Simona Guerra

Central and Eastern European attitudes in the face of union

List of Tables and Figures List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements 1. Introduction: Europe and Europeans 2. Patterns of Support for and Opposition to European Integration as a Candidate Country 3. Patterns of Support for and Opposition to European Integration After Accession 4. Voting for or Against Europe 5. Information on the EU: Poland and Central and Eastern Europe 6. Euroscepticism and the Next Enlargements Conclusion Appendix

Europe Facing New Challenges of Contestation and Communication: Conclusion

We started working on this volume after a symposium held in Vienna in April 2015, where we examined the concept of Euroscepticism and the nature of opposition to EU integration, while studying the relationship between the media and European democracy. In particular, we addressed the role of ‘traditional media’, as well as ‘new media’, and whether these can be facilitator or obstacle to both European democracy and the development of European citizens, or demos, as suggested in the last chapter of this book.

Communicating Europe, Contesting Europe: An Introduction

This volume explores attitudes of various types of political actors (citizens, political parties, social movements) towards the EU and Europe, focusing on the potential role of old and new media on them. In a context of contested legitimacy of the European democracy, the media are crucial either as an arena for political actors where to express their discontent and to contest the EU. The media represent an instrument for citizens to both get informed about European matters and, eventually, increase their interest in European politics and, possibly participation. Hence, the role of traditional mass media and the new ones in an increasingly ‘politicized’ EU can be manifold: agenda setters, catalysers (and amplifiers) of critical situations, as well as bottom-up channel for the voice of citizens (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). In this book, we shall address these issues, framing the current situation of Europe and the positions towards it in the context of ‘mediated’ politics. Therefore, this book will be guided by the following questions: How is Euroscepticism emerging in the current European turmoil? Are the (traditional and new) media, facilitators or obstacles to European democracy and the development of (pro) European citizens?

Eurosceptic Voices: Beyond Party Systems, Across Civil Society

Research questions emerging from the literature move towards ‘understanding’ Euroscepticism more convincingly (Leconte, Understanding Euroscepticism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). However, we still need to investigate Euroscepticism beyond political parties and where and when countries view the lack of success of Eurosceptic parties at the domestic level. This chapter examines public Euroscepticism, as apathy towards politics in general, manifesting itself as an uninterested attitude towards the EU (see Guerra, Central and Eastern European Attitudes in the Face of Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), but also in a more emotional dimension of the phenomenon, when the role of the media or contested debates can further trigger anger and anxiety. The analysis addresses the understanding of the phenomenon to suggest further avenues of research.

Without losing my religion: The dilemmas of EU integration in Poland

In Poland, the Catholic Church has always maintained its vital role across society. During the communist regime, the Catholic Church supported resistance and autonomy and provided legitimacy to any organised form of protest and opposition. Since 1989, it had to reposition itself across the changing social and political life. One of the main aims of the democratization process in the country was Polish membership to the EU. Yet, the Catholic Church never assumed homogenous and coherent positions. Although levels of public support for EU integration were rather high up to the middle 1990s, concerns started to emerge around possible secular European threats towards Polish culture and values. The Catholic Church could so represent the ally of those who sought to defend Polish traditional values. If the official Catholic Church remained rather pragmatic towards EU integration, and finally supportive, although never enthusiastic, it was in these years that radical right and right wing groupings became electorally successful, as with the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin: LPR), campaigning on Euroscepticism and the mobilization against abortion, euthanasia and the role of the Church in the Polish life. An analysis on the Polish National Election Studies shows that these issues are still significant after fifteen years. Despite an overall positive macro-economic situation, in 2015, at the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poles voted against the incumbent, Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska: PO). Young people’ disillusionment and citizens’ disappointment towards the incumbent shifted the votes towards PiS (Law and Justice, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS), Kukiz’15, and KORWiN. Their agenda, advocating social national conservative (PiS), sometimes populist (Kukiz’15), and radical right and hard Eurosceptic (KORWiN) programmes can still indicate that Polish values and Polish policy towards the EU are salient factors, while the radical Catholic Church can still play an important role in the social and political life of the process of Europeanization of Poland.

Anger and protest: referenda and opposition to the EU in Greece and the United Kingdom

Abstract The public image of the European Union (EU) has met increasingly negative evaluations since the economic and financial crisis hit its peak. Although opposition towards the EU has been pitched as a temporary phenomenon, it has now become a distinctive characteristic of European integration, described as ‘embedded’. Recent analyses on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU underline a rational utilitarian dimension, stressing that EU attachment is affected by future life expectations. Are rationalist perspectives the only possible explanation behind the rise of Euroscepticism, though? This article offers an alternative approach, by using discourse analysis, and examines how emotions, as embedded in Eurosceptic discursive frames and practices, may affect attitudes towards the EU. We argue that an analysis of citizens’ opposition through emotions when the salience of the EU increases can show how a Eurosceptic emotion-laden public discourse may become prominent at the domestic level.

Patterns of Support for, and Opposition to, European Integration after Accession

This chapter explores the attitude of Polish public opinion towards European integration after accession (2004–2012) in comparative perspective. In particular, it explores in detail the first three years and the apparent Eurosceptic outcome of European elections and referendums. The very low turnout at the 2004 EP election, the debates on the Constitutional Treaty, and the reasons behind a deceptive supporting attitude towards a possible referendum before the French and Dutch rejections are illustrated, explaining the rationale of the consequent drop in support. The idea of a ‘second-class’ membership seemed to impact on Polish public opinion. As the national parliamentary and presidential elections moved the country rightwards, the chapter gives details of the difficulties around the debate on the Constitutional Treaty among political elites. However, despite gloomy expectations, the relationship between political cues and public opinion could lead to less Eurosceptic conclusions.

Euroscepticism and the Next Enlargements

This chapter draws upon the findings of the previous chapters of this book. In Chapters 2 and 3 the analysis stressed increasing levels of Euroscepticism in the run-up to accession. Also, the comparative analysis highlighted the parallel electoral success of populist parties. Here, the chapter presents a theme that the in-depth examination of the Polish case brought to light: after the opening of the negotiation process and the long period of waiting, it is easier for populist parties to channel citizens’ dissatisfaction, particularly pointing to Euroscepticism, using it as external face of their empty ideological box – in their ‘chameleonic’ nature (Taggart, 2000). It is likely that favourable institutional settings, high volatility rates, and the new politics – absorbed by the CEE countries (Wisniowski, 2000) – together with a large agrarian sector (as in Poland and Romania) and the success or failure of the economic transition (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2001) can favour the emergence of the accession populism, that type of populism rising specifically on the verge of accession and using Euroscepticism as its external face.

Voting for or against Europe

In 2004 the EP elections brought citizens of 27 EU countries out to vote, highlighting a wide ‘Eurogap’ between the old member states, plus Malta and Cyprus, and the eight post-Communist member states. About 55.63 per cent voted in the ‘old Europe’ and Malta and Cyprus, compared with only 31.19 per cent who casted their vote in the new EU member states. When Bulgaria voted in May 2007, turnout was at 29.22 percent and in November 2007 in Romania it halted at 29.47 per cent. In 2009 the general average decreasing trend, registered since the first EP elections took place, did not alter. Also, the ‘Eurogap’ between old member states plus Malta and Cyprus (54.01 per cent) and the post-Communist new EU member states (22.93 per cent) was almost unvaried.

Patterns of Support for, and Opposition to, European Integration as a Candidate Country

How public support for the EU is structured in the short term in Poland may offer insight into the way in which it will develop in all the CEE states. In addition, findings can suggest patterns of support well beyond this comparative perspective and be applied to the EU member states and current candidate countries. This study contends that the Polish study can be examined in the comparative framework of CEE, applied to the EU28, and beyond.