Simone Schütz-Bosbach

On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections

The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals and peripheral afferent signals to these two varieties of body experience remain unknown. In the present review, we consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and we then present a series of experiments that study the interplay between motor and sensory information. In particular, we focus on how multisensory signals interact with body representations to generate the sense of body-ownership, and how the sense of agency modulates the sense of body-ownership. Finally, we consider the respective roles of efferent and afferent signals for the experience of ones own body and actions, in relation to self-recognition and the recognition of other peoples actions. We suggest that the coherent experience of the body depends on the integration of efferent information with afferent information in action contexts. Overall, whereas afferent signals provide the distinctive content of ones own body experience, efferent signals seem to structure the experience of ones own body in an integrative and coherent way.

A New Look at Sensory Attenuation Action-Effect Anticipation Affects Sensitivity, Not Response Bias

The systematic association of an action that a person performs with its sensory effects is thought to attenuate that person’s perception of the effect of the action. However, whether learned sensorimotor contingencies truly affect perception, rather than just inducing a response bias, has yet to be determined. The experiment presented in this article comprised two parts: an action-effect association phase and a test phase, during which the actions’ perceptual effects were tested. During the association phase, specific actions (left-key and right-key presses) were associated with specific visual effects (tilted Gabor patches). In the test phase, participants’ left-key presses and right-key presses triggered the onset of a low-contrast tilted Gabor patch in 50% of trials (no stimulus was presented on the remaining 50% of trials). Participants were required to report the presence or absence of this tilted Gabor patch. Our results showed that participants’ sensitivity (d′) to the Gabor patches was reduced by 10% when the patches were triggered by the action they had previously been associated with. This finding indicates that a person’s action does not induce a response bias (c), but changes the perception (d′) of the learned action effect.

How “Social” is the social Simon effect?

In the standard Simon task, participants carry out spatially defined responses to non-spatial stimulus attributes. Responses are typically faster when stimulus location and response location correspond. This effect disappears when a participant responds to only one of the two stimuli and reappears when another person carries out the other response. This social Simon effect (SSE) has been considered as providing an index for action co-representation. Here, we investigated whether joint-action effects in a social Simon task involve mechanisms of action co-representation, as measured by the amount of incorporation of another persons action. We combined an auditory social Simon task with a manipulation of the sense of ownership of another persons hand (rubber hand illusion). If the SSE is established by action co-representation, then the incorporation of the other persons hand into ones own body representation should increase the SSE (synchronous > asynchronous stroking). However, we found the SSE to be smaller in the synchronous as compared to the asynchronous stroking condition (Experiment 1), suggesting that the SSE reflects the separation of spatial action events rather than the integration of the other persons action. This effect is independent of the active involvement (Experiment 2) and the presence of another person (Experiment 3). These findings suggest that the “social” Simon effect is not really social in nature but is established when an interaction partner produces events that serve as a spatial reference for ones own actions.

Prospective coding in event representation

A perceived event such as a visual stimulus in the external world and a to-be-produced event such as an intentional action are subserved by event representations. Event representations do not only contain information about present states but also about past and future states. Here we focus on the role of representing future states in event perception and generation (i.e., prospective coding). Relevant theoretical issues and paradigms are discussed. We suggest that the predictive power of the motor system may be exploited for prospective coding not only in producing but also in perceiving events. Predicting is more advantageous than simply reacting. Perceptual prediction allows us to select appropriate responses ahead of the realization of an (anticipated) event and therefore, it is indispensable to flexibly and timely adapt to new situations and thus, successfully interact with our physical and social environment.

The self in action effects: Selective attenuation of self-generated sounds

The immediate experience of self-agency, that is, the experience of generating and controlling our actions, is thought to be a key aspect of selfhood. It has been suggested that this experience is intimately linked to internal motor signals associated with the ongoing actions. These signals should lead to an attenuation of the sensory consequences of ones own actions and thereby allow classifying them as self-generated. The discovery of shared representations of actions between self and other, however, challenges this idea and suggests similar attenuation of ones own and others sensory action effects. Here, we tested these assumptions by comparing sensory attenuation of self-generated and observed sensory effects. More specifically, we compared the loudness perception of sounds that were either self-generated, generated by another person or a computer. In two experiments, we found a reduced perception of loudness intensity specifically related to self-generation. Furthermore, the perception of sounds generated by another person and a computer did not differ from each other. These findings indicate that ones own agentive influence upon the outside world has a special perceptual quality which distinguishes it from any sort of external influence, including human and non-human sources. This suggests that a real sense of self-agency is not a socially shared but rather a unique and private experience.

The Impact of Aesthetic Evaluation and Physical Ability on Dance Perception

The field of neuroaesthetics attracts attention from neuroscientists and artists interested in the neural underpinnings of esthetic experience. Though less studied than the neuroaesthetics of visual art, dance neuroaesthetics is a particularly rich subfield to explore, as it is informed not only by research on the neurobiology of aesthetics, but also by an extensive literature on how action experience shapes perception. Moreover, it is ideally suited to explore the embodied simulation account of esthetic experience, which posits that activation within sensorimotor areas of the brain, known as the action observation network (AON), is a critical element of the esthetic response. In the present study, we address how observers’ esthetic evaluation of dance is related to their perceived physical ability to reproduce the movements they watch. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while evaluating how much they liked and how well they thought they could physically replicate a range of dance movements performed by professional ballet dancers. We used parametric analyses to evaluate brain regions that tracked with degree of liking and perceived physical ability. The findings reveal strongest activation of occipitotemporal and parietal portions of the AON when participants view movements they rate as both esthetically pleasing and difficult to reproduce. As such, these findings begin to illuminate how the embodied simulation account of esthetic experience might apply to watching dance, and provide preliminary evidence as to why some people find enjoyment in an evening at the ballet.

Repetitive TMS Suggests a Role of the Human Dorsal Premotor Cortex in Action Prediction

Predicting the actions of other individuals is crucial for our daily interactions. Recent evidence suggests that the prediction of object-directed arm and full-body actions employs the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd). Thus, the neural substrate involved in action control may also be essential for action prediction. Here, we aimed to address this issue and hypothesized that disrupting the PMd impairs action prediction. Using fMRI-guided coil navigation, rTMS (five pulses, 10 Hz) was applied over the left PMd and over the vertex (control region) while participants observed everyday actions in video clips that were transiently occluded for 1 s. The participants detected manipulations in the time course of occluded actions, which required them to internally predict the actions during occlusion. To differentiate between functional roles that the PMd could play in prediction, rTMS was either delivered at occluder-onset (TMS-early), affecting the initiation of action prediction, or 300 ms later during occlusion (TMS-late), affecting the maintenance of an ongoing prediction. TMS-early over the left PMd produced more prediction errors than TMS-early over the vertex. TMS-late had no effect on prediction performance, suggesting that the left PMd might be involved particularly during the initiation of internally guided action prediction but may play a subordinate role in maintaining ongoing prediction. These findings open a new perspective on the role of the left PMd in action prediction which is in line with its functions in action control and in cognitive tasks. In the discussion, the relevance of the left PMd for integrating external action parameters with the observer’s motor repertoire is emphasized. Overall, the results are in line with the notion that premotor functions are employed in both action control and action observation.

Dysfunctional forward model mechanisms and aberrant sense of agency in obsessive-compulsive disorder

BACKGROUND Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) often lack the experience of action completion and have altered feelings of agency. This might depend on the integrity of predictions of action outcomes generated by forward models of the motor system. Such motor predictions are critical for inhibitory gating of actions and their consequences. Therefore, it was hypothesized that OCD patients show compromised forward model mechanisms. METHODS To test whether inhibitory gating based on motor predictions is altered in OCD, we used electroencephalography to measure suppression of the N1 component of the event-related potential during active generation and passive observation of visual feedback in 18 OCD patients and 18 healthy control subjects. Predictability of action feedback was manipulated on the basis of action and external cues, and simultaneous agency judgments were assessed. RESULTS OCD patients showed significantly reduced N1 suppression to actively generated feedback as compared with passively observed feedback. Moreover, in OCD patients, the N1 was not modulated by additional predictive motor cues as observed in control subjects. Patients also reported enhanced estimations of agency experience, which correlated with the strength of incompleteness feelings. CONCLUSIONS OCD patients fail to predict and suppress the sensory consequences of their own actions. The increased mismatch between expected and actual outcomes caused by this forward model dysfunction may explain persistent feelings of incompleteness even after properly executed actions and the augmented search for control in these patients.

Minimizing motor mimicry by myself: Self-focus enhances online action-control mechanisms during motor contagion

Ideomotor theory of human action control proposes that activation of a motor representation can occur either through internally-intended or externally-perceived actions. Critically, sometimes these alternatives of eliciting a motor response may be conflicting, for example, when intending one action and perceiving another, necessitating the recruitment of enhanced action-control to avoid motor mimicry. Based on previous neuroimaging evidence, suggesting that reduced mimicry is associated with self-related processing, we aimed to experimentally enhance these action-control mechanisms during motor contagion by inducing self-focus. In two within-subjects experiments, participants had to enforce their action intention against an external motor contagion tendency under heightened and normal self-focus. During high self-focus participants showed reduced motor mimicry, induced either by mirror self-observation or self-referential judgments. This indicates that a self-focus provoking situation can enhance online action-control mechanisms, needed to resist unintentional motor contagion tendencies and thereby enables a modulation of automatic mirroring responses.

Judging roughness by sight—A 7‐tesla fMRI study on responsivity of the primary somatosensory cortex during observed touch of self and others

Observing another person being touched activates our own somatosensory system. Whether the primary somatosensory cortex (S1) is also activated during the observation of passive touch, and which subregions of S1 are responsible for self‐ and other‐related observed touch is currently unclear. In our study, we first aimed to clarify whether observing passive touch without any action component can robustly increase activity in S1. Secondly, we investigated whether S1 activity only increases when touch of others is observed, or also when touch of ones own body is observed. We were particularly interested in which subregions of S1 are responsible for either process. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging at 7 Tesla to measure S1 activity changes when participants observed videos of their own or anothers hand in either egocentric or allocentric perspective being touched by different pieces of sandpaper. Participants were required to judge the roughness of the different sandpaper surfaces. Our results clearly show that S1 activity does increase in response to observing passive touch, and that activity changes are localized in posterior but not in anterior parts of S1. Importantly, activity increases in S1 were particularly related to observing another person being touched. Self‐related observed touch, in contrast, caused no significant activity changes within S1. We therefore assume that posterior but not anterior S1 is part of a system for sharing tactile experiences with others. Hum Brain Mapp, 2013.