Simon Parsons

The Doctrine of Identification, Causation and Corporate Liability for Manslaughter

This article examines corporate liability for manslaughter. It considers the legal effect of the ‘identification’ doctrine and how it operates as a legal barrier to potential corporate liability. The question of whether the ‘conduct’ of a corporation is a cause of death is also examined. The article maintains that the Court of Appeal in Attorney Generals Reference (No.2 of 1999) had the opportunity to remove the legal fiction of identification and to overcome the problem of causation, so that a proper appraisal of an organisational structure can be made in order to ascertain whether a corporations safety performance was grossly negligent.

The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Ten Years On: Fit for Purpose?

It has been just over 10 years since the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (the Act) was brought into force on 6 April 2008. The Act abolished killing by gross negligence manslaughter in respect of corporations and abandoned the identification doctrine, so that a corporation cannot be attributed with liability for that crime. In its place, the Act creates in English law the offence of corporate manslaughter. The purpose of the change was to enable the courts to get away from the identification doctrine with its emphasis on the directing mind of the corporation being grossly negligent to an offence that would impose direct personal liability on a corporation where there has been a gross management failure which was the cause of a person’s death. The offence enables the conduct of all the management within a corporation to be taken into account when ascertaining whether there were systemic failures in respect of safety that caused a death. Thus, both small and large corporations could face liability for the offence of corporate manslaughter. However, a substantial contribution by senior management to the gross breach of duty is required. Has this requirement made the offence ineffective against large corporations? The case law does appear to give an answer to that question.

Joint Enterprise Murder R v Jogee

The law on joint enterprise murder has been harsh on secondary parties and in R v Jogee the Supreme Court attempts to alleviate this harshness by reversing an incomplete and erroneous reading of the previous case law. This comment considers whether this liberalisation of the law in favour of secondary parties is more apparent than real.

The Loss of Control Defence—Fit for Purpose?

This article examines the case law on the loss of control defence and considers whether the interpretation of the defence has been too conservative so that the defence is barely available as a defence to murder.