Simone Burkhart

Legislative Self-Restraint under Divided Government in Germany, 1976-2002

Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party-political conflict, but rather to a governments legislative self-restraint. We tested the hypotheses following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.

A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany's 2006 Constitutional Reform

The German federal reform adopted in 2006 aims to enhance efficiency and accountability of governance by disentangling the intertwined levels of government and by reducing the veto rights of the Bundesrat, Germanys strong second chamber. In this article, we assess the degree to which reform in these areas has been fulfilled. In particular we ask if the reform will i) accelerate the legislative decision-making process, ii) expand the freedom of political action of the federal government and iii) disentangle the competencies between the intertwined levels of German government. Our analysis shows a remarkable gap between the ambitious goals of reformers and the reality of the actual reform outcome.

Kompromiss und Konflikt im parteipolitisierten Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Die meisten Bemuhungen, das Blockadepotenzial des deutschen Foderalismus in der Gesetzgebungsstatistik nachzuweisen, blieben bisher erfolglos. Auch deswegen ist der Einfluss des Bundesrates auf die Gesetzgebung bei entgegenlaufenden Mehrheiten zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat in der Literatur weiterhin umstritten. Dieser Beitrag fuhrt eine aus der „Judicial Review“-Literatur entnommene Uberlegung zur gesetzgeberischen Autolimitation in die Debatte ein. Die zentrale These des „Autolimitations“- oder Selbstbeschrankungs-Arguments in unserem Zusammenhang lautet, dass sich deutlich entgegenlaufende Mehrheiten zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat im Regelfall nicht in einem haufigen Bundesratsveto und dem Scheitern von Gesetzen niederschlagen, sondern zu Kompromissen bei erheblicher politischer Selbstbeschrankung der Regierung fuhren. Herrschen jedoch im Bundesrat knappe oder uneindeutige Mehrheitsverhaltnisse, spekulieren sowohl die Regierung als auch die Opposition auf die Durchsetzung von weniger kompromissbereiten Positionen sowie auf eine Abstimmungsniederlage des politischen Gegners, sodass wir hier intensiven parteipolitischen Konflikt erwarten. Aus der Argumentation ergeben sich eine Reihe von empirischen Implikationen, die mithilfe eines detaillierten Datensatzes zur deutschen Gesetzgebungstatigkeit zwischen 1976 und 2002 uberpruft werden. Die Ergebnisse bestatigen im Wesentlichen die Autolimitationsthese und unterstreichen damit auch das erhebliche Blockadepotenzial des bundesdeutschen Foderalismus.

Die Dauer der Gesetzgebungstätigkeit und die Herrschaft über den parlamentarischen Zeitplan — eine empirische Untersuchung des Legislativprozesses in Deutschland

Wir verdanken Herbert Dorings zahlreichen Arbeiten zur vergleichenden Regierungslehre, unter anderem den wichtigen Hinweis, dass wir zwischen der parlamentarischen Abstim-mungsagenda und der parlamentarischen Zeitagenda zu unterscheiden haben (Doring 1995, 2005). Mit dieser Unterscheidung hat Herbert Doring gangige Agendasetzermodelle analytisch bedeutend erweitert — Modelle, die sich normalerweise ausschlieβ lich mit der Macht uber die parlamentarische Abstimmungsagenda beschaftigen, obgleich wir wissen, dass die Herrschaft uber den Terminplan’—uber die knappe Ressource Zeit—ein zentraler Aspekt jeder politi-schen Herrschaft ist.

Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976-2005

This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germanys second chamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is often assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat delay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm such an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether and how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threaten to delay the legislative process for an undue length of time. Our study is based on a comprehensive dataset featuring a wealth of information on all bills adopted between 1976 and 2005. We show that divided government delays legislation, but to a somewhat lesser extent than often assumed. We show that under divided government the federal government loses some of its power over the parliamentary calendar – with possible consequences for its ability to implement its political agenda. Interestingly, this finding is not limited to bills that require the consent of the second chamber, but applies to all bills.

Between Consensus and Conflict: Law-Making Processes in Germany

Germany is routinely considered a consensus democracy. Its federal structure, strong bicameralism, corporatism and a powerful constitutional court demand cooperative action on the part of all actors involved in legislative decision-making. It is therefore hardly surprising that research on German law-making has stressed the impact of parliamentary and non-parliamentary institutions which reduce conflicts and promote cooperative behaviour. However, as one takes a closer look, the consensual nature of the German political system becomes questionable. The dichotomy of government and opposition which is the hallmark of majoritarian democracy and comes with strong party political conflict is also dominant in German politics. Moreover, minority cabinets or oversized coalitions, which favour political cooperation in the Scandinavian democracies or the Low Countries, are uncommon in Germany where the federal government is generally supported by a strong and cohesive majority in the first chamber, the Bundestag. The emphasis on consensual politics and policy outcomes sometimes obscures the fact that consensus and cooperation are conditional: although most policy outcomes are highly consensual, the road to achieving such outcomes is often paved with severe conflicts arising, for example, from interand intra-party competition, struggles between government and opposition or between the two parliamentary chambers. While institutionally Germany might rank among consensus democracies, its politics and behavioural patterns often seem to deviate from the consensus ideal. In his seminal study, Gerhard Lehmbruch pointed out that the German political system combines the logic of party competition with the principle of federal cooperation. The combination of the bargaining mode in the party arena and the cooperative mode in the federal arena, Lehmbruch argues, can paralyse legislative decision-making. It is in the legislative arena where the opposing principles of party competition and consensual behaviour are most likely to clash: On the one hand, party competition is likely to be carried into the second chamber, the Bundesrat, which can wield strong veto power. This hampers considerably the government’s capacity to act whenever the opposition controls a majority in the Bundesrat, as was usually the case in recent decades. On the other hand, the need to accommodate a majority in the Bundesrat will blur the boundary between government and opposition, thus diluting party competition. Lehmbruch’s argument, often referred to as