Søren Harnow Klausen

The Notion of Creativity Revisited: A Philosophical Perspective on Creativity Research

This article is a critical, yet constructive, review of some recent attempts to define and understand creativity, informed by the methods and debates of contemporary philosophy. I argue that the definitional project is not essential to creativity research, but important nevertheless. The standard definition of creativity as the production of something that is both novel and appropriate is on the right track, but needs further qualification and tends to be elaborated in ways that make it either too narrow or too broad. I argue that the product, and not the person or process, should be viewed as the primary bearer of creativity and criticize some influential theorists for making creativity too strongly dependent on social acceptance, while also recognizing that the realist alternative tends to widen, and thus threatens to trivialize, the central notion of an appropriate product. The notion of response‐dependence might be of some help to find the proper balance between the two extremes, and some comparisons with evolutionary theory also help to shed further light on the problem. Finally, I try to spell out the practical consequences of my investigation for creativity research.

Losing Belief, While Keeping up the Attitudes: The Case for Cognitive Phenomenology

Cognitive phenomenology has gained considerable support during the last decade. Several philosophers now defend the view that not only sensations and feelings but also cognitive mental states like thinking, judging, and understanding have a distinctive phenomenology — there is “something it is like” to have them (see e.g. Siewert 1999; Pitt 2004; Klausen 2008; Bayne and Montague 2011). The notion of belief occupies an interesting position in this debate. It is a paradigm psychological notion and the epitome of a cognitive state, yet it does not seem amenable to the program of cognitive phenomenology. It is standardly categorized as a mental phenomenon of a completely different sort than sensations or feelings (McGinn 1982, 9; Tye 1995, 79ff.), and its claim to being a phenomenal or conscious state has been rejected by influential proponents of the phenomenological approach to the mind (Chalmers 1996, 19ff.; Crane 2001, 108).

Levels of Literary Meaning

I argue that intentionalist theories of meaning and interpretation, like those of Hirsch and Juhl, have been insufficiently attentive to the different levels of authorial intention that are operative in literary works. By countenancing intentions on different levels—ranging from simple semantic intentions, over the use of irony and allusion, to wideranging strategic decisions or attempts to express general ideas—and their complex interplay, intentionalism converges, at least in practice, on some of the rival approaches to interpretation. This paper provides a rationale for, and a sketch of, a multilevel intentionalism that is more sensitive to authorial and critical practice.

Group knowledge: a real-world approach

In spite of the booming interest in social epistemology, explicit analyses of group knowledge remain rare. Most existing accounts are based on theories of joint intentionality. I argue that this approach, though not without merit or useful applications, is inadequate both when it comes to accounting for actual group knowledge attributions and for purposes of meliorative social epistemology. As an alternative, I outline a liberal, de-intellectualized account, which allows for the complex distribution of epistemic states typical of most real-world collectives, and makes minimal requirements as to the psychological underpinnings of collective states of knowing and the formal features of groups. The account is inspired by theories of distributed and extended cognition. It is guided by the principle that we should use the same standard when dealing with social and individual epistemology. Careful attention to what is normally required—and, in particular, not required—for attributing knowledge to individuals lends support the more liberal view.

Authenticity as Ideal and Idol

The chapter introduces the general idea of authenticity and presents Kierkegaard’s more specific view; how he tries to steer between extreme notions of self-creation and overly passive notions of mere self-finding. The notions of self-choice and autonomy are analysed and different lines of interpretation are considered. One of Kierkegaard’s most important contributions to educational thinking is his precise diagnoses of various ways in which the attempt to become oneself can fail or be misguided. The specific importance of these positive and negative insights for education is considered.

Needs and Dangers of Ambitious Educational Ideals

Most debates in contemporary educational thinking and policy pit practical, short-term result oriented views against more ambitious, philosophical ones. Some educationalists are primarily concerned with employability and measurable skills; they are firmly opposed by those who insist that education should rather aim at ‘cultivating humanity’ or fostering enlightened citizenship. It is argued that while Kierkegaard’s view on education may appear highly ambitious, it is actually compatible with a concern for more mundane learning goals, and less idealist or perfectionist than those of many contemporary thinkers—even Kierkegaard he does maintain that authenticity and self-cultivation are the primary goals of education.

Dialogue and Indirect Communication

Kierkegaard used a wide range of subtle and circumspect forms of communication, like irony, dialectics and pseudonymous utterances. But he was also aware that they could be seen as expressions of an insincere or inauthentic attitude, and so should be used cautiously. His own preferred mode of ‘indirect communication’ is analysed. It is special more with regard to how something is communicated than with regard to what is communicated, but does have a special ‘content’ inasmuch as it aims to bring the listener to grasp herself in her essential subjectivity. While this appears to be a very special aim, it is shown to have potential relevance to more ordinary educational concerns.

Self-Cultivation and Its Discontents

Kierkegaard shared many of the general views on education typical of the German Bildung-movement (represented by, inter alia, Goethe, Schiller, Humboldt and Hegel), but also criticized it for tending towards conformism and superficial learnedness. The core elements of the classical notion of self-cultivation (or Bildung) are outlined. Kierkegaard’s ambiguous and probing stance towards self-cultivation is exemplified by one of his main characters, Judge Vilhelm, who in Either/Or II is depicted as partly succeeding in cultivating his own personality, but also as taking too much pleasure in his own apparent mastery of life. Kierkegaard emphasized the importance of metacognitive skills and emotional self-regulation, but insisted that such abilities should be unified and directed by a fundamental commitment to achieve authenticity.

Existence and Education

It may not be immediately obvious why Kierkegaard should be considered an important educational thinker. It is argued that his relevance to educational issues lies in his thinking about which kinds of knowledge are of primary (that is, practical and existential) significance, in his development and critical discussion of the central notions of authenticity and self-cultivation and in his reflections on the possibility of a special kind of communication, which prompts the student to freely appropriate what is learned. Kierkegaard’s life and work is briefly described and used to characterize the peculiar nature of his project and style of thinking. His doctrine of stages is presented. Finally, Kierkegaard’s criticism of objective knowledge is analysed and its relevance to education is discussed.

What is innovation

This chapter addresses the very general question of what should be understood by innovation, and how innovation relates to phenomena like creativity, entrepreneurship, commercialization, learning and invention. The question is treated mainly by means of the sort of conceptual analysis typical of a philosophical approach. However, this is done with an eye to both sociological theories and results pertaining to innovation, and to possible applications to practice and empirical research. The guiding idea behind the chapter is that conceptual clarification and unprejudiced reflection is needed in order to move forward on the more specific challenges of understanding and furthering innovation in practice. Conceptual and theoretical work on innovation has been relatively sparse, not least as compared to the extensive and still rapidly growing collection of literature on the neighboring notion of creativity. In his comprehensive review of the field, Fagerberg rightly noted that even though innovation has been dealt with by economics, the innovation process itself has been treated more or less like a “black box” (Fagerberg 2005: 3). Schumpeter’s (1934) groundbreaking analysis still remains unique in its depth and scope, even though it was confined to a few pages. It has been commented upon and applied extensively, but hardly developed further or revised. Most extant studies go on very rapidly to analyze specific forms of innovation (for example, Von Hippel (1988), who is particularly concerned with end-user innovation), and sometimes very specific forms or aspects (for example, Christensen and Overdorf 2000, who emphasize so-called “disruptive” innovation). This tendency is understandable. Most scholars, even of a more theoretical orientation, are obviously interested in pushing innovation by identifying particularly attractive paths and strategies. In a way, they are trying to be innovative themselves; this makes them naturally selective. A more disengaged, bird’s-eye perspective on innovation may seem almost like a contradiction in terms. But it really is not. Among the many, many sources of innovation, stepping back and taking a fresh and broad view may not be the least fecund.