual European Defence Union. There are many challenges, not the least of them being the translation of grand political ambitions into political will and actual capabilities, but the conceptual gulf that has opened between the EU capitals and London is nevertheless appreciable.

The Role of Security and Defence Before and After the June 2016 Referendum

Security and defence did not play a primary role in the debates leading up to the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016. Yet, they were far from irrelevant and arguments surrounding security and defence were employed by both remain and leave camps. Following the referendum the dawning realisation of what Brexit might mean for the UK and the EU added further salience to the security and defence aspects. The delivery of the UK’s withdrawal letter in March 2017 opened the question of the extent to which the various components of the ensuing negotiations, including the security dimensions, should be linked. The UK government presented a position paper on security and defence in September 2017 where it made a call for a deep and special relationship with the EU unlike that with any other third party. This demand, however, stands in contrast to the pre-referendum lack of importance of the EU to the UK’s global outlook and its strategic interests belied by its record of involvement in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). For the EU’s members, the results of the referendum met with expressions of regret, but it also represented the potential for reinvigorated cooperation between the members at the European level. This was, in part, due to the prospective withdrawal of the UK from the EU.

National Security and Brexit

Many of the debates surrounding Brexit, security and defence are couched in terms of the EU’s implicit need for British expertise and capabilities. When it comes to national security considerations, the tables are at least partially turned. As an EU member the UK enjoys access to a number of vital databases for counterterrorism and organised crime and it also contributes to them. It is also a member of the EU police agency, Europol. Although there has been dispute about the exact value of this access to the UK, the emerging consensus is that it is of considerable importance to the UKs post-Brexit security, as are a number of bilateral treaties that address the specifics of borders (like those with Northern Ireland, Gibraltar and Calais). Brexit will imply that the UK will have to negotiate some form of associate status with the relevant agencies and, for access to critical databases, it may well have to accept EU date protection and privacy standards, alongside the relevant jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Negotiations can only commence once the UK formally leaves the EU, but they will be complicated and may require considerable concessions from the UK which may be contentious for domestic politics.

Moving Beyond Brexit: Scenarios for the Future

Brexit is often looked at in terms of how it will impact British interests but without apparently acknowledging that it is the UK, not the EU, that is the demandeur in these negotiations. This chapter therefore presents five possible benchmarks against which the UK’s demand for a unique relationship with the EU in security and defence might be measured against. It concludes by observing that the UK is important to the EU’s security and defence, but not as important as it thinks. It also observes that the UK needs the EU for aspects of its own security and it is not therefore a matter of only considering British interests but also of appealing to the security interests of the EU and its members as well. Finally, the idea that the UK can exert more influence through NATO, as a quasi-proxy for any influence it may lose via the EU on security and defence matters, is flawed. The UK is likely to lose influence in both the EU and NATO. A bespoke relationship with the EU does not mean an agreement that will privilege the UK beyond any other non-EU partners. It is in the interests of both parties to find an equitable agreement since it is not in the interests of the EU to have an enfeebled and introverted UK on its doorstep. Nor, by the same token, is it in the interests of the UK to obstruct closer security and defence cooperation at the European level.

Reconceptualizing the World and the Liberal Delusion

The stakes have seldom been so high. The (in) ability to shape strategy and to inculcate a strategic culture at the European level will say much about the EU’s role, purpose and identity on the global stage for the forthcoming years. Successive external strategies will say at least as much about the internal state of the Union as it does about the world around it. The EU’s own inter-institutional examination of the world in 2030 suggested, ‘The EU will need to gather all of its strength and resilience to preserve its values, its prosperity and security, and perhaps its very survival in its present form’. The High Representative has even referred to the use of strategy as a tool to ‘forge a new social contract with European citizens’ through foreign policy. This, in essence, is the challenge for the EU’s external strategy, now and into the near future. It is one that must be met with not a strategy, but the adoption of a habit of regular strategic review based upon sound analytical capacities and the necessary political will. Muddling through is no longer an option, or as the Commission’s 2016 work plan put it in its subtitle, this is ‘No time for business as usual’.

The EU’s Strategic Unconsciousness and Normative Hubris

The period from the end of the Cold War to the onset of the financial crisis and the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 can be thought of as one of strategic unconsciousness. This was also a period in which the EU was guided by the belief in its normative power and post-modern attractiveness. The popular assumptions underlying The End of History only encouraged the assumption the liberal democracy had triumphed and that for the EU it was sufficient to rely upon itself as exemplar to drive its external actions. The Union’s flagship external policy towards its neighbourhood to the east and to the south was an expression of triumphalism, not strategy. The combination of strategic unconsciousness and normative hubris not only contributed to an existential crisis in the Union’s external actions, but also raised broader questions about the role and purpose of integration.

Transatlantic Relations and Europe’s Missing Asia Pivot

The largest geopolitical revolution of the current age is the end of almost two centuries of Western dominance and the rise of Asia. Although there are multiple opportunities for EU engagement with China and the USA at different levels, there are also clear risks, since engaging with one will send out clear signals to the other. A level of autonomy is clearly desirable so that the EU is not seen as an American proxy in the more sensitive areas of engagement with Asia, especially on security questions. It is also equally important to coax China towards normative agendas that promote multilateral approaches and the rule of law. This will imply pro-active engagement with China in the Silk Roads projects in particular. Both will be delicate balancing acts and ones that will require a good deal of strategic insight and diplomatic finesse.

Existential Doubts and Strategic Dilemmas

The EU was jolted awake from its period of strategic consciousness as the result of a combination of internal challenges (such as the sovereign debt crisis and later the challenges emerging from irregular migration) as well as external changes in the international system. In spite of the Union’s dawning consciousness, precious years were lost in introversion stemming from the financial crisis as well as the implementation of institutional and structural changes within the EU stemming from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The continuing lack of any convincing overarching strategy to guide the EU in the world, or meta-narrative, led to reliance upon process-led diplomacy and an audit culture. Efforts were made to link together the various tools and instruments of the Union’s external actions in the form of a comprehensive approach, but at risk that this would became a qua strategy in its own right.

Geopolitics in the Post–Arab Spring

The Arab Spring quickly turned into winters of discontent. Although the events that led up to and followed the Arab Spring cannot be laid directly at the EU’s doorstep, they nevertheless exposed the underpinning dualism behind the EU’s policies towards the region. Prior to the Arab Spring, the EU and its members had engaged in trade with the southern Mediterranean with relatively little comment on the autocratic nature of the regimes, in return for retaining order in the countries and stemming potential migratory flows. Not only did this informal compact unravel in 2011, it also marked a fundamental challenge to the EU in a region where it was supposed to be able to exert considerable attraction. The rise of Islamic State and other forms of Salafist jihadism pose fundamental challenges to stability in the region and beyond. The EU’s ability to help provide stability to the region in association with the Member States and other international partners will require a keener sense of the EU’s strategic interests and stakes. It will also be a litmus test for the Union’s pretentions to be a major actor shaping the international system.