Stefan Rummens

Populism versus Democracy

This article provides a comparative conceptual analysis of the logic of populism and the logic of (constitutional) democracy. Populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology which advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous body. The logic of this ideology is further developed in reference to the work of Carl Schmitt and is shown to generate all the characteristics typically ascribed to populism. The logic of democracy is analyzed on the basis of the work of Claude Lefort and defined as a regime in which the locus of power remains an empty place. This analysis replaces the widespread model of constitutional democracy as a paradoxical combination of a constitutional and a democratic pillar. This two-pillar model fails to appreciate the internal coherence and some of the main features of the (constitutional) democratic logic. Thereby, the two-pillar approach gives rise to an understanding of populism as continuous with the democratic promise of constitutional democracy. In contrast, our analysis explains populism as the closure of the empty place of democracy. This highlights the antagonistic discontinuity between the logic of populism and the logic of democracy.

Democratic Legitimacy in the Bund or ‘Federation of States’: The Cases of Belgium and the EU

Carl Schmitt developed the concept of the ‘federation of states’ (Bund) in order to characterise intermediate constitutional systems which are integrated beyond the level of a confederation (Staatenbund) without, however, acquiring the level of integration of an actual federal state (Bundesstaat). In this paper we analyse the constitutional specificity of the ‘federation of states’ and present three normative principles for assessing the democratic legitimacy of the decision‐making procedures within such a federation. We argue that both the European Union and Belgium can be analysed as instances of such a federation of states and show how this characterisation improves our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of both polities and the constitutional and democratic challenges they are facing.

Democratic Legitimacy in theBundor ‘Federation of States’: the Cases of Belgium and the EU: Democratic Legitimacy in theBund

Carl Schmitt developed the concept of the ‘federation of states’ (Bund) in order to characterise intermediate constitutional systems which are integrated beyond the level of a confederation (Staatenbund) without, however, acquiring the level of integration of an actual federal state (Bundesstaat). In this paper we analyse the constitutional specificity of the ‘federation of states’ and present three normative principles for assessing the democratic legitimacy of the decision‐making procedures within such a federation. We argue that both the European Union and Belgium can be analysed as instances of such a federation of states and show how this characterisation improves our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of both polities and the constitutional and democratic challenges they are facing.

Democratic legitimacy in the Bund or 'federation of states': the cases of Belgium and the European Union

Carl Schmitt developed the concept of the ‘federation of states’ (Bund) in order to characterise intermediate constitutional systems which are integrated beyond the level of a confederation (Staatenbund) without, however, acquiring the level of integration of an actual federal state (Bundesstaat). In this paper we analyse the constitutional specificity of the ‘federation of states’ and present three normative principles for assessing the democratic legitimacy of the decision‐making procedures within such a federation. We argue that both the European Union and Belgium can be analysed as instances of such a federation of states and show how this characterisation improves our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of both polities and the constitutional and democratic challenges they are facing.