Simon Locke

Golem science and the public understanding of science: from deficit to dilemma

“Golem science” is Harry Collins and Trevor Pinchs humanized image of science, filled with irresolution, that they wish to substitute for the “god-like” image of definitive knowledge characteristic of public presentations of science. This god-like image creates unrealistic expectations that fuel “anti-scientific” reactions when unmet. This paper argues that the “flip-flop” view set forth by Collins and Pinch is a deficit model that positions the public as sociologically incompetent. It reflects the dilemma of professional social scientists who deconstruct science whilst appealing to the authority of science. This dilemma is an outcome of a deeper tension within science between the universal status of knowledge claims and the particular, human conditions of knowledge production. Drawing on discursive (or rhetorical) psychology, I show that this tension plays out in the rhetorical organization of scientific discourse in the form of a characteristic contrast between empiricist and contingent repertoires. A similar tension is discernible in everyday, mundane reasoning, which suggests that a golem image of science is already present in commonsense understanding alongside the “god-like” image. Thus, the public understanding of science is dilemmatically constituted, providing the conditions of argumentation with science seen in “antiscience”—itself a “folk devil” and rhetorical label. The analysis in this paper is illustrated using the example of creationism, which arises from an argumentative engagement with science that draws on the resources provided by the dilemma of science in conjunction with other resources drawn from Christianity. There is no simple “flip-flop” here. Further research into rhetorical reasoning in public understanding is called for on the grounds that greater appreciation of this is needed alongside golem science to improve relations between scientists and the public.

Fantastically reasonable: ambivalence in the representation of science and technology in super-hero comics:

A long-standing contrast in academic discussions of science concerns its perceived disenchanting or enchanting public impact. In one image, science displaces magical belief in unknowable entities with belief in knowable forces and processes and reduces all things to a single technical measure. In the other, science is itself magically transcendent, expressed in technological adulation and an image of scientists as wizards or priests. This paper shows that these contrasting images are also found in representations of science in super-hero comics, which, given their lowly status in Anglo-American culture, would seem an unlikely place to find such commonality with academic discourse. It is argued that this is evidence that the contrast constitutes an ambivalence arising from the dilemmas that science poses; they are shared rhetorics arising from and reflexively feeding a set of broad cultural concerns. This is explored through consideration of representations of science at a number of levels in the comics, with particular focus on the science-magic constellation, and enchanted and disenchanted imagery in representations of technology and scientists. It is concluded that super-hero comics are one cultural arena where the public meaning of science is actively worked out, an activity that unites “expert” and “non-expert” alike.

Conspiracy culture, blame culture, and rationalisation

This paper outlines an approach to conspiracy culture that attempts to resolve the conundrum posed by the parallel logics of conspiracy and sociological theorising, without reducing the former to an irrational response to hidden social forces. Rather, from a re-crafting of Webers rationalisation thesis as an analysis of the developmental logic of theories of suffering, it argues that conspiracy culture is an outcome of the means of moral accounting, or blame attribution, that inform mundane reasoning in modernity, as also are the human sciences. As part of this, the paper sketches a tentative framework of moral accounting in relation to the notion of ‘blame culture’ based in part on a distinction between a culture of blaming and the blaming of culture. This is used to argue that there is nothing irrational about conspiracy culture – or at least no more so than there is about sociology.

Sociology and the public understanding of science: from rationalization to rhetoric.

This paper contributes to the reappraisal of sociological theories of modernity inspired by the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). As much as these theories rely on received ideas about the nature of science that SSK has called into doubt, so do they rely on ideas about the public understanding of science. Public understanding of science has been assumed to conform to the monolithic logic and perception of science associated with rationalization, leading to an impoverished view of the cognitive outlook of the modern individual. Rationalization has become the basis for the construction of theoretical critique of science divorced from any clear reference to public understanding, with the result that theory has encountered considerable problems in accounting for public scepticism towards science. However, rather than question rationalization, the more typical strategy has been to propose radical changes in the modernization process, such as postmodernism and the risk society. Against this, an alternative view of public understanding is advanced drawn from SSK and rhetorical psychology. The existence of the sociological critique of science, and SSK in particular, suggests that the meaning of science in modernity is not monolithic but multiple, arising out of a central dilemma over the universal form of knowledge-claims and their necessarily particular, human and social grounding. This dilemma plays out not only in intellectual discourses about science, but also in the publics understanding of science. This argument is used to call for further sociological research into public understanding and to encourage sociologists to recognize the central importance of the topic to a proper understanding of modernity.

Colouring in the “black-box”: Alternative renderings of scientific visualisations in two comic book cosmologies

Two somewhat contrasting views of public uses of scientific visualisations argue that they are “black-boxed” with meaning given by the scientific community or they are “polysemic” with meaning given by the context of presentation. This paper argues that whether they are treated as black-boxed or not and in what manner this is done is itself part of the meaning given by context. Thus, “black-boxing” is done not only by scientists but also by members of the public. The argument is illustrated by reference to two recent comic books, Dave Sim’s Cerebus and Alan Moore’s Promethea, in which the authors present cosmological visions of the universe using scientific visualisations to create a sense of realism. From analysis of their use of images of planet Earth and the human foetus it is argued that, although the images are black-boxed, the authors re-work them aesthetically to suit their specific moral and cosmological views.

Spirit(ualitie)s of Science in Words and Pictures: Syncretising Science and Religion in the Cosmologies of Two Comic Books

This article contributes to recent interest in visuality in contemporary spirituality through a focus on comic books. It builds on the analysis of the discourse of reflexive spirituality regarding the syncretising of science and religion to examine how discursive and visual representations are combined in a mutually reinforcing way to invest a transcendent cosmological belief with a sense of realism. As a ‘hybrid’ medium that combines words and pictures, comics provide an opportune focus for such study and in recent times some comics creators have used them to set out such transcendent visions. Two such visions are examined: those of Dave Sim, writer-artist of Cerebus, and Alan Moore, writer of Promethea. Although both draw upon traditional religious/spiritual beliefs in combination with science, they do so in different ways. However, they use similar rhetorical techniques, including metaphor and synecdoche—features which this article elicits.

Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion

worthy within their genre, one of that genre’s problems is that it is perhaps not atheist enough (106). These works may occupy a role that was frequently assumed to be God’s—‘‘a classically metaphysical. . . theological story in which science, history, love and art play the same transcendental, redemptive role’’ (ibid). Rushdie and Pullman are perhaps not so sure that they have it right and are therefore more generous to others’ ways of thinking and believing, while McEwan and Amis are perhaps Christian liberalists (107). For Bradley and Tate, there are contemporary novelists in both the East and the West who write more engagingly about clashes between new atheism and religion and they consider what the future might be for novels of the new atheist genre, noting that the Christian fundamentalism, which so often nourishes such novels, is likely to be with us for some time yet. While they suggest that new atheist discourse may be correct in challenging religion that inspires ‘bad concepts’, such as racism, misogyny, and terrorism, they argue that it is often itself not immune to such discourses. Bradley and Tate note that such works underline what is lacking in public discourse on religion and that discrimination, sensitivity, and caution have never been needed as much as they are now. For these reasons, the ‘new atheist’ authors have to accept criticism of their works. I congratulate Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate on this interesting and, as I mentioned previously, beautifully written book. It is a real pleasure when one has so often read books that show so clearly the bias of the author(s) to read a book of such balance and erudition.

Book Review: Darin Weinberg, Contemporary Social Constructionism: Key Themes

Russia and Japan, as well as Britain and America. The contributing essays are particularly illuminating in introducing us to the histories and scholarship of Russian, Italian, French and German sociologists and sociological thought. There is also the reminder particularly through Durkheim and the Collège de Sociologie of interdisciplinary interaction – especially of the once vibrant relationship between Sociology and Anthropology before the time of institutional disciplinary divisions. As well, the volume’s empirical studies cover a wide geographical and comparative range including Albania, China, India, Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Palestine and Israel. Fascinating, too, are the provocative essays in the second section on the contemporary relationship of states and empires, and the new imperialism. This is overall an ambitious volume which does what it aims to do, that is, to drag Sociology out of its amnesia and recognize its historical role in colonial research, and to foreground current sociological research on imperialism today. Despite the anthology’s comprehensive coverage, one of course notes geographical omissions (Spanish, Latin American, Scandinavian and Oceanic studies, for example). There is also no mention of the Malaysian sociologist Syed Hussein Alatas who, as early as in the 1960s, grappled with the colonial legacy and societies in newly independent states, and whose 1977 book Myth of the Lazy Native had a significant influence on Edward Said’s Orientalism. This is not a criticism but an indication that there is much more to be done in this area – and to restore many more absent sociologists and their oeuvre to the debate. We need, however, to be mindful that in Sociology’s decentring, we do not re-centre the debate back on Sociology and its origins, that is, namely, back to Europe and America. We need to focus on Sociology’s future, its development and its interactions beyond its English-speaking shores, and be open to different concepts, methodologies and approaches. As such, George Steinmetz’s Sociology and Empire signals a necessary and significant contribution.