Sophie Gibb

Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist

Abstract Despite the fact that Davidson’s theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation – that of anomalous monism – it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson’s understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term ‘property’ in an ontological sense, the second in a linguistic sense. Anomalous monism cannot plausibly be accused of either. The first cannot legitimately be applied to anomalous monism as it is incompatible with Davidson’s ontology. And accusations of predicate epiphenomenalism, although consistent with Davidson’s ontology, are ungrounded regarding Davidson’s anomalous monism. Philosophers of mind have mislocated the problem with Davidson’s anomalous monism, which in fact lies with the implausible theory of the causal relata upon which it rests.

The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization

Proponents of the subset account of property realization commonly make the assumption that the summing of properties entails the summing of their forward-looking causal features. This paper seeks to establish that this assumption is false. Moreover, it aims to demonstrate that without this assumption the fact that the subset account captures an entailment relation—which it must if it is to be of any use to non-reductive physicalism—becomes questionable.

Space Supervenience and Entailment

Abstract Robin Le Poidevin has recently presented an argument that gives rise to a serious problem for relationist theories of space. It appeals to the simple geometrical fact that if A, B and C are three points lying in a straight line, then AB and BC together entail AC. He suggests that an ontological relationship of supervenience must be appealed to to explain this entailment. Given this thesis of supervenience, relationism is implausible. I argue that the problem that Le Poidevin raises for relationism should be rejected, because the thesis of supervenence is false. The latter rests upon what Le Poidevin refers to as the ‘explanatory principle’, a principle which he clams to be a natural extension of the truthmaker principle. Contrary to this, I argue that given any plausible theory of truthmaking, the explanatory principle is false. With the rejection of this principle, Le Poidevins argument against relationism collapses.

'Externalism : putting mind and world back together again.' by M. Rowlands.

1. Whos Afraid of Disjunctive Properties?: Louise Antony (Ohio State University). 2. A Trilemma for Redeployment: Akeel Bilgrami (Columbia University). 3. The Normativity of Content: Paul A. Boghossian (New York University). 4. The Nature of Narrow Content: David J. Chalmers (University of Arizona). 5. Experience as Representation: Fred Dretske (Duke University). 6. Thoughts and Norms: Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor). 7. Representation and Narrow Belief: Frank Jackson (Australian National University). 8. Qualia, Properties, Modality: Brian Loar (Rutgers University). 9. Vs. a New A Priorist Argument for Dualism: William G. Lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). 10. What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?: Colin McGinn (Rutgers University). 11. A Naturalist-Phnomenal Realist Response to Blocks Harder Problem: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University). 12. Could There Be A Science of Consciousness?: David Papineau (University of London). 13. Looks as Powers: Philip Pettit (Princeton University). 14. Content, Character and Color: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University). 15. What Is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?: Galen Strawson (University of Reading). 16. Causal Relevance: Stephen Yablo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)