Spencer Bastani

The Welfare Gains Of Age‐Related Optimal Income Taxation

Using a calibrated overlapping generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age dependent income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can by saving transfer consumption across periods. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent to an age-dependent nonlinear tax amounts in our benchmark model to around three percent of GDP. The gains are particularly high when there are restrictions on debt policy. The gains of using a nonlinear- as opposed to a linear tax are even larger. Surprisingly, it is of secondary importance to optimally choose the tax on interest income.

Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneity in Needs

Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfare-enhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where agents differ only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the similarities/differences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: first, to extend previous contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievable by introducing a public provision scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; finally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from tagging.

Using the Discrete Model to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates

I demonstrate how the discrete model of optimum income taxation can be used to derive the structure of optimal income tax rates. I compare simulations of the discrete and continuous models of optimum income taxation under identical circumstances, based on U.S. wage data. The two models produce similar results once the number of types used to represent the skill distribution is sufficiently large. Whether the discrete or the continuous model is used, in order to accurately capture the shape of the optimal schedule of marginal tax rates, a large number of taxpayers should be employed.