Stanley B. Gyoshev

Collaboration Structure in Nanotechnology R&D: An Analysis of Organizational Dynamics on the Level of Collaboration and Structural Alliances

Many consider nanotechnology field as the key enabling technology, general purpose technology, radical or disruptive technology. As a science-based cluster classified by OECD (1997), nanotechnology is a highly R&D-intensive field and is likely to have a greater level of interaction between actors across sectors. Apart from academic actors, governments and regulatory bodies are aware of possible economic impacts of this field and therefore a significant amount of funds have been allocated for nanotechnology field. In this study, we analyze how the level of collaboration in nanotechnology R&D projects is influenced by various organizational dynamics, funding initiates and legal origins of these entities. Using data from both qualitative and quantitative sources, we examine the collaboration factors that affect collaboration and structural alliances. Our results show that public organizations are more prone to the levels of collaborative activities but less capable of collaboration on an international scale, while small and mediumscale enterprises struggle with having collaborative partners. Also the more networks a nanotechnology firm has in its value chain, the less likely the collaborative structure is enhanced.

Why Do Investment Banks Buy Put Options from Companies

Companies collected billions in premiums from peculiarly structured put options written on their own stock, while almost all of these puts expired worthless quarter after quarter. Buyers of these options, primarily investment banks, lost money as a result. Although these losses might seem puzzling, we model how by offering to buy put options from better informed parties, investment banks receive private information about the issuing company. Empirically, we find a 12% increase in the stock prices and a 40% increase in the trading volumes around the put sales, indicating indeed that investment banks, the bankers personally or their clients may have acted on information obtained from these transactions.

A Separating Equilibrium for Stock Repurchase Programs via PUT Options:Transforming a Mathematical Proof into Visual Form

We develop a mathematical proof demonstrating that only financially-strong firms will sell put options on their own stock, but financially-weak firms will not. The sale of options on a company’s own stock exposes the buyer to default risk of the issuer, which additionally complicates the payoff structure of the put option. This signaling equilibrium is unique because it allows producing a non-costly signal of quality. Instead, the signal allows a cash inflow to the signaling firm. We next develop a graphical presentation of the mathematical proof showing the separating equilibrium. We then show how presenting visually the separating equilibrium before presenting the mathematical proof aids in understanding. We provide some empirical evidence that the combination of three very difficult concepts, put options, separating equilibria, and issuer default risk can be grasped more easily when a mathematical proof can be presented in graphical form prior to a mathematical proof.