Spyridon Repousis

Underground banking or hawala and Greece‐Albania remittance corridor

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study underground banking between Greece and Albania and provide policy makers with specific policy recommendations to reduce hawala, reduce remittances commissions and improve access of banking services to both remittance senders in Greece and beneficiaries in Albania.Design/methodology/approach – The authors measure loans to customers (non‐banks), total assets and net revenues from commissions, including remittances commissions, of a sample of 26 Greek commercial banks during 1996‐2004 and examine recent remittances commissions of the four largest Greek commercial banks and the Greek Postal Office.Findings – Results indicate that Greek commercial banks charge less for remittances services than Western Union, Eurogiro and hawala banking, although remittances are not a core business for them (loans to customers – non‐banks – are their core business).Practical implications – Practical solutions are: lowering remittances commissions to Greek Postal Office for low am...

Is the third Greek Memoranda of Understanding and Loan Agreement of August 2015 odious?: Truth Committee on Public Debt in Greek or Hellenic Parliament and criticism on results

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the odious debt concept in Greece. In Greece, the odious debt concept received high attention during recent financial crisis and Greek or Hellenic Parliament decided to establish a Special Committee. Design/methodology/approach The Greek Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt investigated the public debt in Greece, and the main findings are: increase of debt was related to the growth in interest payments, high public spending in defence expenditures associated with corruption scandals, falsification of public deficit and debt statistical data and illicit capital outflows and adopting the euro led to a drastic increase in private debt. Findings Based on above the third Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and the August 2015 loan agreement, according to Greek Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt are illegal, illegitimate and odious because they fail to recognize the odious character of Greece’s existing debt, and the nature of the instruments by which this debt was financed from 2010 until early 2015. The Third MoU and the August 2015 loan agreement violate the fundamental human rights of the Greek people (both civil and political as well as socio-economic rights) as set out in the Greek Constitution and under international law (treaty-based and customary). Research limitations/implications On the other side of results, Greece was a democratic regime during the time it contracted the vast majority of its loans and membership into the Eurozone, which benefitted country by gaining the highly low interest rates that euro currency involved. Also, substantial borrowing for Greece spent directly on the people via social welfare and public sector wages and infrastructure development. Practical implications Therefore, Greece, instead of the odious debt doctrine, should resort to other debt solutions such as simple debt repayment, restructuring or “haircut” of the debt (principal and interest) or declare bankruptcy without invoking the odious debt doctrine. Although this recourse avoids the dangerous precedent-setting risks of the odious debt doctrine, it also involves numerous other complexities and policy problems because with default, the banking system would collapse. Originality/value It is the first study examining the topic of odious public debt in Greece.

Abnormal stock returns in Greece during the Cypriot banking crisis

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the Cypriot banking crisis in specific bank stocks’ prices traded in the Athens Stock Exchange. Design/methodology/approach In the present study, event study methodology has been used. The basis of the event study is to examine the returns derived from the stock prices of the relevant banks before March 15, 2013. Findings This study focuses on three banks, Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Popular Bank and Piraeus Bank, and finds abnormal stock returns during the ten-day period before the event date (announcement of prohibition and put under suspension trading of all movable securities of Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank). Also, an interesting matter is that during the estimation period and in specific dates, such as October 18, 22 and 23, 2012, a high volume of stocks trading took place in Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study examining it.

Using Beneish model to detect corporate financial statement fraud in Greece

Purpose This paper aims to investigate empirically the eight-variables Beneish M-model to identify occurrence of financial statement fraud or tendency to engage in earning manipulation. Design/methodology/approach A data set of 25,468 companies (Societe Anonyme and Limited Liability Companies) in Greece was analyzed during two-year period of 2011-2012. Financial statements of banks are excluded. Findings The results showed that 8,486 companies or 33 per cent of the whole sample has a greater than −2.2 score, which is a signal that companies are likely to be manipulators. Also, for manipulators, results using F-distribution showed that days sales in receivable index (DSRI), asset quality index (AQI), depreciation index, selling, general and administrative expenses index (SGAI), total accruals to total assets index and leverage index (LVGI) are significant at 99 per cent confidence level in its effect on Beneish M-score. Also, there is a significant relationship between earning management, as expressed by Beneish M-score and each one of variables, DSRI, AQI, gross margin index, sales growth index, SGAI and LVGI. Most of all, DSRI explains 95.92 per cent of the variation in Beneish M-score in statistical terms. Practical implications Results are important for banking system, because financial statements information influence credit decisions of banks. Debt agreements include terms based upon accounting numbers. Also, using Beneish Model, it is a cheap and easy way for examiners of possible fraudulent activity. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is a great lack of research in Greece, using Beneish model. There is only one more study using the Beneish model, examining only a few companies listed in Athens Stock Exchange during 1999-2000. Findings have also important implications not only for banks but also for users of Greek financial statement accounts, especially to investors, auditors, regulators, to taxation and other state authorities.

Stocks’ prices manipulation around national elections?: An event study for the case of Greek banking sector

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of major non-economic events such as the results of five Greek national Parliamentary elections during 1996-2009 on the Greek banks’ stocks. Design/methodology/approach Using daily data from the Athens Stock Exchange, event study methodology and market model, the results of this paper claim that the five Greek national Parliamentary elections during the 1996-2009 period had no statistically significant effect on the Greek banks’ stocks. The results show that cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks’ stocks but not statistically significant at 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels. Findings Investors were not surprised and the political information caused no change and no influence on the future and course of the stock market. Expected winning political party was the same as the actual winning political party. Results showed that during pre-event period of 2000 and 2004 Greek national Parliamentary elections, CAARs for Greek banks’ stocks were slightly positive and after the event period were slightly negative but not statistically significant at all periods. During 2007 Greek national Parliamentary elections, the effect of elections changed because CAARs were generally slightly negative during the pre-event period and positive after the event period. Also, non-statistically significant CAARs indicate that there is no evidence that either political party was able to manipulate bank stocks’ prices for election purposes. Originality/value The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence about effects of national elections to bank stocks’ prices which have important implications for stockbrokers, investors, politicians and political analysts.

Greek fiscal crisis and measures to safeguard financial stability

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to present measures and policies followed during the Greek fiscal crisis to safeguard financial stability. Design/methodology/approach - – Greece since 2009 was subjected to the Excessive Deficit Procedure and a government debt crisis due to the arrival of the global economic crisis leading to a major economic and banking crisis. Two huge bailout loans and programs helped Greece avoid default. However the second bailout loan and participation of banks in the Private Sector Involvement caused losses to the banking system that amounted to €37.7 billion. To deal with the prospect of potential bank failure Bank of Greece the central bank in cooperation with national and international authorities developed many strategies to safeguard financial stability such as cash management and liquidity operations establishment and operation of Greek Financial Stability Fund (GFSF) institutional framework for recapitalization and resolution of credit institutions. Findings - – The first step was to support bank liquidity pressures. In the face of these pressures the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations provided lending to euro that ended 2010 and accounted to €97.6 billion. The second step was to establish a legal and regulatory framework for bank resolution and assess funds needed to recapitalize banks through stress tests and diagnostic assessments. Results showed that during 2012–2014 the Greek banking sector would require approximately €40.5 billion for strengthening its capital base of which €27.5 billion corresponded to the four “core banks”. Bank of Greece and GFSF managed to complete a €48.2 billion bank recapitalization in June 2013 of which the first €24.4 billion was injected into the four biggest Greek banks. In return Bank of Greece received a number of shares in those banks which it can now sell again during the upcoming years. The third step of policies was to implement resolution and restructuring measures. From October 2011 to March 2014 12 banks resolved through the new legal and regulatory framework under either a transfer order (order to transfer assets and liabilities to a transferee credit institution) or establishment of a bridge bank. All policies succeeded to safeguard Greek financial stability and restore bank losses that resulted from Greek public debt “haircut”. Originality/value - – To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the first paper examining this issue.

Regulatory framework and deposit – investment guarantee fund in Greece

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to examine the current regulatory framework of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, trying to show solutions for strengthening it. Design/methodology/approach - – This paper aims to investigate the deposit and investment guarantee fund in Greece by identifying new problems and developing solutions. Findings - – The main finding is that the deposit and investment guarantee fund contributes to the stability of the Greek banking sector and also offers practical solutions to strengthen it. Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund has an important feature, which is the speed of a decision about a bank failure resolution (in five working days), but needs immediately strengthening and increasing its funds to cope with the resolution of non-viable banks and undertaking for costs. There should be an appropriate ratio between the size of total assets (especially cash and cash equivalents) of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund and the amount of total guaranteed deposits, which is now below 2 per cent. Regulatory framework needs revising and fees must be increased if its funds fall below a certain level of coverage of guaranteed deposits. Also, a guarantee premium, not only a flat rate premium, should be implemented for all banks. An additional risk-adjusted premium varying according to Greek banks’ risks of their portfolios would be better to increase funds of deposit guarantee fund and reduce moral hazard of bank manager by increasing costs. They must ensure an adequate diversification of re-deposits of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund funds and must limit and avoid a conflict of interest of its board membership for individuals who are actively involved in Greek commercial banks by implementing framework and rules about it. Also, as a consequence of obeying the regulatory framework, it is necessary to include as board members of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund only those banks that are subject to strong prudential supervision and regulation. Practical implications - – As a result of research, changes are necessary to immediately be made to cope with current financial crises and problems of Greek banking sector. Originality/value - – The originality of this paper is that it is the first description of the Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund and its results are important for economists, politicians and international community, who evaluate the regulatory framework of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, especially at the current time when the Greek economy and the Greek banking sector are in a very weak fiscal position.

International Development Assistance and Economic Growth: the Case of Four Southeast European Countries

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of international development assistance on economic growth in the case of four Southeast European countries, Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, during the period 1991-2010. Foreign aid as additive to domestic savings is expected to cause an increase in economic growth and domestic savings. Surprisingly, our empirical results do not support this hypothesis, since foreign aid is negatively related to domestic savings. These results are consistent with the notion that foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives, and hence hurt savings and growth, by encouraging rent-seeking as opposed to productive activities.

Greece’s Way Out of the Crisis: A Call for Massive Structural Reforms

A great deal has been said about the necessity of structural reforms in Greece. However, there is hardly any discussion about the specific nature of these reforms and the expected gains in terms of growth. The purpose of this chapter is to bridge this gap by bringing into the discussion not only specific reform measures but also an explanation of how implementation of these reforms could enhance growth and improve economic welfare in Greece. The proposals in this chapter offer important solutions for political analysts, politicians, and society as a whole.