Steen Andersen

Building for the Shah: Market Entry, Political Reality and Risks on the Iranian Market, 1933-1939

Unlike other Western European companies operating in Iran between the first and second world wars, the Danish construction firm Kampsax pursued a forestalling strategy in dealing with the political imperative of Reza Shah. The British Bank of the Middle East and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, by contrast, pursued an absorption strategy. That is, they actively tried to “Iranize” their operations by appointing native Iranians to important managerial positions. Kampsax, however, made no attempt at “Iranization,” depending entirely on contractual relations with local builders and labor forces. This no doubt contributed to the firm’s exposure as a totally foreign enterprise and lessened their chances of gaining favor with the Shah’s advisors, who pursued an overtly nationalistic set of policies. The history of Kampsax in Iran therefore offers a useful case to use the concept of the political risks in relation to multinationals working in dictatorial settings. This paper undertakes such a study and concludes that the absorption strategy that was already being pursued by British firms offers a better way of managing such risks.

Escape from ‘Safehaven’: The case of Christiani & Nielsen's blacklisting in 1944

The case of the Danish construction company Christiani & Nielsen in the period 1941–1945 shows that Scandinavian companies were not just pawns in a bigger political game but were to a certain degree capable of promoting their own interests. This paper reveals that the political imperative is not only a matter of political risk but also of political opportunity. The history of Christiani & Nielsen offers a useful case of the political risks and fiscal opportunities faced by multinationals working in dictatorial settings. The paper concludes that, in a choice between a forestalling strategy and an absorption strategy, the latter offers a better way of managing such risks and to minimise exposure.

Between imperative and risk. The case of Christiani & Nielsen's market entry in Norway 1941-45

Abstract While companies from small neutral states are frequently more vulnerable to the risks of doing business with or under dictatorial regimes than are companies from great powers, they are not helpless. This article shows that the strategy that both Danish and Swedish companies selected according to their economic cooperation with Germany and German occupied territories were largely dictated by the choices that were made in the 1930s. The case of the Danish construction company Christiani & Nielsen in the period 1941–1945 shows that Scandinavian companies were not just passive elements in a bigger political game but were capable, to a certain degree, of promoting their own interests. This article reveals that the political imperative is not only a matter of political risk but also of political opportunity. The history of Christiani & Nielsen offers a useful case of the political risks and fiscal opportunities faced by multinationals working in dictatorial settings. This article concludes that, in a choice between a forestalling strategy and an absorption strategy, the latter offers a better way of managing such risks and to minimize exposure. This becomes especially clear in a comparison with Swedish companies.