Siwan Anderson

The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation

This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. We propose an explanation of this based on conflictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosea is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.

Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India

In contrast to most dowry‐oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization, those in India have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades. This paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste. The theoretical model contrasts caste‐ and non‐caste‐based societies: in the former, there exists an inherited component to status (caste) that is independent of wealth, and in the latter, wealth is the primary determinant of status. Modernization is assumed to involve two components: increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status (or caste) groups. The paper shows that, in caste‐based societies, the increases in wealth dispersion that accompany modernization necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments, whereas in non‐caste‐based societies, increased dispersion has no real effect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline.

The Economics of Dowry Payments in Pakistan

Although there are numerous studies of the dowry phenomenon in India, research pertaining to the custom in the rest of South Asia is sparse.The aim of this paper is to study dowry payments in Pakistan.Several interpretations for dowry are distinguished using a simple theoretical framework and the predictions of this model are tested using recent data from Pakistan.The investigation concludes that despite religious and cultural differences, the phenomenon of dowry in Pakistan appears to occur for reasons which are similar to those in India.That is, in rural areas it seems to be the more traditional pre-mortem inheritance, whereas in urban areas the payment has transformed into a groomprice.

Missing Unmarried Women

That unmarried individuals die at a faster rate than married individuals at all ages is well documented. Unmarried women in developing countries face particularly severe vulnerabilities, so that excess mortality faced by the unmarried is more extreme for women in these regions compared to developed countries. We provide systematic estimates of the excess female mortality faced by older unmarried women in developing regions. We place these estimates in the context of the missing women phenomenon. There are approximately 1.5 million missing women between the ages of 30 and 60 years old each year. We find that 35% of these missing women of adult age can be attributed to not being married. These estimates vary by region. India has the largest proportion of missing adult women who are without a husband, followed by the countries in East Africa. By contrast, China has almost no missing unmarried women. We show that 70% of missing unmarried women are of reproductive age and that it is the relatively high mortality rates of these young unmarried women (compared to their married counterparts) that drive this phenomenon.

Dowries and Other Marital Transfers

Payments between families at the time of marriage existed during the history of most developed countries and are currently pervasive in many areas of the developing world. These payments can be substantial enough to affect the welfare of women and a societys distribution of wealth. The prevalence and magnitude of marriage payments vary across countries and depend upon economic conditions, societal structures, institutions, and family characteristics. Marriage payments also evolve within societies and over time. Transfers can rise sharply, and property rights over such payments can shift between marrying partners and parental generations.