Sinan Sarpça

Public Housing Units vs. Housing Vouchers: Accessibility, Local Public Goods, and Welfare

We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.

Private Schools and Residential Choices: Accessibility, Mobility, and Welfare

Abstract Private schools free households from a strict link between residential location decisions and the tax-school quality bundles they consume. In order to study the impact of private schools on educational outcomes, we develop a general equilibrium model that simultaneously incorporates locational choice built on access and locational choice built on tax-school quality attributes of jurisdictions. We conclude that private school choice enhances the welfare of all households—both those attending private schools and those attending public schools—while also working to reduce the amount of housing and school segregation in equilibrium. Investigation of alternative school policies indicates that greater choice, including using targeted school vouchers, can improve welfare and achievement. Finally, we demonstrate how the fiscal burden arising from some households paying less taxes than they consume in public services varies significantly with the structure of school choice options.

Profiling in Bargaining over College Tuition

Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college in the US. We find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that signalling and profiling are important aspects of the college admission process.

The Relationship Between Nonprofits’ Revenue Composition and Their Economic-Financial Efficiency

We study financial efficiency in the nonprofit sector and document that organizations that rely mainly on commercial revenues are more efficient in managing their overhead and administrative expenses compared with nonprofits that rely mainly on donations. We also record a positive relationship between the extent of a nonprofit’s reliance on donations and its efficiency in generating them. Our findings suggest economies of scale in the nonprofit sector and also a positive (negative) relationship between receiving government grants (membership income) and overall efficiency. We discuss what our findings imply for social enterprises and traditional nonprofits.