Sören Riechers
University of Paderborn
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Publication
Featured researches published by Sören Riechers.
acm symposium on parallel algorithms and architectures | 2014
André Brinkmann; Peter Kling; Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide; Lars Nagel; Sören Riechers; Tim Süß
We consider the problem of scheduling a number of jobs on m identical processors sharing a continuously divisible resource. Each job j comes with a resource requirement rj∈[0,1]. The job can be processed at full speed if granted its full resource requirement. If receiving only an x-portion of r_j, it is processed at an x-fraction of the full speed. Our goal is to find a resource assignment that minimizes the makespan (i.e., the latest completion time). Variants of such problems, relating the resource assignment of jobs to their processing speeds, have been studied under the term discrete-continuous scheduling. Known results are either very pessimistic or heuristic in nature. In this paper, we suggest and analyze a slightly simplified model. It focuses on the assignment of shared continuous resources to the processors. The job assignment to processors and the ordering of the jobs have already been fixed. It is shown that, even for unit size jobs, finding an optimal solution is NP-hard if the number of processors is part of the input. Positive results for unit size jobs include an efficient optimal algorithm for 2 processors. Moreover, we prove that balanced schedules yield a 2-1/m-approximation for a fixed number of processors. Such schedules are computed by our GreedyBalance algorithm, for which the bound is tight.
algorithmic game theory | 2014
Maximilian Drees; Sören Riechers; Alexander Skopalik
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analyzed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential.
workshop on algorithms and data structures | 2015
Alexander Mäcker; Manuel Malatyali; Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide; Sören Riechers
Consider the problem in which n jobs that are classified into k types are to be scheduled on m identical machines without preemption. A machine requires a proper setup taking s time units before processing jobs of a given type. The objective is to minimize the makespan of the resulting schedule. We design and analyze an approximation algorithm that runs in time polynomial in n, m and k and computes a solution with an approximation factor that can be made arbitrarily close to \({^3 /_2}\).
arXiv: Data Structures and Algorithms | 2017
Pascal Bemmann; Felix Biermeier; Jan Bürmann; Arne Kemper; Till Knollmann; Steffen Knorr; Nils Kothe; Alexander Mäcker; Manuel Malatyali; Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide; Sören Riechers; Johannes Schaefer; Jannik Sundermeier
Consider a network in which n distributed nodes are connected to a single server. Each node continuously observes a data stream consisting of one value per discrete time step. The server has to continuously monitor a given parameter defined over all information available at the distributed nodes. That is, in any time step t, it has to compute an output based on all values currently observed across all streams. To do so, nodes can send messages to the server and the server can broadcast messages to the nodes. The objective is the minimisation of communication while allowing the server to compute the desired output.
algorithmic game theory | 2015
Maximilian Drees; Matthias Feldotto; Sören Riechers; Alexander Skopalik
In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The players utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor
workshop on approximation and online algorithms | 2017
Alexander Mäcker; Manuel Malatyali; Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide; Sören Riechers
\alpha
Theoretical Computer Science | 2017
Antonios Antoniadis; Peter Kling; Sebastian Ott; Sören Riechers
through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold
conference on combinatorial optimization and applications | 2016
Alexander Mäcker; Manuel Malatyali; Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide; Sören Riechers
\alpha_\delta
conference on combinatorial optimization and applications | 2016
Jürgen König; Alexander Mäcker; Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide; Sören Riechers
(where
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization | 2018
Alexander Mäcker; Manuel Malatyali; Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide; Sören Riechers
\delta