Sonja Puntscher Riekmann

Representation in the European State of Emergency: Parliaments against Governments?

Abstract ‘If governments allow themselves to be entirely bound to the decisions of their parliament, without protecting their own freedom to act, a break up of Europe would be a more probable outcome than deeper integration.’ The statement of the Italian Prime Minister and head of the so-called ‘governo tecnico words have to be seperated ’ is one remarkable instance for colliding visions of representation in EU member states affected by the financial crisis. It exposes an old problem of representation: that is, representation of the whole versus representation of the parts. National parliaments are called to endorse the European decisions of their governments and simultaneously to sell the sacrifices to their constituencies. This development is conducive to clashes between parliaments and governments. The collision occurs between governments representing the Euro and Europe and national parliaments representing national voters’ interests. Nevertheless in the period of analysis (2010–2012) the governments generally succeeded in commanding the majority needed to pass relevant legislation, whereby most intriguingly majorities were repeatedly formed by government and opposition parties. We are interested in the analysis of how this came about, how MPs argued over and negotiated the outcome. The hypothesis is twofold: First, we expect that despite reservations the majority consents because entrapped in a European discourse, building on arguments of how the rescue mechanisms are in the best European as well as national interests. Second, budget competence being the ‘crown jewel’ of parliaments these are anxious to keep control of decisions taken at the European level and have to be satisfied through side-payments or constitutional concessions strengthening their control function. To test our hypothesis we analysed parliamentary debates and negotiations of national parliaments in three member states: Germany, Italy and Austria.

In Search of Lost Norms: Is Accountability the Solution to the Legitimacy Problems of the European Union?

The article investigates the concept of accountability as one attempt to answer the question of legitimacy of European governance. The guiding thesis is that accountability is an important organizing principle of democracy. There is, however, a lack of consensus on the definition of democracy as the fundamental norm beyond the state. The current career of accountability as a topic of European political discourse may be interpreted as an instance for the search of that norm lost in the creation of the supranational polity, which has led to a diffusion of power. The result is a form of ‘diffuse democracy.’ Stressing accountability will not necessarily solve the dilemmas of European democracy. The procedures of accountability provided by the treaties do not suffice to convince the citizens of the democratic quality of the Union. By way of conclusion, the article advocates greater clarity through appropriate constitutionalization of the Union.

European administration: Centralisation and fragmentation as means of polity-building?

The creation of a unified administrative space is part and parcel of all polity-building processes. We hold that the accelerating agencification in the European Union has created a complex administrative space characterised by simultaneous centralisation and fragmentation. Due to the fact that the finalité of integration is open-ended, this complexity is not just a passing occurrence but a defining moment of the EU. Administrative cooperation within and outside primary law, the establishment of a growing number of agencies with divergent powers, scope, and depth support this claim. Hence, we witness a development which impacts considerably on the democratic quality of the Union. The area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters serves as a case in point. This article discusses potential problems which might arise from the creation of regulatory agencies in light of classical theories of representative democracy and their constitutional frameworks governing the member states as well as the Union.

Harmonizing national options and discretions in the EU banking regulation

The European Central Bank strives to harmonize over 160 national options and discretions (O&Ds) that contribute to the fragmentation of banking union’s regulatory framework. National authorities seem prepared to accept it, despite previously insisting on the inclusion of all O&Ds into the EU legislation. We analyze a sample of O&D choices and their correspondence to cleavages pertinent to the political economy of EU banking. We find that the 11 post-communist member states use O&Ds more stringently to protect capital and liquidity in the local subsidiaries of foreign-own banks, which may complicate their potential opt-in to the banking union.

‘Obligations of good faith’: on the difficulties of building US-style EU federalism

The sovereign debt crisis has exposed the weaknesses of the regulative and institutional arrangements of the European Monetary Union. A number of American scholars have highlighted that there are lessons on federalism for Europe to learn from the USA. But to what extent can the US model of fiscal federalism be transferred to the European context? Our general assumption is that besides the differences of the historically developed institutions, structures and economic concepts, it is the different logic that has and is driving the two integration processes that would impede such a transfer. Basing the argument on Oates’ theory of two generations of fiscal federalism, we see that the USA – building on a firm constitutional framework – provided for a crucial role of central government in macro-economic stabilization, whereas the European Union (EU) style of fiscal federalism remains contractual. Although transfers are inevitable, the EU shuns the logic of financial solidarity as economic divergencies cannot be harmoniously accommodated by a commitment to a common constitutional framework. As crisis management largely relies on an intergovernmental decision-making process, it enhances the power of creditor states vis-à-vis the debtor states and follows the logic of ‘surveillance and punishment’. The European emphasis is on controlling the moral hazard and the most likely outcome of the crisis will be differentiated integration.

Europas Verfassung nach Lissabon. Europäische Politik in der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise zwischen Pragmatismus und Legitimation

Das lange europaische Verfassungsjahrzehnt wurde mit dem Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon am 1. Dezember 2009 fur beendet erklart. Die Vision einer europaischen Verfassung hatte in einen Vertrag gemundet, der zwar den Grosteil der Anderungen des im franzosischen und niederlandischen Referendum abgelehnten Verfassungsvertrags enthalt, aber nicht mehr so heisen durfte.1 Fur alle Probleme des Ratifikationsprozesses fand man einen Schuldigen: den Begriff Verfassung.2 Die Schuldbeweise sind zwar so dunn wie die Evidenz gros ist, dass auch der Vertrag von Lissabon die Verfassungsgrundlage der Union darstellt,3 aber die Regierungen konnten der Versuchung einer einfachen Erklarung nicht widerstehen. Da tat es auch nichts zur Sache, dass Irland den Vertrag von Lissabon in der Volksabstimmung von 2008 ablehnte, obwohl der Verfassungsbegriff langst getilgt war, und ihn dann wie im Falle des Vertrags von Nizza nach Zugestandnissen im Oktober 2009 doch annahm. Und vergessen waren die Eurobarometer-Umfragen rund um den Konvent, die eine kontinuierliche Zweidrittelmehrheit von Verfassungsbefurwortern feststellten.4 Doch die Debatte, ob die Vertrage eine Verfassung seien oder nicht, ist eine Scheindebatte, und man beendete sie dezisionistisch in den Schlussfolgerungen des Europaischen Rates vom Juni 2007, auf dass endlich Ruhe einkehren wurde.